RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Nick Iannazzo, Adjudicator
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 22-009313/AABS
Case Name: Flordeliza Marcelo v. The Personal Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Yoni Silberman, Counsel
For the Respondent: Yann Grand-Clement, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On December 11, 2024, the applicant requested a reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated November 21, 2024 (“decision”).
2Following a written hearing, I issued the decision. I found that the applicant’s injuries did not remove her from the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”). In reaching that decision, I found that the applicant did not have a head injury that removed her from the MIG, nor a concussion, nor chronic pain, nor a pre-existing medical condition that took her out of the MIG. I found that she had a contusion, namely a brain contusion, and this injury fell within the definition of a “minor injury”, pursuant to section 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”).
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant seeks a reconsideration of the decision under Rule 18.2(b). The applicant is requesting that the decision be varied or, in the alternative, that a re-hearing be scheduled.
5The respondent’s position is that the Tribunal did not make an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. Furthermore, the respondent contends the applicant is seeking a “do-over” of the case, which is not the purpose of a reconsideration. The respondent requests that the applicant’s reconsideration request be dismissed.
RESULT
6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(b) – Error of law by classifying a brain contusion as a “minor injury.”
8I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b), based on my interpretation of “contusion” in the decision.
9The applicant submits that I erred in law by finding that the definition of “minor injury” under section 3(1) of the Schedule includes a brain contusion. The applicant submits that the word “contusion”, in the definition of “minor injury” in section 3(1), is limited in the Schedule. As such, the applicant contends that to find it “includes all types of contusions, including a brain contusion”, is absurd, illogical, incoherent and incompatible with the definition of “catastrophic impairment” as it relates to traumatic brain injuries.
10The applicant refers to the definition of “catastrophic impairment” in section 3.1(1)4, where it states that an impairment is a catastrophic impairment if a person sustains:
…a traumatic brain injury that meets the following criteria:
i. The injury shows positive findings on a computerized axial tomography scan … indicating intracranial pathology that is a result of the accident, including, but not limited to, intracranial contusions.
ii. When assessed in accordance with … Structured Interviews for the Glasgow Outcome Scale and the Extended Glasgow Outcome Scale: …, the injury results in a rating of,
A. Vegetative State …,
B. Upper Severe Disability … or Lower Severe Disability …, or
C. Lower Moderate Disability…
11The applicant submits that the above definition of catastrophic impairment defines an objective diagnosis of an intracranial contusion as an intracranial pathology, and this satisfies one part of the test for catastrophic impairment based on a traumatic brain injury. The applicant submits that inconsistency and absurdity would be created if a claimant has been objectively diagnosed with an intracranial contusion, being one of the criteria for a catastrophic impairment designation, and yet can also be within the definition of a “minor injury” and the MIG.
12The applicant submits that, if the legislature intended for “contusion” in the definition of “minor injury” under section 3(1) to include brain contusions, then it would have specified intracranial contusions. In section 3.1(1) 4 the legislature specified intracranial contusions as a form of intracranial pathology contributing to the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury. The fact that the legislature did not specify intracranial contusions in the definition of minor injury suggests that intracranial contusions do not qualify as minor injuries.
13The applicant submits that, after the plain language of the regulation is considered, the context and purpose must then be considered. The term “contusion” in the definition of “minor injury” must be interpreted in accordance with other provisions in the Schedule. The applicant points out that the object of this statutory scheme is to provide speedy medical and rehabilitation benefits for minor injuries, and section 18(1) of the Schedule caps the benefits at $3,500.00.
14The applicant notes that the definitions of:
a. “sprain” excludes tears of tendons, ligaments and muscles;
b. “strain” excludes complete joint dislocation;
c. “subluxation” excludes a complete dislocation of a joint; and
d. “whiplash associated disorder” excludes clinically relevant neurological signs and a fracture in or dislocation of the spine.
