Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17408/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Sharon Pratt

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Sharon Pratt, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference:

August 15, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Sharon Pratt (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on July 22, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Joshua Pratt (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant lives in a Warkworth, in a rural part of Northumberland County. She is 77 years old, retired, and lives with her son, who was the driver at the time of the impoundment. Her husband is deceased and her daughter lives in New Brunswick.

14There is no transit or reasonable taxi service in Warkworth. The appellant submits that to get groceries or to attend medical appointments, she must travel to either Campbellford (over 15 km away) or to Cobourg (over 40 km away). The appellant testified, further, that there is no regular ride-share service for Warkworth seniors to get to Campbellford or Cobourg.

15The impounded vehicle is a 2017 Dodge Ram pickup truck. The appellant owns a second vehicle, a 2018 Hyundai sedan. The appellant testified that the Hyundai is not in driving condition. She testified that her mechanic said it is losing its oil because of a cracked engine block or faulty rings, and he advised her that it was not safe to drive.

16The appellant’s son, the driver, does not own a vehicle. The appellant testified that she lives independently, and that her closest friend no longer drives because of Alzheimer’s disease.

17The appellant testified that to get groceries and essentials, she can phone in an order to a store in Campbellford and a friend can pick them up. For prescriptions, there is a pharmacy in Warkworth that delivers them to her door.

18The appellant testified that her main concern is getting to and from medical appointments during the impoundment period. She identified the following future medical appointments:

i. August 25, 2025: Respiratory clinic in Cobourg

ii. September 9, 2025: Family physician in Cobourg

iii. September 18, 2025: Diabetic clinic in Campbellford

19The appellant submitted that it is difficult to rely on friends to transport her to medical appointments because of the distance, and the need for them to wait until the appointment is concluded. The appellant testified that she could reschedule some appointments if necessary. She did not provide evidence that the impoundment had caused her to miss a medical appointment since the day of the impoundment. The appellant testified that her son’s friend might be able to give her a ride to her appointment at the respiratory clinic on August 25, 2025.

20The respondent submitted that the vehicle was impounded because the driver’s licence of the driver was suspended on July 28, 2024, for an impaired driving conviction; the licence was suspended until March 4, 2026. The respondent submitted that, because it was a Criminal Code of Canada conviction, the police acted appropriately in impounding the vehicle for the 45-day period required under 55.1 the Act.

21The respondent submitted that the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle for taking care of essentials, including relying on friends to pick up groceries. Regarding medical appointments, the respondent submitted that the end of the impound period is September 5, 2025, therefore only one medical appointment, that of August 25, 2025, would possibly be affected. The respondent argued that, while inconvenient, the appellant appeared to have the ability to obtain a ride for that appointment.

22The respondent argued that, while the impoundment might be an inconvenience to the appellant, it does not meet the Regulation’s threshold of exceptional hardship, because the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle for essential travel during the impoundment period. The respondent argued, further, that under s. 10(2) of the Regulation the Tribunal shall not consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to the person normally transported by the vehicle.

23I find that the appellant’s Hyundai sedan is not an alternative to the impounded vehicle, because it is not in working condition. However, I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, including getting deliveries and rides from friends, and doing without a vehicle for non-essential travel during the impound period. I find that the impoundment results in an inconvenience to the persons normally transported by the vehicle. Section 10(2)(a) of the Regulation precludes me, specifically, from considering inconvenience to any person in determining whether there is exceptional hardship.

24Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

25I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

26The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.