Jamie-Lee Smith v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 84264

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17462/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under s. 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Jamie-Lee Smith

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Emily Morton

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Jamie-Lee Smith, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

Heard by teleconference: August 18, 2025

BACKGROUND

1On August 4, 2025, the appellant’s vehicle was impounded for 45 days pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“respondent”) sent the appellant a Notice of Impoundment and Release dated August 4, 2025, as the appellant was listed in the Registrar’s records as the owner of the vehicle. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant’s brother, whose license was under suspension pursuant to an order made under the Criminal Code was driving the vehicle.

2By a Notice of Appeal dated August 6, 2025, the appellant appeals to this Tribunal from the impoundment of the vehicle pursuant to s. 50.2 of the Act. The issue to be determined on appeal as follows:

i. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3) of the Act.

RESULT

3For the reasons set out below, the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

4The appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act for the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release an impounded vehicle pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

5I am satisfied the appellant has met the burden of proving that the impoundment will cause “exceptional hardship” as that term is defined in Ontario Regulation 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

6The Regulation prescribes the criteria the Tribunal must consider when determining whether an appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. The Tribunal must first determine whether there is no available alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

7Only if the appellant demonstrates that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available to her, may I consider the other factors and criteria in the Regulation that define the exceptional hardship test, for example, financial loss or the health and safety of persons who may rely on the impounded vehicle. Importantly, the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

The appellant has no alternatives to the impounded vehicle

8The appellant is the single mother of four children, aged 17, 16, 13 and six years. One of her children is described as having special needs and another child has experienced significant medical needs over the past year. Neither of the appellant’s teenaged children drive and all are dependent on her for transportation and the necessaries of life. The appellant lives in the small community of Carrying Place, Ontario. She works full time at a site that is about a 45-minute drive from home. She testified that she is in a managerial role and expected to attend important meetings and events in-person. The appellant gave evidence that prior to the impoundment, she relied on her vehicle to get to and from work, to attend to errands for her family, such as obtaining groceries and prescription medications and to attend medical appointments for her child with special medical needs.

9With respect to attending work since the impoundment, the appellant testified that since the August 4, 2025, impoundment, she has been able to work remotely. Her evidence is that she has not informed her employer of the impoundment specifically but has told them her vehicle is not a reliable option for now. The appellant does not know whether her employer will accommodate her for the remainer of the 45-day period of the impoundment and she testified there are significant meetings coming up at work that she feels she will be required to attend in person. The appellant testified that she is concerned that the failure to attend meetings and work more generally for four further weeks will negatively impact her employment and may form a basis for dismissal. In addition, the appellant testified that she has not asked a co-worker to drive her to or from work some days of the week for the remainder of the impoundment period, as all co-workers live such a distance a way this is not a feasible option.

10In terms of groceries and appointments, the appellant’s sister has assisted by driving her twice, each time on a weekend, since the impoundment to obtain groceries. The appellant stated in her evidence that her sister also has demands on her time and cannot assist with transportation more than occasionally. That being said, one of the appellant’s children has had a medical condition that required attention, including hospital visits, over the past year. The appellant gave evidence that this child’s medical condition has stabilized since the end of June, though there are further medical appointments to attend. The appellant has had to reschedule one appointment since the impoundment. The appellant has not arranged transportation to that appointment and is only hopeful that her sister can take the time to drive the appellant and her doctor to the physician’s office, which is about 35 minutes away.

11The appellant clarified in her evidence that she has not had to seek emergency or urgent medical care for her child in the very recent past, though she is always concerned about the side effects of her child’s relatively new medication. The appellant confirmed she is aware she can use 9-1-1 emergency services and agreed she can contact TeleHealth Ontario in urgent circumstances.

12The appellant also gave evidence that her two older children live with health challenges of their own. Her eldest child is described in the appellant’s evidence as developmentally delayed and her 16-year-old child is described as exhibiting symptoms of an anxiety disorder that have been worsening. The appellant’s evidence is that this prevents each of her two older children from accessing alternative modes of transportation themselves to participate in activities. The appellant gave evidence that since August 4, 2025, she has had to cancel significant social or milestone activities for her children as a result of the impoundment of the vehicle.

13With respect to alternate modes of transportation, the appellant gave evidence public transportation is not available in her area. When pressed in cross-examination, the appellant agreed she had not looked into whether public transit from the nearby municipality of Belleville will service her residence in Carrying Place. She testified she has never seen or heard of public transit near her residence. She testified that even if public transit were available, she did not think it would assist with getting her to and from work in a timely manner, nor would it assist in getting her child to appointments with her physician.

