Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17343/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Diana L. Ross

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Diana L. Ross, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference: July 18, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Diana L. Ross (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, June 30, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Sheyanne M. Ross (“S.R.”) was driving the vehicle while her driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

6I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant lives in the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation, now known as Neyaashinigmiing, on the Bruce Peninsula. Neyaashinigmiing has a population of 700 and a total land base of 6,253 hectares (15,451 acres). The appellant is a single grandmother, raising two children aged 6 and 7 years old, in a two-bedroom house.

14The appellant is estranged from her ex-husband and is no longer in contact with him. She has not been in contact with her elder daughter, the mother of the two children, or with the children’s father, for several years. The appellant’s grandchildren started living with the appellant when they were 3 and 4 years old. The appellant’s younger daughter, S.R., lives in Neyaashinigmiing in a separate house.

15S.R.’s driver’s licence (the “licence”) was suspended on January 11, 2022, following an impaired driving conviction, for a period of two years. The licence was reinstated on January 9, 2024, with a condition of a mandatory ignition interlock device on her vehicle. As of January 9, 2025, S.R. was eligible to have the ignition interlock condition removed with a completed Substance Abuse Assessment Form, completed by a treating physician, specialist or nurse practitioner. As of the day of the impoundment, this form had not been submitted to the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario (“MTO”) Medical Review Section, and the ignition interlock condition remained on the licence. The appellant testified that, shortly after the impoundment, S.R. submitted a completed form to the MTO.

16The appellant works regular in-person office hours, Monday to Friday, as a finance clerk for the Neyaashinigmiing First Nation administration. The children are not in school in the summer. The appellant testified that she takes the children to daycare in Neyaashinigmiing during work hours in the summer.

17The applicant submits that she has no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. She submits that Neyaashinigmiing is remote and sprawling, and that the distances to work and daycare do not make walking a reasonable alternative, especially for young children. She testified that the nearest community to get groceries and essentials is Wiarton, which is a 25-minute drive away. She testified that because Wiarton is small and expensive, she would normally do her shopping in Owen Sound, which is a 45-minute drive away.

18The appellant testified that she has only one active vehicle registered to her name. S.R. has one active vehicle registration, but the appellant testified that S.R.’s vehicle is rusting, missing a muffler, has a broken windshield, and is not road-worthy or safe to drive. For these reasons, the appellant testified that S.R.’s vehicle sits in the driver’s yard and is not insured, and that is why she borrowed the appellant’s vehicle on the day of the impoundment. The appellant testified that she was aware of S.R.’s condition on her licence, but that she thought the condition had expired.

19The appellant testified that there is no transit or taxi service in Neyaashinigmiing. She testified that, during the impoundment, she has been paying a friend who lives on the other side of Neyaashinigmiing to provide rides to and from work and daycare. She testified, also, that she had requested rides from other friends in Neyaashinigmiing to get groceries and essentials in Wiarton and Owen Sound. The appellant testified that friends, on whom she has relied for rides, are leaving Neyaashinigmiing during parts of the impoundment period, and that they will not be available everyday for the duration.

20The appellant testified that she cannot borrow a vehicle from her friends because they do not have one to spare. She testified that, for the weekend after the hearing, she was going to rent a vehicle to care for her and her grandchildren’s needs, and that it would cost her $600. She argues that renting a vehicle is not sustainable, on her income, for the duration of the impoundment period.

21The respondent submits that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle. It submits that the appellant can get to work and to daycare with rides from friends, and that she can rely on friends to get groceries and essentials. It argues that the impoundment is an inconvenience. It argues that driving a vehicle in contravention of the conditions imposed on the licence should have consequences, and that the impoundment of the vehicle should be confirmed.

22I find that the appellant has established that there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. While she can rely on the kindness of friends for a while, I find that, for the duration of the impoundment period, these friends cannot be expected, reasonably, to serve as drivers for the appellant and the children, during weekdays for work and daycare, as well as for any emergencies that might arise.

23For these reasons, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

24I am satisfied that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of persons ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

25The appellant is a single grandmother raising two children aged 6 and 7 years old. The appellant did not submit that the children had experienced any emergencies during the first two weeks of the impoundment period. Nor did she submit that the emergency response services of Neyaashinigmiing were deficient in any way. The appellant testified that she, herself, is a member of the Neyaashinigmiing volunteer fire department. Like many small communities in Ontario, Neyaashinigmiing relies on volunteers to respond to fires and other emergencies. In most cases in Ontario, fire departments are the first responders in medical and other emergencies.

26The appellant appears to me to be a hard-working, diligent grandparent to the children. However, a situation may arise where the children are in an emergency. The appellant made no submissions on any specific threats to the health of the children, nor did she submit any statistical evidence of the potential for any accidents or health crises. However, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, a threat to the health and safety of children is worthy of consideration by the Tribunal, in determining the merits of the appeal of the impoundment.

27I find that for the appellant to rely on the kindness of friends, who may or may not be available in an emergency situation, would put the children at risk. I note that Neyaashinigmiing does not have a hospital or an emergency health services unit. The Neyaashinigmiing volunteer fire department may be proficient at what it does, but it may or may not have persons with paramedical training, and it may not be sufficient in an emergency health situation.

28For these reasons, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, that there is potential threat to the health and safety of the children, and that it is in their interest that the appellant should have access to her vehicle.

Conclusions

29I find that:

i. the appellant has established that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle;

ii. the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of persons ordinarily transported by the vehicle; and,

iii. the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

30The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.