RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before:
Christopher Yan
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:
23-011571/AABS
Case Name:
Kathleen Janes v. TTC Insurance Company Limited
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant:
Sean Brown, Counsel
Jean-Claude Rioux, Counsel
Laura Bassett, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Justin Lim, Counsel
Stephen Sargent, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On April 4, 2025, the respondent requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision released March 14, 2025 (the “decision”).
2The decision followed a videoconference hearing to determine a preliminary issue. In the decision, I found that the incident of August 20, 2023, where a TTC bus drove over a raised manhole cover, constituted a “collision” with “any other object” for the purposes of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 (“Insurance Act”). As a result, I ordered that s. 268(1.1) does not apply to disentitle the applicant from statutory accident benefits.
3In my decision, I found that the raised manhole cover constituted “any other object” because the roadwork had transformed it from an integrated part of the roadway into a distinct, tangible, and temporarily elevated feature. I also found that the incident was a “collision” because the excessive speed of the bus transformed what would have been an intended traversal into a forceful and disruptive impact, satisfying the ordinary meaning of the term.
4The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
5The respondent relies on Rule 18.2(b), alleging that I erred in law and fact in my interpretation of s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.
6The applicant opposes the respondent’s request for reconsideration.
RESULT
7The respondent’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
9The respondent submits that I made several errors of law and fact, which can be summarized as follows:
a. I failed to properly consider the legislative intent, purpose, and context of s. 268(1.1);
b. I failed to consider or properly apply relevant caselaw;
c. I improperly relied on irrelevant tort law considerations;
d. My interpretation creates absurd and uncertain results; and
e. My decision relied on evidentiary gaps.
10I find the respondent has not established that any of these grounds meet the standard for granting a reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(b). The arguments raised are largely attempts to re-litigate positions that were not successful at first instance.
Legislative Intent and Statutory Context
11The respondent submits that I failed to properly assess the legislative intent of the Bill 173 amendments, which were to create a “bright line” that divert public transit passengers to the tort system in the absence of a collision.
12I find this submission unpersuasive. My analysis in the decision was grounded in the modern principle of statutory interpretation, as set out in cases including Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 which requires the words of a statute to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme and purpose of the Act. The respondent’s arguments were addressed during the initial hearing, and the decision explicitly engages with the legislative framework. In the section titled “Legislative Intent and the Statutory Framework,” I directly considered the respondent’s position. My interpretation was not that the legislative intent was irrelevant, but that the respondent’s view of that intent was overly broad. I concluded that the intent to divert claimants to the tort stream is triggered only after it has been determined that the specific statutory requirements for a collision have not been met.
13At paragraph 36 of the decision, I stated:
I accept that section 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act is designed to limit statutory accident benefits to specific incidents involving a collision with another vehicle or object. However, that purpose does not support the respondent’s interpretation of “collide” or “any other object.” The statutory scheme redirects claimants to the tort system only after concluding that no collision has occurred.
[emphasis in original]
14I found that expanding the rights of civil actions in tort does not illustrate a legislative intent to narrow the definition of “collision” or “any other object.” The history of Bill 173 does not support a blanket exclusion of all roadway-integrated objects; rather, it distinguishes between incidents that involve a collision and those that do not. I accepted this distinction in the decision.
15While my reasons did not walk through each Bill 173 amendment in detail, they engaged with the “bright‑line” argument the respondent advances. My reasons need only be adequate, not encyclopedic. The respondent has not shown that this analysis constitutes an error, nor has it demonstrated that a fuller recital of the legislative history would likely have changed the outcome.
Failure to Consider or Apply Relevant Case Law
16The respondent submits that I erred in my application of London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Sowards, 1923 CanLII 2 (SCC) (“Sowards”) and, more significantly, I erred by failing to consider Cusido v. TTC Insurance Company Limited, 2015 ONFSCDRS 176 (“Cusido”).
17I find the respondent has not shown how my assessment of the case law constitutes an error of law or fact. The decision explicitly considered and distinguished Sowards at paragraphs 17 and 18. I found that the incident in Sowards focused on an overturning and contact with the roadbed itself. The respondent’s argument that Sowards stands for the proposition that contact with any roadway feature is not a collision was unconvincing, particularly where the respondent accepted that the Supreme Court’s findings made no mention that the initial contact with the culvert was the source of its findings.
18My decision also specifically addressed the distinction between a permanent roadway feature and a distinct object at paragraph 15, where I found the raised manhole cover to be a “distinct iron structure” and an “independent feature” that could be temporarily elevated due to roadwork and “installed or removed independently.” This separates it from inseparable features of the roadway, like a rut in the road.
19Regarding the failure to cite Cusido, the respondent has not established that this omission constitutes a reversible error pursuant to Rule 18.2(b). To succeed, the respondent must show not only that an error was made, but that the error was such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result. The respondent has failed to explain how a discussion of Cusido would have met this test.
20The respondent’s argument overstates the relevance of Cusido to the issues before me. The incident in Cusido involved a passenger injured by contact with a pole inside the bus following a sudden brake. The legal issue was whether “any other object” could refer to an object internal to the vehicle. The arbitrator’s analysis was textual, concluding that the object must be external. The legislative history of Bill 173 was noted merely as context for the legal consequences of that finding (the trade-off between accident benefits and tort rights), not to inform the primary interpretation of “collision” or “any other object” in the context of an external impact.