14The appellant gave evidence that family supports other than her sister is limited to non-existent. Her brother is the suspended driver who drove her vehicle at the time of impoundment, and though he is remorseful for his conduct, has no funds to contribute to assist the appellant with renting a car. The appellant’s sister has significant time commitments of her own and can help out only very occasionally. The appellant’s two teenaged children do not drive. The appellant testified that her household budget is very strict, and she has no funds to rent a car, which she priced at approximately $500 a week, or to take a taxi or ridesharing service to appointments, which she testified cost $60 even for a 20 or 30 minute trip.

15With this context in mind, I find the appellant does not have alternatives to the impounded vehicle. I found the appellant to be credible and straightforward in her evidence. The appellant gave evidence she is required to attend in-person meetings at work in the coming week. While her employer has permitted her to work remotely in the very short term, she is concerned that failure to attend in-person meetings will put her employment in jeopardy. Her work site is a 45 minute drive on the highway from her residence. The appellant does not have co-workers who can assist her with the commute, according to her evidence. The appellant is a single mother to four children who depend on her income.

16The appellant further testified that given the distances involved in her travel to and from work and to her child’s medical appointments, public transportation is not a viable option. Her evidence is that even if she could discern how to use Belleville’s public transit to do errands closer to home for her family of five, this would cause a strain on her time that is not viable given the needs of her children and her full-time work commitments.

17The appellant testified that her sister is only able to help her very occasionally, and on weekends. This alternative to the impounded vehicle, being only available on weekends, is not a viable alternative to attend work full-time or to attend further medical appointments for her child, should they arise during the remaining period of the impoundment.

18Finally, I accept the appellant’s evidence that she is not able to afford the alternatives of renting a vehicle or using taxi or ride sharing services. The applicant has looked into the actual costs of these alternatives, and gave evidence about how much each would cost, and testified that she cannot afford either option given her household budget.

19For these reasons, I am satisfied that appellant has demonstrated that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss. I find the appellant has demonstrated she cannot do without any motor vehicle during the impound period because of the distance of her workplace from her home and the fact she cannot work remotely for the impound period without imperiling her employment. I find that the appellant has inquired into and considered every other reasonable option, including vehicle rental, public transit, reliance on others or use of a taxi or ride sharing service. The appellant gave evidence as to why each of these options is not a reasonable alternative given her circumstances.

Impoundment poses a threat to health and safety

20Since the impoundment, I find the appellant lacks reliable alternatives to prevent a risk to the health and safety of her children during the impound period. Though the appellant acknowledged that she has access to emergency services and Telehealth Ontario, as noted she missed an appointment at the outset of the impoundment period that relates to one child’s serious medical condition. Though her child is being treated with medication, the appointment, which the appellant has re-scheduled for a day within the impound period, is to address what she testified are worsening side-effects of the medication. The physician’s office is in another town about 30 minutes away by car, and I accept the appellant’s evidence that taxi, ride sharing, vehicle rental or public transportation are prohibitively expensive or time consuming to provide a reasonable alternative to attending the appointment. I accept her evidence that her sister is not able to provide her with transportation apart from the weekends. I find the lack of a reasonable alternative to attend physician appointments for this child poses a health and safety risk to the child.

21In addition, I accept the appellant’s evidence that one of her other children has a developmental disability and another of her children displays symptoms of an anxiety disorder that are worsening. These children all depend on the appellant’s use of her vehicle to have access to activities. The appellant testified that she has had to cancel significant activities for her children in the period since the impoundment. I accept the appellant’s evidence that, apart from very occasional assistance from her sister on weekend days, she has no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle to provide transportation for her children. I accept the appellant’s evidence that three out of her four children currently live with physical or mental health challenges. The combination of these circumstances, I find, poses a threat to the health and safety of the appellant’s children for the duration of the impound period.

22For these reasons I find the appellant has met the requirements in ss. 10(1) and 10(4) of the Regulation. She has established on a balance of probabilities that exceptional hardship under s. 55.1 of the Act results from the impoundment as it poses a threat to the health or safety of her children, who are ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, and there is no reasonable alternative, as defined in s. 10(4) of the Regulation.

CONCLUSION

23I find the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3) of the Act.

ORDER

24The Tribunal orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.