Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17378/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Ritu Kaushal

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Ritu Kaushal, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Stephen Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by teleconference: August 1, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Ritu Kaushal (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on July 5, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Justin Raghubeer (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant lives North York, in Toronto Community Housing, with her mother. The appellant testified that she has no siblings, and that her mother is disabled and collecting Ontario Disability Support Program payments. The appellant testified that her mother has mobility challenges, does not own a car and does not drive. She submitted that her mother cannot take public transit, and therefore needs to be taken to medical appointments by car. She submitted that, without the impounded vehicle, her mother risks missing medical appointments.

14The appellant testified that she (the appellant) has been diagnosed with diabetes since she was 13 years old. On the day of the impoundment, she testified that she was near Wasaga Beach with the driver, when her blood sugar level went up alarmingly. She testified that she did not have her insulin and medication with her that day. She did not have cell phone coverage at the time, so she asked the driver to take her to a gas station to make a phone call to ask someone to bring her insulin and medication. When stopped by the police, the appellant’s vehicle (the “vehicle”) was impounded when it was determined that the driver’s licence of the driver had been suspended for Criminal Code of Canada convictions for impaired driving. The appellant testified that another family member brought her insulin and medication to her when she was with the police, and she was able to avoid further diabetes-related complications.

15The appellant testified that she works full-time in the accounts payable department of a property management company. During the impoundment, she testified that she had been able to get to work via rides from co-workers or by taking public transit. She testified that the impoundment had inconvenienced her but had not impeded her ability to commute to and from work.

16The appellant testified that it takes 15 to 30 minutes by transit to get to a grocery store or pharmacy to get essentials, and that it takes longer to walk.

17The appellant testified that she had investigated Toronto Transit Commission (“TTC”) Wheel-Trans service that provides accessible transit options for persons with disabilities, but that it takes considerable time and effort to get set up for the service. She testified that, as of the day of the hearing, she was still waiting for a response from the TTC to get her mother registered for Wheel-Trans service.

18The appellant submitted, into evidence, documents on her mother’s medical appointments as follows:

i. A referral from Dr. Husna Husainy, dated July 5, 2025, for occupational therapy services, labeled “non-urgent”;

ii. A referral from Dr. Husainy, dated March 19, 2025, for respirology diagnostic services, labeled “non-urgent”;

iii. A referral from Dr. Michael Taglione, dated August 4, 2024, for pelvic x-rays, labeled “non-urgent”;

iv. A referral from Dr. Syed Nadeem, dated September 25, 2024, for cardiology diagnostic services, for an appointment on September 25, 2025; and

v. An appointment confirmation with Dr. Buki Ayeni, dated March 19, 2025, for a consultation for plastic and reconstructive surgery, related to her mother’s arthritis, on July 23, 2025.

19The appellant submitted that the vehicle should be released from impoundment primarily for the health and safety of her mother.

20The appellant testified that on the date of the impoundment, her vehicle insurance had expired, and therefore her vehicle was not insured. She testified that she only became aware of the expired insurance when stopped by police on July 5, 2025. She testified that she paid her insurance premiums annually, but she had not paid the renewal because of lack of funds. The appellant submitted into evidence a temporary motor vehicle liability insurance card, indicating that the vehicle insurance premium had since been renewed, with an effective date of August 1, 2025.

21The respondent submitted that the vehicle was impounded because driver’s licence of the driver was suspended on August 8, 2021, and suspended further on April 29, 2024 for impaired driving convictions. The respondent submitted that, because these were Criminal Code convictions, the police acted appropriately in impounding the vehicle for the 45-day period required under 55.1 the Act.

22The respondent submitted that the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle for getting to work and for taking care of essentials, including rides from co-workers and friends, public transit and walking.

23Regarding the health and safety of the appellant’s mother, the respondent submitted that the appointments described in points (i), (ii) and (iii) in paragraph 18 above are identified as “non-urgent” and can be re-scheduled until after the impound period. The respondent submitted, further, that the appointment described in point (iv) is for after the impound period, therefore it is unaffected by the impoundment. Lastly, the respondent submitted that the appointment described in point (v), although scheduled during the impound period, was during a time when the appellant did not have any insurance for her vehicle. Therefore, the respondent submitted, she could not have driven her mother to her appointment legally.

24I find that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle for work and for taking care of daily essentials, including rides, public transit and walking.

25I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of her mother, who is ordinarily transported by the vehicle, since there are alternatives such as re-scheduling of non-urgent medical appointments, as well as making use of rides, taxis or para-transit services. I also find that the appellant did not have a legally insured vehicle during the first 26 days of the impoundment, therefore she would have been required to find alternative forms of transportation for her mother during that time.

26Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, and she has not established that there is a threat to the health and safety of a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation. Therefore, I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

27I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

28The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.