RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Greg Witt, Adjudicator
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 23-006747/AABS
Case Name: Wayne Edward v. Aviva General Insurance
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Marina Korshunova, Paralegal
For the Respondent: Branson Wong, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On May 2, 2025, the applicant requested a reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated April 14, 2025 (“decision”).
2In the decision, I found that the applicant was subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 limit of the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”) and not entitled to any of the following:
a. physiotherapy services treatment plan in the amount of $1,873.52;
b. interest; or
c. an award.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a. The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b. The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c. There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant is seeking a request for reconsideration under Rules 18.2(a) and 18.2(b). The applicant claims that the Tribunal violated procedural fairness and erred by finding that he has not satisfied his burden of establishing that the accident caused his carpal tunnel syndrome. The applicant also challenges the Tribunal’s finding about chronic pain.
5The applicant seeks a reconsideration and order finding: the decision is overturned, he is removed from the MIG, and the OCF-18 in dispute is approved. Or, in the alternative, he is seeking a rehearing with a different adjudicator.
6The respondent asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request for reconsideration.
RESULT
7The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(a) – Material breach of procedural fairness
9I find the applicant has not shown that the Tribunal’s decision was procedurally unfair.
10The applicant submits that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by failing to diligently review all the evidence he presented. The applicant provides that the Tribunal heavily relied on the medical examination report of Dr. Moolla, physician, and failed to draw an adverse inference from the fact that the respondent had chosen not to request another assessment. The applicant adds that, when a party remains silent or fails to provide evidence, it should lead the Tribunal to infer that the missing evidence would have been detrimental to its case.
11In paragraphs 10 – 21 of the decision, I review and assess the medical evidence presented by both the applicant and the respondent. At paragraph 18, I indicate that I am persuaded by the consistent medical evidence of Dr. Zahid, Dr. Verma and Dr. Moola that the applicant sustained some injury to his left wrist, but that those injuries were soft tissue sprain and strain injuries.
12The fact that the applicant disagrees with the decision or how the evidence was weighed does not demonstrate that the Tribunal’s handling of the medical evidence amounts to a material breach of procedural fairness.
13I see no breach of procedural fairness in my decision. As a result, I find the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(a).
Rule 18.2(b) – Error of law or fact
14In order for the applicant to establish grounds for reconsideration, he must establish that there was an error of fact or law in the decision, and that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. I disagree with the applicant and find that I did not err in my decision, and, even if there was an error, I do not find that the concerns raised by the applicant would likely have changed the result of my decision.
15The applicant argues that the Tribunal failed to apply the “but for” test, and the failure to apply the test was predicated on the fact that there were no medical records predating the accident that indicated he was having wrist issues.
16While I agree with the applicant that I did not use the words “but for”, I clearly applied the concept. At paragraph 18 of my decision, I found that the applicant had not satisfied his burden of establishing that the accident caused his carpal tunnel syndrome in his wrist. Furthermore, at paragraph 20, I highlight that the applicant did not meet his burden of establishing a casual link between the accident and the carpal tunnel syndrome.
17The applicant submits that I applied the incorrect test with respect to the impact of chronic pain and that it must be the cause of disability. I disagree. It is well-established by the Tribunal that, for chronic pain to take an applicant out of the MIG, there must be an element of functional impairment or disability.
18The applicant submits a list of alleged mistakes of fact, including that the Tribunal did not properly review the medical records of Dr. Verma and Dr. Kember. At paragraph 12 of my decision, I reference Dr. Verma’s medical reports, the applicant suggests that the Tribunal’s use of the word “simple” alongside Dr. Verma’s diagnosis was used to undermine the applicant’s diagnosis. I disagree, it was language used in the respondent’s submission that was reused in the decision.
19At paragraph 13 of my decision, I reference Dr. Kember’s medical reports. The Tribunal did not err in pointing out that Dr. Kember’s report dated December 13, 2022 stated the pain complaints were reported, but the report does not mention whether the pain was as a result of the accident. Once again, the reconsideration process is not a venue to ask for a re-weighing of evidence considered at first instance. More is needed than disagreement alone with the factual findings made by the Tribunal. I disagree with the applicant and find that I did not err in my decision, and, even if there was an error, I do not find that the concerns raised by the applicant would likely have changed the result of my decision.
20The remainder of the applicant’s submissions did not allege mistakes of law or fact, but he rather made allegations of bias. The applicant did not present any arguments to demonstrate how my findings reach the high threshold needed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. He has not presented cogent evidence that substantiates his allegation. Rather, this allegation appears to rest on the applicant’s disagreement with my findings in the decision. I find that disagreement with the decision alone is not sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias in this case.
21I find the applicant has not shown any error of law or fact in my decision. The applicant did not persuade me on a balance of probabilities that the carpel tunnel syndrome was as a result of the accident.
22As a result, I find the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b).
CONCLUSION
23For the reasons noted above, I dismiss the applicant’s request for reconsideration.
Greg Witt Adjudicator Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: August 6, 2025