Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17270/CVOR

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a Cancellation and Seizure Order issued pursuant to the Act

Between:

Oral’s Haulage Inc.

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Caley Howard

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Oral Wynter, Representative

For the Respondent:

Patrick Moore, Counsel

Heard by way of written submissions

OVERVIEW

1Oral’s Haulage Inc., the appellant, filed a motion seeking an extension of time to file an appeal from the Cancellation and Seizure Order (the “decision”), issued by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “respondent”).

2The effective date of the decision was February 14, 2025. The appellant filed his Notice of Appeal with the Tribunal on June 17, 2025.

3A Notice of Written Motion Hearing was issued by the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) and sent to the parties on July 17, 2025. I am satisfied that the Notice of Written Motion Hearing was sent to the correct address for the appeallant, according to the contact information in the Tribunal’s records. The accompanying direction indicated that the motion would proceed in writing on July 22, 2025. The appellant was to serve and file its submissions no later than July 14, 2025. The respondent was to serve and file its submissions by July 18, 2025. The appellant had the option of filing reply submissions by July 21, 2025.

4The appellant did not file any submissions beyond those set out in the Notice of Motion. The respondent filed its submissions and evidence on July 16, 2025.

ISSUE

5The issue in dispute is:

i. Whether the applicant has established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time, which would permit it to file its appeal.

RESULT

6I find that the applicant has not established reasonable grounds to support an extension of time. The motion is dismissed. It follows that this appeal is also dismissed.

ANALYSIS

There are no reasonable grounds for an extension of time

7I find that the appellant has not established reasonable grounds to support an extension of the time to file its appeal.

8Pursuant to s. 50(1.0.1) of the Act, an appeal from a Cancellation and Seizure Order must be made to the Tribunal within 30 days after the decision takes effect.

9The respondent’s decision had an effective date of February 14, 2025. The 30-day appeal period therefore concluded on March 17, 2025. The appellant did not file its appeal until June 17, 2025.

10Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, provides that the Tribunal may extend the time limit for appealing the decision if it finds that there are reasonable grounds for granting that relief. The appellant has the onus of proving that there are reasonable grounds for granting an extension of time.

11Pursuant to the Divisional Court decision in Manuel v. Registrar, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.) (“Manuel”), the Tribunal must consider the following factors when assessing whether there are reasonable grounds for an extension of time:

i. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal;

ii. The length of the delay;

iii. Prejudice to the other party; and

iv. The merits of the appeal.

12All four factors must be applied to the specific facts of each case, with no one factor taking priority over the others, in order to determine whether the justice of the case requires that an extension of time be granted. The appellant bears the burden of persuading me that its motion for a time extension should be granted.

Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

13The appellant made no submissions respecting its intention to appeal within the appeal period. I find that the appellant has not established that it had a bona fide intention to appeal the decision within the 30-day time limit.

Length of delay

14The appellant filed its Notice of Appeal 122 days after the effective date of the decision. This is 92 days after the expiration of the appeal period specified in the Act. I find this delay significant, particularly as the appellant has not provided any explanation for the delay.

Prejudice to the other party

15The appellant made no submissions regarding the prejudice to the respondent resulting from its delay in filing the appeal.

16The respondent submits that prejudice against the respondent can be presumed when its efforts to impose discipline on a party within the regulatory scheme are delayed.

17I find that there would be some minor prejudice against the respondent in these circumstances given the lengthy delay, as the respondent benefits from the certainty imposed by the timelines of the regulatory scheme. I find that this minor prejudice to the respondent, while not weighing significantly against the appellant, does not weigh in its favour either.

Merits of the appeal

18On this motion, the appellant is not required to prove its appeal on a balance of probabilities. It is only required to establish that there is some merit to the appeal.

19The appellant’s Notice of Appeal and the attached decision indicate that the appellant’s CVOR was cancelled because: the appellant did not submit certain documents requested by the respondent; and the appellant was dissolved as of February 1, 2025 for non-compliance. The appellant submits that it provided the documents to the respondent as requested and that it received confirmation of receipt from the respondent. The appellant acknowledged that it was dissolved as of February 1, 2025.

20The respondent submits that it is not necessary to consider whether the appeal has any substantive merit as the appellant does not have a right to appeal to the Tribunal. The respondent submits that the appellant was dissolved under s. 212 of the Canada Business Corporations Act as of February 1, 2025 and, as such, is not a legal “person” with a right to appeal under s. 50(1.0.1) of the Act. The respondent relies on the corporate search and the Certificate of Dissolution for the appellant.

21Pursuant to s. 212(4) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, a dissolved corporation ceases to exist on the date shown in the certificate of dissolution.

22I have reviewed the corporate documents and I find that the appellant, a corporation, was dissolved for non-compliance with s. 212 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, effective February 1, 2025. I find that the appellant ceased to exist on February 1, 2025.

23I find that a corporation that has ceased to exist is not a legal “person” with a right to appeal a decision of the respondent under s. 50(1.0.1) of the Act. As a result, I find that the appellant has no reasonable chance of success on appeal.

Conclusion

24Given the significant length of the delay, the lack of evidence that the appellant had an intention to appeal within the appeal period, and the unlikelihood that the appeal will be successful, I find that the appellant has not established reasonable grounds for an extension of time.

ORDER

25The appellant’s motion to extend the time for appealing the decision is dismissed. The appeal is also dismissed.