RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Jan Dymond, Vice Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16631/MVIA
Case Name: Millennium Car and Truck Rentals Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Heard in Writing
For the Appellant: Eric Sabbah, Paralegal
For the Respondent: Patrick Moore, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On May 21, 2025, the appellant, Millennium Car and Truck Rentals Inc. (“Millennium”), requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated January 29, 2025 (“decision”).
2In the decision, I found that the appellant was barred under s.50.2(4) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”) from appealing the impoundment of the subject motor vehicle on the grounds of exceptional hardship, under s.50.2(3)(b), because of two previous impoundments of a Millennium vehicle. I therefore did not consider the appeal on the grounds of exceptional hardship, and as there was no other appeal ground advanced, I confirmed the impoundment of the subject motor vehicle.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The appellant is relying on Rule 18.2(b) and Rule 18.2(c) to support this reconsideration request. Specifically, the appellant submits the following:
a) The Tribunal made a material error of fact by attributing two prior impoundments to Millennium;
b) New evidence has been discovered confirming that Millennium was not the owner of the subject motor vehicle at the time of the impoundment;
c) The appellant acted diligently upon discovering new evidence, and the delay is not prejudicial to the respondent;
d) The impoundment of the vehicle exceeds that statutory maximum applicable of 45 days, resulting in significant financial hardship; and
e) The cost of retrieving the vehicle now equals or exceeds its value, which is catastrophic for the appellant’s small business and may amount to an infringement of its rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s.7 and s.15).
5The Registrar acknowledges that the Tribunal incorrectly stated that the appellant was the owner of the vehicles involved in the two previous impoundments, but they oppose the appellant’s request for reconsideration.
6The appellant requests the following relief:
a) That the Tribunal reconsider and set aside the January 29, 2025 decision;
b) That the Tribunal issue a declaration confirming that Millennium had no prior suspensions at the time of the incident;
c) That the Tribunal order the immediate release of the impounded vehicle;
d) That the Tribunal order that storage costs be limited to the 45-day statutory maximum; and
e) That the Tribunal update its records to reflect these findings.
RESULT
7The appellant’s request for reconsideration is granted. Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the Tribunal decision dated January 29, 2025 is cancelled, and the matter is ordered for a rehearing.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(b) – The Tribunal made an error of fact by attributing two prior vehicle impoundments to Millennium
9I find the appellant has established that the Tribunal made an error of fact by attributing two prior impoundments to Millennium. I am further satisfied that the appellant has shown that the final result of the decision would likely have been different had this error not occurred.
10Section 50.2(4) of the Act states that s.50.2(3)(d), i.e., the ground of exceptional hardship, does not apply if there was a previous impoundment under s.55.1 with respect to any motor vehicles then owned by the same owner. The appellant submits that I erred in finding that it owned the 2023 and 2024 impounded vehicles, and that I would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. The appellant relies on the Notices to Registrar listing the owner at the time of the impoundments as Cooperators General Insurance Company (“Cooperators”). This is the same evidence submitted by the Registrar at the hearing in support of their position that s.50.2(3)(d) was not available to the appellant because it was the owner of two vehicles previously impounded.
11At the time of the hearing, the Registrar submitted documentary evidence, in the form of a Notice to Registrar, establishing that the subject vehicle was to be impounded for 45 days and listing Cooperators as the owner. The Registrar also submitted evidence listing Cooperators as the owner on the RIN summary for the subject motor vehicle, along with RIN summaries establishing that Cooperators was the owner of two vehicles previously impounded vehicles, specifically a 2012 Dodge PRC impounded on May 16, 2023, and a 2008 Acura TYS impounded on March 30, 2024. The Registrar testified that, because of these impoundments, the impoundment period for the vehicle involved in the January 6, 2025 was extended to 180 days and submitted that, pursuant to s.50.2(4) of the Act, the ground of exceptional hardship under s.50.2(3)(d) should not be permitted.