The applicant submits that those exclusions indicate that there is a limit on the interpretive breadth of each of the components of a “minor injury” to ensure only the most minor injuries are captured, and intracranial contusions ought to be excluded. Since an “intracranial contusion” is referred to in section 3.1(1) 4 as one of the requirements for a catastrophic impairment, it is not minor and should not be in the MIG. And an intracranial contusion is not amenable to speedy treatment which is the express objective of the MIG. The applicant contends that considering the entire context, including section 18(1) of the Schedule and the MIG, my conclusion that “contusion” is not limited and includes all types of contusions, including a brain contusion is not a plausible interpretation.
15The applicant relies on Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”) for the view that statutory provisions should be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme and object of the legislation and the intent of the legislature. The applicant relies upon Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC) (“Rizzo”) and other cases citing Rizzo for the view that “the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences”, and it could be absurd if the interpretation is “incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment”.
16The respondent submits that there was no error of law or fact in finding that the applicant’s accident-related injuries fall within the MIG. The respondent refers to paragraph 18 of the decision where I held: “Firstly, a “minor injury” as defined in section 3(1) expressly includes a “contusion”. The word “contusion” is not limited in the Schedule. In other words, a contusion includes all types of contusions, including a brain contusion. The CT scan showed, and Dr. Leung opined that there was a cerebral contusion. Accordingly, I find that the applicant’s cerebral contusion is a “contusion” within the meaning of “minor injury”.”
17The respondent submits that the applicant is not correct in claiming that the word “contusion” was misinterpreted because it did not concord with the definition of “catastrophic impairment”. Catastrophic impairment was not an issue in dispute, the MIG was. So, there was no reason to refer to the “catastrophic impairment” definition. Furthermore, the applicant’s submission that her brain contusion makes up part of a catastrophic impairment must be given no weight because catastrophic impairment is not an issue in dispute.
18The respondent points out that, at paragraph 23 of the applicant’s reconsideration submissions, she highlights that the definitions of “sprain”, “strain”, “subluxation”, “whiplash injury” and “whiplash associated disorder” expressly exclude certain impairments from the definition of “minor injury”. However, there are no exclusions from the word “contusion”. The respondent submits that if the legislature had intended to have exclusions to “contusion”, it would have stated so. Therefore, the type of contusion the applicant had fits within the definition of “minor” by virtue of it being a “contusion”.
19In the case before me, I found the applicant to have a minor injury based upon the definition of minor injury and the absence of evidence that her brain contusion resulted in an impairment that took her out of the MIG. As set out in paragraph 21 of my decision, the applicant did not report any head-related issues to her family doctor after approximately 3 weeks from the accident. As set out in paragraphs 19, 20 and 22 of my decision, neither the family doctor nor any other party found that she had suffered a concussion. As set out in paragraph 40 of my decision, the applicant returned to work within less than 2 months after the accident, and there was no evidence from the employer that her work duties had to be modified, nor did the applicant report to her family doctor any pain or any impact upon her work. Furthermore, in paragraphs 36 to 48, I found that the applicant did not suffer from chronic pain, and in paragraph 55 I found that she did not have a pre-existing medical condition that took her out of the MIG.
20In paragraph 18 of my decision, I held that a “minor injury” as defined in section 3(1) expressly includes a “contusion”, and a “contusion” is not limited in the Schedule, so a contusion includes all types of contusions, including a brain contusion. Accordingly, I found that the applicant’s cerebral contusion is a “contusion” within the meaning of “minor injury”.
21I am not persuaded by the applicant’s reconsideration submissions.
22I accept the applicant’s position that the interpretation of the Schedule must be guided by the modern principle of statutory interpretation. Statutory provisions should be interpreted in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme, object and intention of the legislation: see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at paragraphs 117-118. Furthermore, I accept that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences, as stated in Rizzo.
23In essence, the applicant submits that a brain contusion, in and of itself, is an exclusion from the definition of minor injury. Despite my acceptance of the modern principle of statutory interpretation, I do not find that I made an error in law by finding that a brain contusion is a minor injury, absent evidence of it resulting in an impairment that takes it out of the minor injury definition, for the reasons that follow.
