Citation: Ayub vs. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2025 ONLAT 23-002858/AABS

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 23-002858/AABS

In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.

Between:

Zain Ayub

Applicant

And

Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rebecca Hines

APPEARANCES:

For the Applicant:

Muhammad Aftab Alam, Counsel

For the Respondent:

Amanda Lennox, Counsel

HEARD:

By way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1Zain Ayub, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on May 10, 2019, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.

2The applicant was involved in a serious accident, where he was a passenger in a vehicle which lost control and hit a cement pole, which fell onto the vehicle killing the driver. Both parties agree that the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment due to a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”). He has also been diagnosed with Somatic Symptom Disorder, with predominant pain, and Adjustment Disorder, with mixed anxiety with depressed mood. He also sustained a fractured pelvis and soft tissue injuries to his cervical and lumbar spine.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

3I have been asked to decide the following preliminary issue:

1. Is the applicant excluded from applying for a non-earner benefit (“NEB”) or the housekeeping and home maintenance benefit because he knew or ought reasonably to have known that, at the time of the accident, the driver was operating the automobile without the owner’s consent pursuant to s. 31(1) (c) of the Schedule?

ISSUES

4I have been asked to decide the following substantive issues:

1. Is the applicant entitled to a non-earner benefit (“NEB”) in the amount of $185.00 per week from May 10, 2019 to May 10, 2021?

2. Is the applicant entitled to $5,549.06 for physiotherapy services, proposed by Pearson Medical Assessment Centre in a plan dated July 27, 2022?

3. Is the applicant entitled to housekeeping and home maintenance benefits in the amount of $100 per week from May 10, 2019, to date and ongoing?

4. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?

5. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

RESULT

5After considering the parties submissions and all of the evidence, I find:

1. The applicant is not excluded from applying for a NEB and housekeeping and home maintenance benefit pursuant to s. 31(1) (c) of the Schedule.

2. The applicant is entitled to payment of NEBs in the amount of $185.00 per week from June 7, 2019, to October 1, 2020, plus interest pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.

3. The applicant is not entitled to payment of a housekeeping and home maintenance benefit in the amount of $100.00 per week from May 19, 2019, to date.

4. The applicant is not entitled to $5,549.06 for physiotherapy services, proposed by Pearson Medical Assessment Centre in a plan dated July 27, 2022.

5. The applicant is not entitled to an award pursuant to s. 10 of Regulation 664.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

6Neither parties’ submissions complied with the maximum 15 page limit provided for in the Tribunal’s case conference report and order (“order”). The applicant’s submissions were 15 pages, however, the margins were significantly widened and did not include proper spaces in between sentences or paragraphs. The respondent’s submissions were 16 pages in length. Despite the fact that the applicant did not comply with the Tribunal’s order, he requested that the respondent’s submissions be excluded for non-compliance.

7I find that neither party complied with the Tribunal’s order regarding the maximum page limit for written submissions despite the fact that the applicant withdrew numerous issues in dispute. I find that both parties disregarded the Tribunal’s order and interfered with the Tribunal’s ability to conduct an efficient hearing. Because both parties failed to comply with the Tribunal’s order, I decline to exclude either parties’ submissions. However, I caution the parties that if they fail to abide by the Tribunal’s orders in the future, they run the risk of the hearing adjudicator not considering their submissions.

ANALYSIS

Is the applicant excluded from applying for a NEB and housekeeping and home maintenance benefit pursuant to s. 31(1)(c) of the Schedule?

8The applicant is not excluded from applying for a NEB or housekeeping and home maintenance benefit.

9Section 31(1)(c) of the Schedule states that an insurer is not required to pay a NEB (and other specified benefits) in respect of an occupant of an automobile at the time of the accident who knew or ought reasonably to have known that the driver was operating the automobile without the owner’s consent. The onus is on the respondent to prove that the exclusion applies.

