Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17272/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to subsection 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Robert Yaccato

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

PANEL:

Dr. David To, Member

Emily Morton, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Robert Yaccato, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Melissa Litrenta, Representative

HEARD: July 17, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Robert Yaccato (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend his Class G driver’s licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received a report from a treating physician that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his ability to drive safely.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Paragraph 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely cognitive impairment, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He denies that he suffers from cognitive impairment and denies that this medical condition interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE - Appellant’s Motion for a Confidentiality Order

6At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant brought an oral motion seeking a confidentiality order from the Tribunal to seal access to records in the Tribunal’s file and to prohibit the publication of any information that could identify him.

7The appellant submits that he has a right to privacy of his health information. No other reasons were provided for the confidentiality order.

8The Registrar took no position on this issue.

9There were no members of the public present at the hearing. The appellant did not request an order limiting public access to the hearing.

10The Tribunal reserved its decision on the confidentiality motion to allow the hearing to proceed, indicating that the ruling would be included in the written decision. The following is our reasons.

11Tribunal records are generally open to the public, as per the Open Court Principle and s. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 60 (“TARA”). These include notices of appeal, evidence, submissions, and decisions.

12As public access to adjudicative records is protected by the s. 2(b) Charter of Rights and Freedoms right to free expression, restrictions on access are exceptional. Pursuant to s. 2(2) of TARA, the Tribunal may order that all or part of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if the Tribunal determines that:

i. matters involving public security may be disclosed; or

ii. intimate financial or personal matters or other matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.

13In this appeal, the appellant’s request is based on his desire to maintain privacy over his personal health information.

14We considered the criteria in s. 2(2) of TARA and find that the appellant’s motion for confidentiality does not meet the test.

15First, this appeal does not involve matters of public security.

16Second, the personal matters in this appeal relate to personal health information and are not so intimate and of such a nature that avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public. The appellant’s personal information in this appeal includes limited information about his health and driving record. The appellant’s physician did not provide the appellant’s complete medical chart and history, but only noted concerns about cognitive decline based on in-office testing.

17The test established by the Supreme Court of Canada for making a confidentiality order is explained in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (“Sherman Estate”). The Court held that a person seeking to limit the open court presumption must establish that:

i. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

ii. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and

iii. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

18In Sherman Estate, the Supreme Court held that “protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity that arises when information revealing core aspects of their private lives is disseminated through open court proceedings is an important public interest for the purposes of the test.” (para. 73). However, as a general rule, the sensibilities of the individuals involved is not a sufficient basis for departing from access to tribunal records. Intrusions on privacy that are inherent to the adjudicative process will not, in the ordinary course, override the open court principle. The fact that openness is embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will not generally on their own warrant interference with tribunal openness: Sherman at para. 63.

19In this appeal, after explaining the criteria in Sherman Estate to the parties and providing an opportunity for submissions, there was no evidence brought forward by the appellant to demonstrate that his dignity was at risk. Further, there was no evidence court openness poses a serious risk to any other important public interest.

20For these reasons, we find the appellant has failed to establish the criteria required in seeking to limit the open court presumption based on the test in the Supreme Court’s decision in Sherman Estate.

21Accordingly, the Tribunal denies the appellant’s motion for a confidentiality order.

ISSUE

22The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

23To resolve this, the following questions must be addressed:

i. Does the appellant suffer from cognitive impairment?

ii. If so, is this condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?

RESULT

24After considering all evidence and submissions, we find that the Registrar has met the burden of proof. The appellant suffers from a medical condition likely to significantly impair his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Accordingly, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from cognitive impairment?

25The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely cognitive impairment.

26The Registrar’s position is supported by a May 21, 2025 Medical Condition Report completed by his family physician, Dr. Rachel Goldberg.

27Dr. Goldberg wrote that the appellant has a “cognitive impairment” due to an unknown cause, with “deficit in visuospatial”. Dr. Goldberg explained that there is no current diagnosis of dementia but believes that further assessment for driving safety is warranted.

