Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17399/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Samantha E. Pereira

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Samantha Pereira, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Ian Sookram, Representative

HEARD by Teleconference:

Friday, August 1, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Samantha Pereira, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on July 17, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Joseph Miller (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that she is currently waiting to begin a series of significant daily health treatments, five days per week for up to three weeks, which could begin as early as August 11, 2025. She hopes that the treatments will be at Credit Valley Hospital, which is approximately 5 kms from home, but they could occur at Queensway Health Centre (Sherway Dr.) which is 15 km away. It is yet unclear which location she will attend. She testified that her four-year-old daughter cannot attend her appointments so she must arrange for her to attend daycare during those times, which is located in Oakville, approximately 15 kms from their home. There are daycare centres closer to home, which are affiliated with the daycare centre where she works, but she cannot depend on them being available.

14The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, she has had two medical appointments and was able to attend both with the help of her brother who drove in from Waterloo to do the driving. She testified that, besides her brother, there are no other relatives nearby with vehicles to help with driving.

15The appellant testified that the only other person living at her residence is the driver, who is her partner and the daughter’s father. She testified that he is self-employed in a landscaping business and that his hours are irregular and not dependable. He is also living with a mental health condition and cannot be depended on to care for their daughter while she is attending radiation appointments.

16The appellant testified that she is the main income-earner in the household with a gross income of approximately $63,000.00 per year. She is the manager of the daycare centre in Oakville that her daughter attends. Since the impoundment, she has taken one-week off using vacation days and attended her work on the other days with the help of friends and co-workers to drive to/from the daycare centre.

17The appellant testified that public transit service is available from her home, but she is reluctant to use it to attend her medical appointments.

18The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, they have been able to walk to get supplies and pharmaceuticals or arrange to have them delivered. She testified that they have been using Uber services as well, but they are finding it expensive.

19The appellant testified that she has looked into a rental car, but the cost is beyond their means, and she is looking into financial or transportation support that may be available to support patients living with a similar health condition to her own, in her community.

20I find that the appellant has not established that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

21As difficult, inconvenient, and costly as her transportation options may be, I find that she has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle including transit, Uber, friends, family and co-workers’ vehicles, and the family is able to walk or get delivery for household needs.

22Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

23For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion(s)

24I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

25The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.