10The respondent argues that the applicant is excluded from receiving a NEB because he knew or ought to have known that the driver of the vehicle on the date the accident occurred had taken the vehicle without the owner’s consent. It relies on the applicant’s testimony at an Examination Under Oath (“EUO”) when he was asked if the driver had the owner’s consent to take the vehicle and he confirmed that there was no permission. The respondent relies on the Financial Services Commission of Ontario’s decision in Batoor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (“Batoor”), 2016 ONFSCDRS 68 in support of its position that the applicant ought to have known that the driver did not have consent to drive the vehicle. In that decision, the arbitrator highlights that to determine what an insured ought to have known, I should assess what an ordinary rational person, of the age, education, and background of the applicant, in the circumstances encountered that day ought to have known. This test measures the reasonable likelihood of knowledge or lack thereof.

11The applicant submits that the exclusion does not apply because the respondent’s questions at the EUO led him to guess that the deceased driver did not have consent to drive the vehicle. When asked if the driver had a licence he answered “I don’t know. I don’t think he did,” which implies that he was unsure and was speculating. Further, he stated that “there was no permission” to drive the car. However, he then stated that the driver had driven the car before when his uncle was teaching him how to drive. The applicant asserts that he was suffering from a TBI at the time of the EUO and was unsure about what he was answering, and his condition had declined by the date of the EUO on October 1, 2020. The applicant also submits that there is no evidence from the deceased driver about whether he had consent to drive the vehicle or from the driver’s parents (the owners of the vehicle) that no consent was given. The applicant maintains that he had no reason to suspect that the deceased driver did not have consent to drive the vehicle on the date in question. The applicant relies on this Tribunal’s decision in N.P. v. Economical Insurance Group, 2019 CanLII 94133 (ON LAT) in support of his position that the Tribunal requires proof and evidence of consent not intuition.

12I find that the respondent has not met its onus in proving that the s. 31 exclusion applies for the following reasons.

13First, I find the decision in N.P. to be a useful guide as far assessing whether the applicant knew or ought to have known that the vehicle was being driven without the owner’s consent. The adjudicator highlighted that to make this determination I must decide the following:

(i) Was the driver operating the automobile without the owner’s consent?

(ii) Did the applicant know or ought reasonably to have known that the vehicle was being operated without the owner’s consent?

14In N.P., the adjudicator emphasized that the insured does not have to prove that there was consent; rather, the respondent must prove lack of consent. This decision also stresses that the case law is well established that exclusions must be interpreted narrowly and in such a way, where possible, to allow coverage, not deny it. Any benefit of the doubt is to be given to the insured.

Was the driver operating the automobile without the owner’s consent?

15I find that the respondent has not met its onus in proving that the driver operating the vehicle on the date in question did so without the owner’s consent. I note that other than the applicant’s statement at the EUO that “no permission was given,” the respondent has not relied on any other evidence to support that the driver was operating the automobile without the owner’s consent on the date the accident occurred.

16Although I acknowledge that the respondent was unable to interview the deceased driver, this did not prevent it from interviewing the owner of the vehicle or the other occupant in the vehicle on the date the accident happened. I find that in both decisions relied on by the parties there was evidence from other sources such as the driver, the owner of the vehicle, the adjuster or police interviews which confirmed the facts relied upon in those cases. In this case, the only evidence I have before me is the applicant’s one statement at the EUO that there was no permission. However, I note that the applicant testified that the driver had driven the vehicle before when learning how to drive. In the absence of evidence from the owner of the vehicle that no consent was given, I find that the respondent has not met its onus in proving that the driver was driving the car without the consent of the owner based on the evidence before me.

Did the applicant know or ought reasonably to have known that the vehicle was being operated without the owner’s consent?

17I find that the respondent has failed to prove that the applicant either knew or ought to have known that the driver of the vehicle was operating it without the owner’s consent. I find the questions asked at the EUO provided little context about what the applicant knew on the date the accident occurred. For example, the respondent did not clarify whether the applicant knew that the vehicle was being operated without the owner’s consent prior to getting into the vehicle on that date, or whether he became aware that the driver did not have permission after the fact. As highlighted in Batoor, important to the analysis is what would an ordinary rational person, of the applicant’s age, education, and background, in the circumstances encountered that day [Emphasis Mine] ought to have known.

