Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17351/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act"), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to subsection 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

C. A.

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dr. David To

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

C. A., Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Ian Sookram, Representative

HEARD: August 8, 2025

OVERVIEW

1C. A. (the "appellant") appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles ("Registrar") to suspend his Class G driver's licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act") after the Registrar received a report from a treating physician that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his ability to drive safely.

2Under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act, the Registrar may suspend or cancel a driver's licence for any sufficient reason. Paragraph 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the "Regulation") states that a holder of a driver's licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3At the onset of the hearing, the Registrar clarified that there was only one medical condition currently in dispute for this appeal, namely a mental health condition.

4The Registrar asserts that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

5The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He denies he suffers from a mental health condition and denies that this condition would significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

6Pursuant to s. 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

ISSUE

7The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a mental health condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

RESULT

8Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a Class G motor vehicle safely.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE - Appellant's Motion for a Confidentiality Order

9At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant brought an oral motion seeking a confidentiality order from the Tribunal to prohibit the publication of any information that could identify him.

10The appellant submits that there is stigma associated with having mental health challenges, which he denies that he has. He reasons that he would lose potential work opportunities from being associated with mental health challenges.

11The Registrar took no position on this issue.

12There were no members of the public present at the hearing. The appellant did not request an order limiting public access to the hearing.

13The Tribunal reserved its decision on the confidentiality motion to allow the hearing to proceed, indicating that the ruling would be included in the written decision. The following are my reasons.

14The test established by the Supreme Court of Canada for making a confidentiality order is explained in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 ("Sherman Estate"). The Court held that a person seeking to limit the open court presumption must establish that:

i. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

ii. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and

iii. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

15In Sherman Estate, the Supreme Court held that "protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity that arises when information revealing core aspects of their private lives is disseminated through open court proceedings is an important public interest for the purposes of the test." (para. 73). However, as a general rule, the sensibilities of the individuals involved are not a sufficient basis for departing from access to tribunal records. Intrusions on privacy that are inherent to the adjudicative process will not, in the ordinary course, override the open court principle. The fact that openness is embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will not generally on their own warrant interference with tribunal openness: Sherman Estate at para. 63.

16In this appeal, after explaining the criteria in Sherman Estate to the parties and providing an opportunity for submissions, the appellant explained that he is very worried that he will be stigmatized as being associated with mental health challenges, especially in his line of work. I agree with the appellant that mental health conditions continue to be associated with stigma. In Sherman Estate, the Supreme Court wrote that courts have demonstrated a willingness to recognize the sensitivity of information related to stigmatized medical conditions (para. 77).

17As such, protecting the appellant from the threat to their dignity is an important public interest. A confidentiality order is necessary in this appeal based on the particular facts, as there are no other reasonable alternative measures. A confidentiality order can be made that is proportional to the negative effects of intruding on the Open Court Principle.

18For these reasons, I find the appellant has established the criteria required in seeking to limit the open court presumption based on the test in the Supreme Court's decision in Sherman Estate. I find this is necessary in this case because of the specific details surrounding psychosis and depression that were included in this decision to provide a clear rationale for the decision, and because of the consequences detailed by the appellant related to disclosure.

19Accordingly, the Tribunal grants the appellant's motion for a confidentiality order, by providing anonymization of the decision. To intrude as minimally as possible on the Open Court Principle, the Tribunal's decision will refer to the appellant by his initials only. However, a publication ban is not granted, as this would overly intrude on the Open Court Principle.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from a mental health condition?

20The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition.

21The Registrar's position is supported by medical reports completed by two physicians.

22The appellant's psychiatrist, Dr. Carolyn Whitty, completed a Medical Condition Report dated June 12, 2025, noting the appellant had "likely substance induced psychosis".

23The appellant's family physician, Dr. Bridget Miller, wrote in their Mental Health Assessment report dated August 7, 2025, that the appellant's diagnoses include major depressive disorder and anxiety, which are improving with ongoing symptoms. However, Dr. Miller did not note any symptoms of psychosis in that report.

24The appellant denies that he suffers from a mental health condition but acknowledges that he has been going through difficult personal circumstances over the past several years. The appellant denies ever having any symptoms of psychosis.

25I give greater weight to Dr. Miller's assessment that the appellant does have a mental health condition than to the appellant's testimony. As a physician, Dr. Miller provides an objective medical assessment on the appellant's health over a longitudinal period. Dr. Miller has been the appellant's family physician for approximately 9 years according to the appellant's testimony.

