Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17440/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Nathan St. Denis

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Nathan St. Denis, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by Teleconference August 19, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Nathan St. Denis (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his motorcycle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motorcycle was impounded on Tuesday, July 29, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was riding the motorcycle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment for the motorcycle was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(b) of the Act, whether the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the motorcycle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The driver’s licence (Reference No) of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was then under suspension

6The appellant submitted that he never had a driver’s licence and did not know that a licence that was never issued could be suspended. The respondent testified that although the appellant did not write a driver’s licence test and did not formally have a driver’s licence, the Ministry of Transportation’s procedure led it to create a reference number as a result of the appellant’s criminal conviction of impaired driving on March 18, 2010, so that the Ministry could record that the appellant’s driving privileges were suspended as a result of that conviction. The suspension was supposed to expire on April 27, 2011, but it persisted past this date because the appellant failed to complete provincial remedial program required to remove the suspension. The respondent stated that if the appellant decides to write a driver’s licence test in the future, the reference number will be converted to a driver’s licence number.

7On the basis of this information, I also considered the appellant’s appeal on the ground that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and this was added as an issue in dispute.

8For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that at the time the motorcycle was detained in order to be impounded, the appellant’s driver’s licence was then under suspension.

9The appellant testified that he was not aware that he needed a driver’s licence to operate the electric motorcycle nor that the motorcycle had to be plated or insured in order to be operated on a highway. He characterized the motorcycle he was riding, a Talaria Sting, as an e-bike and stated that the pedals were temporarily removed for repairs because the bearings were worn out and were stiff to pedal.

10The respondent submitted that according to the manufacturer’s web site, the Talaria Sting is an electric motorcycle and as such must be plated, registered, insured and operated by a rider with a valid driver’s licence on streets and highways. The respondent further submitted that the reason for the traffic stop was that the officer did not see a licence plate on the motorcycle operated by the appellant. A review of the https://talariacanada.com website accessed on August 19, 2025 confirms that the manufacturer refers to the Talaria Sting as a motorcycle and states that “all motorcycles sold by Talaria or its dealers are for off-road use. These vehicles may not comply with certain national, federal, provincial and/or local laws or regulations.”

11Given the nature of the item that was impounded and the parties’ disagreement about what it is under the Act, I must determine whether the Talaria Sting is in fact a “motor vehicle” as defined in the Act and whether it is impoundable. The Act states that a “motor vehicle includes an automobile, a motorcycle, a motor assisted bicycle unless otherwise indicated in this Act, and any other vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power but does not include a power-assisted bicycle.” The Act also defines a “motor assisted bicycle” as a bicycle “that is fitted with pedals that are operable at all times to propel the bicycle”. Since the Talaria Sting was not fitted with pedals at the time of detainment, I find that it does not meet the definition of a “motor assisted bicycle” in the Act.

12I continue my analysis with a determination whether the Talaria Sting is a “power assisted bicycle.” Among other things, the Act defines a “power assisted bicycle” as “a pedal-driven bicycle of conventional exposed fork-and-frame bicycle design and appearance that does not resemble a motor scooter or motorcycle, and that is fitted at all times with pedals that are always operable to propel the bicycle.” Based on these criteria and the fact that the Talaria Sting was not equipped with pedals at the time of detainment, I conclude that the Talaria Sting is also not a “power assisted bicycle” as defined by the Act.

13The Act defines a “motorcycle” as “a self-propelled vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the driver and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, and includes a motor scooter, but does not include a motor assisted bicycle.” Since I found that the Talaria Sting is not a motor assisted bicycle nor a power assisted bicycle as defined by the Act, I conclude that it meets the definition of a “motorcycle” which in turn falls within the definition of a “motor vehicle,” particularly since it was propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power. The Talaria Sting was impoundable as per the Act.

14I am persuaded by the respondent’s evidence, namely the Extended Driver Record Search and the Driver Status by Date records, that although the appellant was never licenced, the reference number issued to him in 2010 was suspended on the date of the impoundment. I am also persuaded that the appellant required a valid driver’s licence to operate a motorcycle/motor vehicle on streets and highways.

15I find that the appellant has not established that his driver’s licence reference number at the time his motorcycle was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

16I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

17The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

18If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

19If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

20The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

21The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

22I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

23The appellant submits that the impoundment will result in exceptional financial hardship and testified that he uses the Talaria Sting to get around, get groceries, visit family and exercise on local trails. He stated that he may walk 2-3 blocks to get groceries, and although public transit is available in London, Ontario, he is not familiar with the bus routes and needs assistance with technology/internet as he lives with a disability. The appellant’s family lives in Woodstock and Ingersoll and he is unable to visit them while his motorcycle is impounded, particularly since his family members also don’t drive. He also testified that he is receiving disability support and cannot afford to access taxis or ride-shares. He had to cancel a dental appointment because he did not have transportation to attend the appointment.

24The respondent submits that the appellant lives in London, Ontario and has access to public transportation to mitigate the temporary loss of his motorcycle. Although taking taxis or Uber is expensive, it is an option that is available and to date the impact of the impoundment is limited to the need to reschedule one appointment.

25I considered the testimony of both parties and find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative to the impounded motorcycle. Public transit is available and, with some assistance, is a reasonable option for the appellant for the duration of the impoundment.

26Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

27I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motorcycle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

28The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.