18I find that I have no evidence before me about what the applicant knew leading up to the circumstances encountered on the day the accident happened. In my view, relying on one statement (without any context) in an EUO which took place over one-year post-accident with an applicant who sustained a TBI is insufficient for me to conclude that the applicant knew or ought to have known that the vehicle was driven by the driver without the owner’s consent. In addition, I find the transcript of the applicant’s testimony at the EUO supports that he was confused or unsure about many of the questions asked by the respondent.

19I also find the respondent is asking that I make assumptions about what the applicant ought to have known because the driver was 16 years old and could not have had a valid licence – therefore the driver could not have had consent to drive the vehicle. When the applicant was asked at the EUO whether the driver had a licence he said, “I don’t know…I don’t think so.” I find this response demonstrates that the applicant was unsure about whether the driver had a licence and does not establish that he knew that there was no consent to drive the vehicle. I find that the respondent did not ask relevant questions such as whether the applicant was aware that there is a graduated licence program in Ontario or whether he knew the driver did not have a licence on the date of the accident before he got in the vehicle.

20I find that applying an exclusion based on this assumption is inconsistent with the case law which supports that exclusions should be interpreted narrowly in favour of coverage and the applicant should be given the benefit of the doubt. As stated above, the applicant also stated that the driver had driven the vehicle before when he was learning to drive which supports that he may have thought that the driver either had a licence or had consent to drive the vehicle. Consequently, I give the applicant’s statement at the EUO little weight.

21For the above-noted reasons, I find that the respondent has not met its onus in proving that the s. 31 exclusion applies. Consequently, I find that the applicant is not excluded from applying for a NEB or a housekeeping and home maintenance benefit.

Is the applicant entitled to a non-earner benefit (“NEB”) in the amount of $185.00 per week from May 10, 2019, to May 10, 2021?

22The applicant is entitled to payment of a NEB from June 7, 2019, to October 1, 2020.

23Section 12(1) of the Schedule provides that an insurer shall pay a NEB to an insured person who sustains an impairment as a result of the accident, if 1) the insured person suffers a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident and,

i. Was enrolled on a full-time basis in elementary, secondary or post-secondary education at the time of the accident, or

ii. Completed his or her education less than one year before the accident and was neither employed nor a self-employed person after completing his or her education and before the accident, in a capacity that reflected his or her education and training.

24Section 12 (3) of the Schedule provides that the insurer is not required to pay a non-earner benefit:

(a) for the first four weeks after the onset of the complete inability to carry on a normal life; and

(b) before the insured person is 18 years of age; and

(c) for more than 104 weeks after the accident.

25Section 3(7)(a) defines a “complete inability to carry on a normal life” as “an impairment that continuously prevents the person from engaging in substantially all of the activities in which the person ordinarily engaged before the accident.” The Court of Appeal set out the guiding principles for NEB entitlement in Heath v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 ONCA 391 (CanLll) (“Heath”), which focuses on a comparison of the applicant’s pre-and post-accident activities.

26The respondent argues that the applicant is not entitled to payment of NEBs from May 10, 2019, to May 9, 2021, because he was not 18 years of age pursuant to s. 12(3)(b) of the Schedule. Further, it is not liable to pay the benefit because the applicant did not turn 18 within 104 weeks. Alternatively, the respondent submits that it is not liable to pay NEBs until June 7, 2019, which is four weeks after the accident as per s. 12(3)(a). Finally, the respondent maintains that the applicant has not proven that he suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of his accident-related impairments.

27The applicant submits that he suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of his accident-related impairments within 104 weeks of the accident. He contends that the seriousness of his impairments and functional limitations are well-grounded in the medical records and reports. He relies on the clinical notes and records (“CNRs”) of his family doctor, hospital records, school records, attendant care assessments and reports of Inderneet Arora, occupational therapist (“OT Arora”), Dr. Getahun, orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Ladha, pediatrician, and Dr. Stevens in support of his position. The applicant submits that, because he met the test for entitlement to NEBs within the 104-week period following the accident, the respondent is required to pay him NEBs for two years after he turned 18 years old.