12The Registrar testified that it is a common business practice for an insurance company to be listed as the owner for vehicles that are, in fact, owned and operated by a vehicle leasing company. The Registrar submitted that Millennium was the actual owner of the vehicle impounded on January 6, 2025, as well as the vehicles impounded in 2023 and 2024.
13The Registrar’s position with respect to the appellant’s ownership of the vehicles impounded in 2023 and 2024 appears to have changed since the time of the hearing, such that they now agree with the appellant’s submission that Millennium was not the owner of those impounded vehicles. In their reconsideration brief, the Registrar concedes that the Tribunal incorrectly stated that the appellant was the owner of two previously impounded vehicles; however, they submit that the error is not so significant that the Tribunal would have reached a different result if the error had not been made.
14In light of the Registrar’s revised position, I find that my decision was made based on evidence submitted in error which has now being rectified by the Registrar and that, as a result, an error occurred in the decision.
15Having found that an error occurred in the decision under Rule 18.2(b), I now must consider whether I would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. I find that there would have been.
16In the original decision, I declined to hear the appellant’s ground of exceptional hardship because I found that it was statute-barred by s. 50.2(4) of the Act from relying on that ground of appeal. That ground was the only one advanced by the appellant at the hearing.
17I am not persuaded by the Registrar’s submissions that the error is not so significant that I would not have resulted in a different decision has it not been made.
18I find that, had the error not occurred, I likely would have reached a different result. Specifically, I would have proceeded to hear the appellant’s appeal on the ground of exceptional hardship, pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act and applicable regulations.
Rule 18.4 – Cancelling the Decision
19Since the appellant has established a ground for reconsideration under Rule 18.2, I will now turn to the authority permitted to me under Rule 18.4. Upon reconsidering a decision under Rule 18.4, the Tribunal may:
a. Dismiss the request, or
b. After providing responding parties an opportunity to make submissions,
i. Confirm, vary, or cancel the decision or order; or
ii. Order a rehearing on all or part of the matter.
20Having found that I made an error of fact that resulted in barring the appellant from appealing on the ground of exceptional hardship, I find the appropriate relief available is to cancel the decision and order a rehearing of the matter.
21I find that the appellant’s request for relief that I issue a declaration confirming that Millennium had no prior impoundments at the time of the subject vehicle’s impoundment is outside my knowledge. By canceling the original decision, that finding has been vacated and that issue shall be left to the adjudicator at the rehearing to determine, if it arises again then. I also decline to grant the appellant’s request that I order the release of the impounded vehicle because I find it inappropriate to do so at this stage: the Tribunal can order the release of the vehicle only if an appellant establishes at a hearing that they satisfy one of the grounds of the appeal under s.50.2(3) of the Act, and no hearing on the merits of the appellant’s ground of appeal of exceptional hardship has been conducted. I also decline to grant the appellant’s request that I order the storage costs to be reduced to 45 days; rather, as I find that ordering a rehearing is the most appropriate remedy at this stage, it will be open to the parties to make fulsome arguments about the amount of the impoundment fees under ss. 50.2(5) and 50.2(7) of the Act. With respect to the appellant’s request that the Tribunal update its records to reflect these findings, this decision serves to update the Tribunal record according to the findings that I have made here.
22I find that the appellant has met its onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Tribunal made an error in fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made, because the decision was made based on the evidence and testimony of the Registrar. I find that the appellant has established this ground for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b).
23Having granted the appellant’s request for reconsideration on the ground that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made, I need not address the other grounds for reconsideration submitted by the appellant.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
24The appellant’s request for reconsideration is granted.
25The decision, dated January 29, 2025, is cancelled, pursuant to Rule 18.4(b)(i).
26Pursuant to Rule 18.4(b)(ii), the Tribunal shall schedule a rehearing to be held no later than Tuesday, September 16, 2025.
Jan Dymond
Vice-Chair
Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: August 26, 2025