Tribunals Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17294/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s.55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Ashley Brunelle

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Dagmar Boettcher, Member

Jan Dymond, Vice Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Ashley Brunelle, Self-Represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: by teleconference July 17, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Ashley Brunelle, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”) from the 45-day impoundment of a 2020 Hyundai motor vehicle (the “vehicle”). The appellant’s vehicle was impounded on June 16, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Mathew Henry Thiessen (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6We are not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. Section10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that there is no alternative available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12We are not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant submits that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle and will face exceptional hardship as a result of the impoundment for the following reasons: (1) it limits her ability to find and attend work; (2) it impacts her ability to attend medical appointments in Aylmer and in London; and (3) it impacts her ability to visit her father and take him to his medical appointments and deliver his groceries.

14The appellant testifies that she has been unemployed since November 2024 and that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle for attending job interviews or transporting herself to work, should she find a new position. She is a registered nurse and has worked in nursing homes in the area; however, she currently seeks an administrative position. Since the start of the impoundment, she has not missed any job interviews. The appellant testifies that a friend has driven her to one interview since the impoundment and she does not currently have any other interviews scheduled. She is registered with a placement agency; however, she has not had any assignments offered since the start of the impoundment and can specify a start date after her vehicle is retrieved from the impoundment.

15The appellant testifies that she has missed one appointment with a neurologist and that she may have a ride arranged next week for one of these appointments. The appellant also testifies that she has postponed appointments with her family doctor, who practices nearby, and with her dentist next week.

16The appellant acknowledges that she has access to a grocery store within a 3-minute walk but prefers a store on the edge of town – approximately 15 minutes walking distance. Her mother and a friend have taken her either grocery shopping or dropped groceries at her home during the past month.

17The appellant testifies further that, while she had been taking her father to medical appointments and grocery shopping before the impoundment, her father has a vehicle of his own and has been able to rely on other family members to attend these appointments and help out with other needs. She testifies that she is able to use her father’s vehicle for short trips around Aylmer, but not for longer trips such as travel to London or St. Thomas.

18The respondent submits that, based on the appellant’s testimony, the appellant has access to alternative means of transportation. A friend has driven the appellant to a job interview; there is a possibility that she can borrow her father’s truck for in-town groceries and appointments; her father’s brother lives locally and has assisted with some of her father’s needs; her mother has assisted the appellant with groceries; and a taxi service is available, though costly. The respondent argued that the appellant has been able to attend one neurological appointment and may have transportation for the next. In terms of employment, the respondent submits that no employment has been offered, and a friend recently took the appellant to a job interview. The respondent submits that the fact that the vehicle has been impounded has not stopped the appellant from obtaining and attending an interview. The respondent submits that the appellant has not met the criteria of “exceptional hardship”.

19We find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle for the reasons that follow: a friend has provided transportation to an interview; her mother has delivered groceries and will provide occasional transportation to treatments; her father has not missed any medical appointment and has been able to rely on others, and her father’s truck may be available for in town needs.

20Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, we find therefore that the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. We therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

Conclusion

21We find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

22Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the Tribunal Orders that impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.