28I find that neither party properly interpreted the application of s. 12(3)(b) of the Schedule because they both ignored s. 12 (1)2(i) which states that to qualify for payment of a NEB an insured must be enrolled on a full-time basis in elementary, secondary, or post-secondary education at the time of the accident. If I accepted the respondent’s interpretation that an insured has to be 18 years or older to receive payment of a NEB, it would create an absurd result because it would disqualify anyone enrolled in elementary school from ever receiving payment of a NEB. In my view, if the legislature intended for the Schedule to be interpreted in the manner proposed by the respondent it would not have included elementary school students in s. 12(1) 2(i) of the Schedule. I find that s.12(3)(b) of the Schedule does not apply in this case because the applicant was enrolled full-time in secondary school when the accident occurred. However, I do agree with the respondent’s submission that the applicant would not be entitled to a NEB until June 7, 2019, as per s. 12(3)(a) of the Schedule and he is only eligible for the benefit until May 19, 2021, the 104-week mark. I will now focus my attention on whether the applicant meets the complete inability test.

29As set out in Heath the first step in determining whether an individual qualifies for a NEB is to compare their pre- and post-accident activities of daily living. The applicant submits that prior to the accident he was independent in his self-care and housekeeping and home maintenance tasks. He was a Grade 10 student in high school and was a good student. He had an active lifestyle and enjoyed playing basketball, soccer, and hockey. He also enjoyed hanging out with friends playing videogames, attended mosque once a week and had a good relationship with his family.

30Post-accident, the applicant is unable to complete his personal care and housekeeping and home maintenance tasks because of his TBI and physical impairments and functional limitations. Further, because of the TBI sustained in the accident he has impaired memory and cognitive function which has impacted his academic performance at school. In addition, he has only played soccer once post-accident, is socially isolated and plays videogames by himself.

31I find the applicant is entitled to a NEB from June 7, 2019, to October 1, 2020, for the following reasons.

32Following the accident, the applicant was admitted to a rehabilitation program for his TBI until July 1, 2019. He relies on an OCF-3 completed by OT Arora, completed on June 25, 2019, which supports that he has a complete inability to carry on a normal life as a result of his accident-related impairments. I find that during this period of time he had a complete inability to carry on a normal life because he was hospitalized and was precluded from carrying out any of his pre-accident activities of daily living.

33I find the evidence before me supports that the applicant’s academic performance was significantly impacted following the accident. Although I acknowledge that he was not a gifted student prior to the accident and that his grades continued to fluctuate post-accident, he was unable to finish his Grade 10 semester. Furthermore, it took the applicant an extra year to graduate high school despite being placed on an Individual Education Program (“IEP”) and receiving accommodations such as extra time to complete assignments, tutoring supports, and assistive devices.

34I find that the evidence supports that the applicant’s struggles with his academic performance is because of his accident related TBI and the requirement for accommodation was supported by the reports of Dr. Ladha, pediatrician, dated February 26, 2020, and Dr. Stevens, psychologist, dated September 7, 2020.

35Further, the report of OT Arora dated June 19, 2019, established that the applicant’s impairments resulted in functional limitations in his ability to carry out his personal care and housekeeping and home maintenance tasks due to his accident-related impairments. The applicant submits that OT Arora’s recommendations resulted in him receiving 24-7 support from a personal support worker to assist him in carrying out his daily activities. I find this fact was undisputed by the respondent. Further, Dr. Getahun’s report dated October 30, 2019, also confirmed that the applicant’s physical impairments would interfere with his ability to participate in his daily activities such as housekeeping and home maintenance tasks and recreational activities such as playing soccer.

36I also find the psychological treatment records support that the applicant’s TBI resulted in a psychological impairment which negatively impacted his ability to communicate with friends and family and that these relationships became strained during the relevant time period. Moreover, there is no evidence before me that the applicant had these issues pre-accident. Although the applicant continued to attend mosque once a week post-accident, I find this does not support that he was carrying out the bulk of his pre-accident activities in any meaningful way.

