RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Ulana Pahuta
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-012434/AABS
Case Name: Mohsin Raza v. XL Specialty Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Syed M. Raza, Counsel
For the Respondent: Jason Frost, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On May 9, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated April 23, 2025 (“decision”).
2In this preliminary issue hearing decision, I found that the applicant was statute-barred from proceeding with his application for accident benefits, pursuant to s. 61 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”).
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant seeks reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(a) and (b). He submits that in rendering my decision, I failed to consider all of the relevant facts and that I had erred in law by not considering the case law he had cited in his hearing submissions. Although not expressly stated, I infer that the applicant is requesting that the decision be reconsidered, and that an order be made permitting the applicant to proceed with his accident benefits application.
5The respondent submits that the applicant is attempting to have the Tribunal rehear the dispute on the same evidence, and come to a different result. It argues that the applicant has not established any error of law or fact.
RESULT
6The request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(b) – No error of fact
8The applicant submits that in coming to my decision I failed to consider certain key facts of his case, which the applicant argues had cumulatively established that the NAL policy was not an “other workers’ compensation plan” for the purposes of s. 61(1) of the Schedule.
9The key facts included: (a) that the NAL policy was only a disability policy for fleet accidents and not a workers’ compensation plan; (b) that the policy only covers certain limited benefits; (c) that the maximum aggregate amount of NAL coverage for a motor vehicle accident totals only $30,000 and that NAL had only paid out $4,973.87; and (d) that the NAL policy did not provide any coverage for assessment reports. The applicant argues that I made errors of fact in the decision when I incorrectly stated that the applicant had received $71,889.93 in payouts from NAL and when I found that the NAL policy was a workers’ compensation plan.
10I find the applicant’s submissions are largely a request to re-consider and re-weigh the evidence, which is not grounds for reconsideration. I did consider the applicant’s submissions at the initial hearing that the NAL policy was not a workers’ compensation plan. However, in paragraphs 21 to 24 of the decision, I provided reasons as to why the NAL policy constituted an alternative workers’ compensation plan for the purposes of s. 61(1).
11I do not agree with the applicant that I erred in fact when I stated in the decision that the applicant had received $71,889.93 in benefits from NAL. In his reconsideration submissions the applicant argues that he had only received $4,973.87 in chiropractic treatment, although he concedes that the $71,889.93 total “might” include the amount of his USA hospitalization bill. I find no error of fact in my decision. In its initial hearing submissions, the respondent had provided a detailed summary of benefits paid by NAL, including a breakdown of the $40,000 paid in income replacement benefits, $26,157.47 in out of province medical expenses, approximately $5,000 in chiropractic treatment and additional costs for massage therapy and attendant care. I do not find that it was an error in fact to rely on the respondent’s summary of benefits.
12I further find no error in fact in my description of the NAL policy. Although the applicant disputes that the NAL policy covers assessment reports, the policy clearly stipulates an Assessment Fee Benefit at pg. 16 of the policy. The applicant also submits on reconsideration that the $71,889.93 amount must be factually incorrect, since the NAL policy states that the maximum aggregate amount for a motor vehicle accident is $30,000. However, from my review of the NAL policy, the reference to $30,000 maximum is with respect to Professional Care Treatment Benefits. Rather, the policy states at pg. 14 that the maximum amount payable for all Motor Vehicle Accident Medical Treatment Benefits is $125,000 for an injury resulting from any one accident. Therefore, I do not agree with the applicant that the $71,889.93 amount referenced in paragraph 23 of the decision must be factually incorrect.
13Accordingly, I find that the applicant has not established errors of fact in my decision.
Rule 18.2(b) – No error of law
14The applicant submits that I erred in law in failing to properly consider the caselaw cited by the applicant. In particular, in his reconsideration submissions the applicant refers to the 2011 Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision cited as Decision No. 512/06, 2011 ONWSIAT 2525.
15I find that the applicant has not established an error of law. In its reasons, the Tribunal is not required to refer specifically to every argument or every piece of jurisprudence it considered in arriving at its decision. In coming to my decision, I considered all of the caselaw submitted by the parties. However, I found that the WSIAT decision cited by the applicant was not relevant to the matter at hand. The ONWSIAT decision referenced the 1998 Divisional Court decision Medwid v. Ontario, 1988 CanLII 193 (ON SC). This decision considered the historical context and purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539. I agree with the respondent that the applicant has not explained how this decision supports a finding that the NAL plan is not a workers’ compensation plan.
16The applicant further submits on reconsideration that I erred in not applying the “several LAT decisions” he had cited at first instance. As previously noted, the Tribunal is not required to refer specifically to every argument or jurisprudence in a decision that are raised by the parties. In any event, I find that there was no error in not applying these decisions, as they were neither binding on me nor relevant.
17None of the Tribunal decisions cited by the applicant at first instance considered alternative workers’ compensation plans, but rather, they considered elections under s. 61(2) of the Schedule. In paragraph 26 of the decision, I state that s. 61(2) is not applicable in the present case, since the applicant did not make an election under s. 30 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997. As such, I find that the applicant has not established an error of law in not applying these decisions.
Rule 18.2(a) – No material breach of procedural fairness
18The applicant submits that in the decision I failed to provide sufficient reasons as to why I did not consider his affidavit in support of the authenticity of the employment contract.
19I find that the applicant has not established a basis for reconsideration on this ground. As stated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653 at para 128, administrative decision makers are not expected to respond to every argument or line of possible analysis, or to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however subordinate, leading to its final conclusion.
20In paragraphs 6 to 9 of the decision, I considered the applicant’s arguments relating to the authenticity of the employment agreement, including the arguments contained in his affidavit. In paragraphs 10 to 12 of the decision, I provide my reasons as to why I found that the applicant had not established that the employment agreement should be excluded due to inauthenticity. I find that my decision fell well inside the requirements set out in Vavilov at para 126 with respect to the importance of making a reasonable decision. The fact that the applicant disagrees with the findings in my decision does not mean that I failed to grapple with the key issues.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
21For the reasons above, I find no violation of procedural fairness and no error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
22The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Ulana Pahuta
Adjudicator
Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: July 24, 2025