21The issue before me was entirely different. A decision-maker is not required to reference every case cited, particularly when it is distinguishable on its facts and legal reasoning. Furthermore, decisions from the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) are not binding on this Tribunal. The respondent has not demonstrated how this distinguishable, non-binding decision would have likely altered my interpretation of “collision” or “any other object” in the circumstances of this case.
Reliance on Tort Law Considerations
22The respondent’s central ground for reconsideration is that my finding of a “collision” was an error of law. However, the respondent has not met its onus to establish that my consideration of the factual circumstances of the impact, including its speed and force, constituted such an error. The respondent’s submission is that I improperly engaged in a tort-based analysis of negligence by referencing speed and the presence of caution signage, but it has not directed me to any binding authority that prohibits a decision-maker from assessing the physical properties of an impact to determine if it meets the ordinary meaning of a “collision.”
23The respondent’s arguments mischaracterize my reasoning. The speed, force, and circumstances of an event are fundamental factual elements in determining whether it meets the ordinary meaning of a “collision.” My analysis did not determine fault or negligence; it characterized the physical nature of the impact based on the evidence. As I explained at paragraph 28 of the decision: “…I find that this excessive speed transformed what would have been an intended interaction with the road feature into a forceful, disruptive contact, consistent with the ordinary meaning of a collision…”.
24It is not a legal “transformation” based on fault, but a physical one based on velocity and force. An interaction’s character is defined by its properties. For example, using an analogy the applicant raised at the hearing, a person gently placing a hand on a window constitutes “contact”; a person punching the same window at high speed constitutes a “collision”. The object and the actor are the same; the speed and force are what change the physical nature of the event. The same common-sense logic applied here. The excessive speed of the bus was what made the interaction with the raised manhole cover (what I have found to constitute “any other object”) a forceful, jarring impact, a collision, rather than a simple, incidental traversal.
25My reference to the signage provided further objective context to this analysis. The respondent claims the signs prove the interaction was intended. On the contrary, the signs established the parameters for an intended, cautious traversal, warning of an abnormal road condition. By travelling at 57 km/h, the bus operated outside the scope of that intended interaction. The signs and the speed, taken together, demonstrate that this was not a routine event, but a forceful, high-speed impact consistent with the ordinary meaning of a “collision”.
26Further, there is no inconsistency, as the respondent alleges, in my findings regarding the lack of bus damage and the forceful nature of the impact. I found that a collision is defined by the character of the impact, not by its outcome in terms of property damage. A vehicle can be involved in a forceful collision without sustaining visible damage. The force of the impact on the vehicle and its occupants is the relevant factor. The evidence, including the fact the applicant was ejected from her seat, supports the finding of a forceful impact, regardless of the subsequent repair bill.
27Ultimately, the respondent has not identified a legal error. It has restated its disagreement with my factual characterization of the event and the weight I assigned to the evidence of speed and force.
Absurd or Uncertain Results
28The respondent argues that my decision creates impermissible uncertainty and will lead to absurd results, suggesting that every minor interaction with a speed bump, sewer grate, streetcar track, or railway crossing could now be litigated as a “collision”.
29This argument is unpersuasive, as my reasoning was predicated on the opposite conclusion, i.e., not all impacts with the roadway are collisions. I did not establish a new, universal threshold. Rather, I found that a common-sense interpretation of the term “collision” requires that a distinction be drawn between a significant, forceful impact and a minor, everyday road event. My conclusion was that, whatever the precise boundary of that threshold may be, the circumstances of this specific case crossed it. This is reflected in my analysis at paragraph 36 of the decision, where I explained the necessary distinction:
...in my view, there must be a degree of consequence or disruption to the vehicle’s motion, something beyond a de minimis impact, to meet the statutory requirement of the word “collide”. This threshold ensures that only non-negligible contacts with distinct objects are captured by section 268(1.1), rather than every minor or inconsequential encounter with the roadway.
[emphasis added]
30Furthermore, the respondent’s argument about creating legal uncertainty is misplaced. As both parties acknowledged at the hearing, there was no binding case law directly addressing these specific facts. In such a novel situation, I am required to interpret and apply the statute to the evidence before me.
31The respondent has not shown how my finding that the impact in this case was more than de minimis and constituted a “collision” creates a new, uncertain legal standard. My analysis applied existing principles of statutory interpretation to a specific and unique set of facts. This fact-specific adjudication, where none previously existed, does not generate additional uncertainty; it resolves the dispute before me as required.
Evidentiary gaps and onus
32The respondent submits that there was no measurement of the manhole’s height and no expert evidence.
33This was acknowledged at paragraph 9 of my decision, where I explained that I was not presented with such evidence. However, I found I was required to decide the matter on the facts that were presented.
34More importantly, this submission ignores the manner in which the parties chose to conduct the hearing. At the outset, I canvassed the issue of the burden of proof. As noted in paragraph 8 of the decision, both parties ultimately agreed that, because the issue turned solely on statutory construction based on an agreed record, a traditional onus analysis was not determinative. The absence of specific height evidence does not vitiate the result when the parties themselves framed the matter as an exercise of statutory interpretation.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
35The respondent has not met its onus to show that I committed an error of law or fact such that I would likely have reached a different result, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
36The respondent’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Christopher Yan
Adjudicator
Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: August 27, 2025