37I accept the medical evidence tendered by the applicant regarding his accident-related impairments and limitations because the respondent did not submit any medical reports during the relevant time period to refute it. However, I find that as of October 1, 2020, the applicant was functioning at a higher level because at the EUO he testified that he plays soccer once a week, has friends over to play videogames and had resumed some of his housekeeping and home maintenance tasks. I find that the applicant’s testimony at the EUO about his ability to carry out his daily activities conflicted with the functional limitations highlighted in OT Arora’s second report which was completed in the same month. The applicant did not provide any explanation to address these inconsistencies. I find his testimony about his daily activities in October 2020 does not support that he continued to have a complete inability to carry on a normal life as of this date.

38For the above-noted reasons, I find the applicant is entitled to payment of a NEB in the amount of $185.00 per week from June 7, 2019, to October 1, 2020.

Is the applicant entitled to housekeeping and home maintenance benefits in the amount of $100.00 per week from May 10, 2019, to date and ongoing?

39I find the applicant has established entitlement to the housekeeping and home maintenance benefit from May 10, 2019, to October 1, 2020. However, he is not entitled to payment of same because he has not submitted any proof that the benefit has been incurred pursuant to s. s. 3(7)(e) (iii) of the Schedule.

40Section 23 of the Schedule requires an insurer to pay up to $100.00 per week for reasonable and necessary additional expenses incurred by or on behalf of an insured person as a result of an accident for housekeeping and home maintenance services if, as a result of the accident, the insured person sustains a catastrophic impairment that results in a substantial inability to perform the housekeeping and home maintenance services that he or she normally performed before the accident.

41In order for the insured person to receive payment for the housekeeping and home maintenance benefit, there must be evidence that the expense was incurred as per s. 3(7)(e) (iii) of the Schedule. To satisfy this requirement the insured person must have received the service to which the expense relates and paid or promised to pay the expense.

42The applicant contends that prior to the accident he was independent with his housekeeping and home maintenance tasks. He would clean his room, assist with groceries, and help with laundry, lawn care and snow removal. Post-accident he is unable to complete these tasks because of limitations with prolonged sitting, standing, walking, bending, lifting, and climbing stairs. The applicant relies on the above-noted reports authored by OT Arora and Dr. Getahun who recommended that the applicant requires housekeeping assistance.

43The respondent argues that the applicant has not proven entitlement to the benefit because at the EUO he acknowledged that since the accident he no longer does the laundry but tries to help with the dishes and take out the garbage. The respondent maintains that the IE of Dr. Soric demonstrates that the applicant presented with full ROM of the cervical spine with no complaints of pain, and he did not have any signs of ongoing physical impairment. The respondent also submits that the applicant’s accident-related impairments flow from a TBI rather than a physical impairment and he has the physical functional tolerance to complete his housekeeping and home maintenance tasks. The respondent also relies on surveillance evidence where the applicant can be seen walking and helping neighbours move furniture where he bent to lift items. Finally, it submits that the applicant is not entitled to payment of the benefit because he has not proven that the benefit has been incurred pursuant to s. 3 (7) (e) (iii) of the Schedule.

44As already noted above, I find that the applicant was limited in his ability to carry out his housekeeping and home maintenance tasks based on the reports of OT Arora and Dr. Getahun noted above. Further, I assign Dr. Soric’s IE report little weight because it significantly post-dates the start date for the time period of entitlement. However, as highlighted above, I find that as of October 2020, the applicant had resumed some of his housekeeping and home maintenance tasks which was inconsistent with the functional limitations outlined in OT Arora’s second report completed in the same month. For these reasons, I find the applicant has not established ongoing entitlement to the benefit beyond October 2020.

45However, I find that the applicant is not entitled to payment of the benefit between May 10, 2019, to October 1, 2020, because he has not submitted proof that the benefit was incurred pursuant to s. 3(7)(e) (iii) of the Schedule. I have no evidence before me to support that the applicant has received the service to which the expense relates or paid or promised to pay for the expense. Consequently, I find the applicant is not entitled to payment of the housekeeping and home maintenance benefit.

