Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17464/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Taylor A Powles

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Taylor A Powles, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

HEARD by Teleconference August 19, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Taylor A Powles (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Wednesday, July 30, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Avery McDavid (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1), and the vehicle was not equipped with an ignition interlock device. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to ss. 50.2(3)(b.1) and 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

5The appellant selected two grounds of appeal in her Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) dated August 6, 2025: that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship. The respondent testified that the vehicle was impounded because the driver, Avery McDavid, was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device, not because he was driving with a suspended licence.

6On the basis of this information, I also considered the appellant’s appeal on the ground whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1) and this was added as an issue in dispute.

ANALYSIS

7For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the interlock condition

8I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the interlock condition.

9In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

10Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

11The appellant submitted that she did her due diligence in determining that the driver’s licence was not under suspension. However, the parties agree that the driver’s licence was valid at the time of the impoundment. Indeed, the vehicle was impounded not because the driver’s licence was under suspension, but that it was subject to an ignition interlock requirement and the vehicle was not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

12The respondent presented evidence which establishes that the driver’s licence was subject to an ignition interlock condition, which was present since August 1, 2019.

13The appellant submitted that the driver was not aware and he did not inform her or any of the individuals whose vehicles he borrowed that there was an interlock condition on his driver’s licence. The appellant testified that she has known the driver since August 2023 and they are in a relationship. In the time she has known him, he purchased and insured his own car and drove her vehicle as well as vehicles belonging to his parents on multiple occasions. The appellant testified that the driver had a prior conviction for driving with more than 80 mgs alcohol in blood from almost seven years ago; however, he completed the required driver reintegration program, paid the associated fines, and was able to renew his driver’s licence. The appellant relies on two declarations submitted by the driver and both his parents, dated August 12, 2025 as well as proof of insurance and vehicle/plate registration for the driver’s own car in support of her testimony.

14I find it reasonable for the appellant to believe that the driver held a valid driver’s licence because she had witnessed him driving various vehicles, including those of his parents, and saw his renewed driver’s licence. Based on the evidence before me, namely the Extended Driver Record Search and the Driver Status by Date records, I conclude that at the time of the incident, the driver did hold a valid driver’s licence, albeit with a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

15The appellant acknowledges that she was aware that the driver recently renewed his driver’s licence and looked at the photo of his new licence card but did not notice the “I” beside restrictions/conditions on the licence card nor understood that the Ministry of Transportation could impose such a condition. She submits that the driver himself was not notified that there was a condition on his driver’s licence. The appellant relies on the evidence referenced above and Armstrong v Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 72390 in which the Tribunal ordered the Registrar to release the impounded vehicle in that case. The appellant argues that the circumstances in both cases are similar and should result in the same outcome.

16The respondent submits that the appellant did not look at the driver’s licence of the driver to check if there are any conditions, did not call the Ministry of Transportation/Service Ontario to check, and relied on other individuals and entities such as the driver’s parents, a vehicle dealer, and his insurance company to tell her there is an interlock condition on his licence. The respondent further submits that the Ministry of Transportation Driver Improvement Office sent a letter dated February 3, 2020 to the driver advising him that he “may be eligible to have the ignition interlock condition removed from your driver’s licence as soon as July 31, 2020” if he provides specific information. This letter clearly states that the interlock condition will remain on the licence and he “must only drive vehicles that are equipped with an approved ignition interlock device or be subject to penalties under the Act” if the information is not provided. Finally, the respondent argues that the Temporary Driver’s Licence issued to the driver during renewals would also clearly state that there is an “I” condition and would define this condition for his awareness.

17I find the evidence presented by the respondent to be persuasive, and do not find it reasonable to believe that the driver was not aware of the interlock condition on his licence.

18I am not persuaded by the declaration from the driver and find it carefully worded to avoid direct mention of whether he was in fact aware of the interlock condition. From my view, the driver is deflecting responsibility to others for not making “a single inquiry or regard to the restriction on my license” without accountability for his actions (or lack thereof) and how they contributed to impoundment of the appellant’s car.

19I am also not persuaded by the declaration submitted by the driver’s parents, because their awareness of the interlock condition is not central to the ground I am considering, namely whether the appellant herself exercised due diligence in confirming that the driver’s licence did not include an interlock condition.

20The appellant relies on the Tribunal’s decision in Armstrong v Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 72390 in which the Tribunal ordered that the Registrar release an impounded vehicle. Although the adjudicator found declarations submitted by family members persuasive and ordered the release of the vehicle, I find that the current circumstances are different. In Armstrong the driver was driving with a suspended licence, not with a valid licence subject to an interlock condition. Second, each case must be decided on its own merits. The adjudicator in Armstrong was persuaded by the evidence presented in that case; however, that case’s outcome does not mean I must similarly accept the present evidence without careful review. I am not bound by the findings of another Tribunal adjudicator and apply the legal test to the evidence presented in this specific case instead.

21I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that she took all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances. The appellant testified that she was aware of her partner’s prior conviction of driving with more than 80 mgs alcohol in blood. She also testified that the driver had a car accident last year and that she was routinely driving him to work since January 2025 because his own car was uninsured. On the day of the impoundment, the appellant was unavailable, and the driver used her car. I find it more likely than not that the appellant was aware that there was a reason why the driver should not use her car and am not persuaded that she was not aware of the interlock condition on his licence.

22I find that the appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

23Since the appellant has not established that she satisfies this ground of appeal, I must now consider whether the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

24I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

25The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

26If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

27If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

28The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

29The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

30I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

31The appellant testified that she uses the impounded car to drive herself and her partner to work, run household errands, and attend medical appointments. She stated that the impoundment is causing emotional distress and led her to re-schedule and postpone doctor’s appointments until a time when she can borrow a car. The appellant also argues that taxis, ride shares, and renting a car would cause severe financial hardship and although Sudbury has a public transit system, she does not feel safe taking the bus. The appellant confirmed that she is able to walk to a local pharmacy and borrow a car from her mom occasionally while her car is impounded.

32The respondent submits that the appellant lives in Sudbury, Ontario and has access to public transportation to mitigate the temporary loss of her car. She is also able to borrow a car from her mom and asks for assistance in obtaining groceries. To date, she has been able to take vacation and personal days to work around the one day per week in-office requirement for her job. The respondent requests that the impoundment be confirmed.

33I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded car. The appellant has family support, including borrowing her mom’s car, and public transit is available in her city. While not as convenient as a personal vehicle, these options are reasonable and will provide an alternate source of transportation for the period of the impoundment.

34I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

35Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

36I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

37The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: August 27, 2025

__________________________

Dagmara Szczudlo

Adjudicator