28The appellant denies having cognitive impairment. He testified that he has no memory or vision issues and was unaware of any concerns from recent brain CT and MRI scans. He also stated that he was not informed of the driving implications of the cognitive tests and did not have his reading glasses during the assessment. He found the test stressful, which he testified impacted his ability to complete the test to the best of his ability and expressed a desire to retake it.

29While the appellant disagrees with a diagnosis of cognitive impairment, there is no medical evidence to dispute the diagnosis. The only medical evidence before the Tribunal is a Medical Condition Report from the appellant’s physician documenting cognitive impairment.

30We give greater weight to Dr. Goldberg’s report than to the appellant’s testimony. As a physician, Dr. Goldberg provides an objective assessment on the appellant’s health. Dr. Goldberg’s description of the cognitive impairment in the Medical Condition Report explained the tests she conducted and the deficits she observed in the appellant’s test results. While we acknowledge the appellant’s concerns about the testing process, they do not supplant the weight we give to the medical evidence.

31We find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from cognitive impairment.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

32We find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

33The Registrar argues that cognitive impairment interferes with the appellant’s ability to drive safely because the appellant’s cognitive functions necessary for driving are impaired, and this would pose a significant risk to road safety.

34The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [February 2021] (the “CCMTA Standards”). Chapter 6 of the CCMTA Standards describes cognitive impairment in general and the concerns that result regarding driving safety. It reports that the significance of cognitive impairment in relation to driving was the subject of a panel of experts in the context of the revision of the Canadian Medical Association medical guide. Following an extensive review of the scientific literature, the study’s main conclusions include that cognitive problems often have a direct effect upon fitness to drive and any indications of possible cognitive compromises of fitness to drive must not be neglected by clinicians. Furthermore, Chapter 6 states that drivers with cognitive impairment are not able to compensate for their functional impairment.

35Paragraph 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but, like the Registrar, is not bound by them.

36CCMTA Standard 6.6.1 recommends that a driver who has been diagnosed with cognitive impairment be considered eligible for a licence if several criteria are met. These include a complete medical assessment indicating that cognitive functions necessary for driving are not impaired, and where required, a functional driving assessment does not affect ability to drive.

37The Registrar relies on Dr. Goldberg’s May 21, 2025 report, which states that the appellant scored 21/30 on the MoCA cognitive assessment with “significant deficits/challenges in visuospatial domain/executive function with Trails and Clock Drawing”.

38The appellant argues that he has no impairment in his driving ability. He testified that he drives well, that he has not heard from others that his driving ability has deteriorated and does not get lost when driving.

39While we have considered the appellant’s testimony, it is not supported by any medical evidence. We weigh this testimony against the only medical evidence available for this appeal, which is Dr. Goldberg’s report, explaining that the appellant suffers from cognitive impairment, and the scientific research described in the CCMTA Guide that cognitive problems often have a direct effect on fitness to drive. The appellant’s significant cognitive deficits in the visuospatial and executive domains, as noted by Dr. Goldberg, would likely significantly interfere with his ability to safely drive.

40Although not bound by the CCMTA Standards, the Tribunal may consider them when making its decision. These Standards are developed through a rigorous process based on the best available evidence, focusing on functional driving ability rather than solely on medical diagnoses. While each appeal must be adjudicated on its own merits, s. 14(2)(a) of the Regulation permits the Tribunal to consider the CCMTA Standards. Though we are not bound by the CCMTA Standards, we find they are relevant here. Our review of the evidence shows that the conditions recommended for licensing outlined in the CCMTA Standards have not been met.

41CCMTA Standard 6.6.1 for cognitive impairment requires that cognitive functions necessary for driving are not impaired. Based on Dr. Goldberg’s cognitive testing of the appellant, it is likely that the appellant has some deficit in executive function and visuospatial processing, which are key cognitive functions necessary for driving.

42Although the appellant offered to do a functional driving assessment, at the time of this hearing this had not been completed.

43For the reasons above, we are satisfied the respondent has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

CONCLUSION

44We find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely cognitive impairment, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

ORDER

45For the reasons set out above, pursuant to s. 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.