Is the applicant entitled to $5,549.06 for physiotherapy services, proposed by Pearson Medical Assessment Centre in a plan dated July 27, 2022?

46The applicant is not entitled to the OCF-18 in the amount of $5,549.06 proposed by Pearson Medical.

47To receive payment for an OCF-18 under s. 14 and 15 of the Schedule, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that the benefit is reasonable and necessary as a result of the accident. To do so, the applicant should identify the goals of treatment, how the goals would be met to a reasonable degree and that the overall costs of achieving them are reasonable. The case law also supports that treatment is reasonable and necessary if it results in relief of pain which leads to improvement in function.

48The OCF-18 was completed by Dr. Pascual, chiropractor, and proposed 24 sessions of physiotherapy, 24 sessions of chiropractic treatment, 12 sessions of massage therapy and 12 sessions of other therapeutic intervention. The goals of the plan were pain reduction and increase range of motion (“ROM”), in order to return the applicant to his activities of normal living, pre-accident work activities and modified work activities.

49The applicant argues that the OCF-18 is reasonable and necessary because the extensive medical evidence supports same. For example, his family doctor’s CNRs note ongoing pain. Further, he submits that the past treatment received has met the objective of pain relief and that the cost is reasonable because it meets the professional fee guidelines.

50The respondent submits that the applicant has not met his onus in proving that the OCF-18 is reasonable and necessary. It denied the OCF-18 because the applicant had received significant treatment over three years post-accident and that his complaints had not changed despite receiving so much treatment. It provided a comparison of the notes of the treating clinic in support of this position which did not document any improvement. The respondent relies on the aforementioned IE of Dr. Soric, physiatrist who determined that further treatment was not reasonable and necessary.

51I find the applicant’s submissions unclear regarding what medical evidence supports his position that the OCF-18 for physical therapy is reasonable and necessary other than referring to the medical evidence as a whole. I was not directed to the evidence that past treatment achieved its objective of pain relief and improved function or that it resulted in increased ROM. The applicant provided lengthy summaries of the medical evidence without articulating how it supports his position. Further, the CNRs of Scarborough Physiotherapy relied on by the applicant span from July 12, 2019 to September 15, 2019, and do not address whether past treatment relieved the applicant’s pain or led to improvement in his ROM. In contrast, the IE of Dr. Soric supports that there was no evidence of any physical impairment which would require further treatment. I find the applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to refute this opinion.

52For the above-noted reasons, the applicant has not met his onus on a balance of probabilities in proving that the OCF-18 for physiotherapy is reasonable and necessary.

Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?

53Interest applies on the payment of any overdue benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule. I find the applicant is entitled to interest on payment of the NEB between June 7, 2019, and October 1, 2020, because I have determined that the benefit is overdue. The applicant is not entitled to interest on the remaining benefits because I determined that the applicant is not entitled to payment of same.

Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?

54The applicant sought an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664. Under s. 10, the Tribunal may grant an award of up to 50 per cent of the total benefits payable if it finds that an insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed the payment of benefits.

55The applicant submits that he is entitled to an award because the respondent denied his entitlement to the benefits in dispute. I find the respondent’s denial of the benefits in dispute in and of itself does not prove entitlement to an award. For these reasons, I find the applicant has not met his onus in proving that he is entitled to an award.

ORDER

56For the above-noted reasons, I order as follows:

1. The applicant is not excluded from applying for a NEB and housekeeping and home maintenance benefit pursuant to s. 31(1) (c) of the Schedule.

2. The applicant is entitled to payment of NEBs in the amount of $185.00 per week from June 7, 2019, to October 1, 2020, plus interest pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.

3. The applicant is not entitled to payment of a housekeeping and home maintenance benefit in the amount of $100.00 per week from May 19, 2019, to date.

4. The applicant is not entitled to $5,549.06 for physiotherapy services, proposed by Pearson Medical Assessment Centre in a plan dated July 27, 2022.

5. The applicant is not entitled to an award pursuant to s. 10 of Regulation 664.