26I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition, specifically major depressive disorder and anxiety. However, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant does not suffer from substance induced psychosis. This is because I give greater weight to Dr. Miller's assessment that the appellant has no psychosis based on Dr. Miller's longstanding physician-patient relationship with the appellant.

Is the appellant's mental health condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

27I find that the Registrar has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant's medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a Class G motor vehicle safely.

28The Registrar argues that the appellant's mental health condition interferes with the appellant's ability to drive safely.

29The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [February 2021] (the "CCMTA Standards"). According to the CCMTA Standards, depressive disorders may cause cognitive symptoms – such as poor concentration, memory, and reaction time – that can impair driving ability.

30Paragraph 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. While the Tribunal may consider these standards, neither the Registrar nor the Tribunal is bound by them.

31CCMTA Standard 14.6.1 outlines criteria for determining licence eligibility for individuals with psychiatric disorders (including mental health disorders). These include stability of the condition, sufficient insight to stop driving if the condition becomes acute, unimpaired functional abilities, and support from a treating physician to return to driving.

32There are two mental health conditions, which are likely separate, that are at issue in this appeal: psychosis and depression/anxiety.

33The appellant argues that he has never experienced psychosis. He explained that he felt ill with vomiting and diarrhea one day after consuming a few sips of an off tasting can of beer, and others who tried the same drink also became sick. He states his vision was slightly blurry after consuming this small amount of beer, but never had any vision issues apart from this incident. He also testified that his hearing was temporarily impaired after a nearby transformer blew up but has not had any hearing difficulties since. He explained that after telling his psychiatrist Dr. Whitty about these symptoms, she had completed the Medical Condition Report stating the appellant had "likely substance induced psychosis". He testified that he has been seeing Dr. Whitty regularly over the past five years for pain management but stated that Dr. Whitty had not previously expressed significant concerns about his mental health.

34The appellant states that he has been consuming cannabis daily under the guidance of a medical cannabis clinic, as cannabis helps with his pain and sleep. He testified he does not smoke cannabis for 4 to 5 hours prior to driving as he understands that would not be safe. He denied any paranoid thoughts, hallucinations, or delusions when consuming cannabis.

35As a licensed physician in Ontario, and as authorized by s.16 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, I draw on generally recognized information within my specialized knowledge to take notice that cannabis use can induce psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations or delusions, although these are rare symptoms. Although I understand that individuals who have psychotic symptoms generally lack the insight into those symptoms, based on the evidence available, and in particular his family physician's opinion, it is unlikely that the appellant has psychosis that would significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

36Although not bound by the CCMTA Standards, the Tribunal may consider them when making its decision. These Standards are developed through a rigorous process based on the best available evidence, focusing on functional driving ability rather than solely on medical diagnoses.

37In this particular case, I do not find it helpful to strictly follow the criteria in CCMTA Standard 14.6.1 when assessing the appellant's mental health condition of depression and anxiety because the symptoms noted – particularly depression, anxiety, panic, restlessness and extreme worry – would not significantly interfere with the appellant's ability to drive safely. As a physician, I understand that other symptoms (which Dr. Miller does not list) such as command hallucinations, delusions and suicidal ideation would be a high risk for driving safety.

38I primarily rely on Dr. Miller's Mental Health Assessment report. The criteria for mental health stability in Standard 14.6.1 is not explicitly met; rather it is noted to be "improving with ongoing symptoms". Dr. Miller diagnoses the appellant with depression and anxiety but does not express any concerns regarding the appellant's driving safety. Specifically, Dr. Miller notes that the appellant does not have poor insight into his medical condition, does not lack understanding of his illness and the impacts on his ability to drive, and does not have ongoing symptoms that may impair his ability to drive.

39Despite the diagnosis of depression, the appellant testified that he has no suicidal ideation, and Dr. Miller also noted that the appellant has not been hospitalized two or more times in the last 12 months.

40In his testimony, the appellant demonstrated appropriate insight and judgment regarding his condition – an important consideration for drivers. He recognizes not to use cannabis in the hours before driving as it could impair his driving ability. He also testified that he does not drive when he is in pain or feels unwell. He states he typically follows up with his family physician once or twice each month to help maintain his health. On these points, I accept the appellant's testimony, and there was no evidence to the contrary submitted by the Registrar.

41Accordingly, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant's mental health condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a Class G vehicle safely.

CONCLUSION

42I find that the Registrar has not met the burden of proof of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a Class G motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

43For the reasons set out above, pursuant to s. 50(2) of the Act, I set aside the Registrar's decision to suspend the appellant's driver's licence.

Released: August 21, 2025

__________________________

Dr. David To

Adjudicator