Catastrophic Impairment Definition
24The applicant submits that since an intracranial contusion is one of the criteria for a catastrophic impairment designation, it cannot be classified as a “minor injury”. It would create inconsistency and absurdity if a claimant who has been objectively diagnosed with an intracranial contusion, one of the criteria qualifying for a catastrophic impairment designation, could also be within the minor injury definition. The respondent submits that since catastrophic impairment was not an issue in dispute there is no reason to look at the catastrophic impairment definition in section 3.1(1) to give meaning to the term “minor injury”.
25I do acknowledge that section 3.1(1) 4 refers to an intracranial pathology that includes an intracranial contusion. However, I am not persuaded that the inclusion of “intracranial contusions” in section 3.1(1) 4 precludes all brain contusions from being minor injuries.
26Firstly, if the legislature had wanted to preclude all intracranial contusions from minor injuries, it could have done so by defining “contusion” such that it excluded “intracranial contusions” from being a minor injury. The legislature did not do that, indicating its legislative intent not to preclude intracranial contusions from the minor injury definition.
27Secondly, the legislature defined certain terms (i.e. sprain, strain, sublaxation, whiplash associated disorder) in the minor injury definition, and set a threshold at which they became non-minor injuries, but it did not do that with respect to “contusion”, “abrasion” and “laceration” indicating that it did not want to set a threshold as to when they ceased to be minor injuries. The reason being is that the legislature recognized that a contusion, abrasion and laceration, in and of themselves, are the injury mechanism that results in the impairment, and it is the severity of the impairment that determines whether it is a minor injury or not. Therefore, a contusion, abrasion and laceration are minor injuries if they do not result in a non-minor impairment.
28Thirdly, section 3.1(1) 4 indicates that at an intracranial contusion itself is the injury mechanism that results in the impairment, and the impairment can vary from very severe to little or none. Section 3.1(1) 4 states that an impairment is a catastrophic impairment if a person sustains (emphasis added):
… a traumatic brain injury that meets the following criteria:
i. computerized axial tomography scan indicating intracranial pathology that is a result of the accident, including, but not limited to, intracranial contusions.
ii. When assessed in accordance with … Structured Interviews for the Glasgow Outcome Scale and the Extended Glasgow Outcome Scale: …, the injury results in a rating of,
A. Vegetative State …,
B. Upper Severe Disability … or Lower Severe Disability …, or
C. Lower Moderate Disability …
29An intracranial contusion, in and of itself, is insufficient to satisfy the catastrophic impairment designation. There must first be a finding of a traumatic brain injury, and then it must satisfy both criteria i and ii. A traumatic brain injury that only satisfies criteria i (intracranial contusion) does not meet the catastrophic impairment definition. Criteria ii must also be satisfied, and it indicates the level of severity of the impairment resulting from the intracranial contusion. Criteria ii sets a very high level of severity - the injury must result in a rating of A. Vegetative State or B. Upper Severe Disability or Lower Severe Disability or C. Lower Moderate Disability. This indicates that the intracranial contusion itself is the injury mechanism, and it is that mechanism that results in the impairment, and the severity of the impairment can vary. In other words, an intracranial contusion may result in little or no impairment, but on the other hand, it may result in an impairment so severe that it satisfies criteria (ii). It is the severity of the impairment that is determinative of whether an intracranial contusion is a minor injury or not. An intracranial contusion, in and of itself, is a minor injury if it does not result in a non-minor impairment.
30Accordingly, the inclusion of “intracranial contusions” in section 3.1(1) 4 does not preclude an intracranial contusion from being a minor injury. And this is consistent with the legislature’s decision to not define a “contusion” so as to preclude intracranial contusions from the minor injury definition.
31In the case before me, I found the applicant’s brain contusion to be a minor injury because the applicant did not prove that it resulted in a non-minor impairment. As noted earlier, the applicant did not report any head-related issues to her family doctor after approximately 3 weeks from the accident, neither the family doctor nor any other party found that she had suffered a concussion, she returned to non-modified work within less than 2 months after the accident and reported no pain or any impact upon her work. Furthermore, there was no chronic pain nor a pre-existing medical condition that took her out of the MIG. Therefore, the applicant’s brain contusion did not result in a non-minor impairment, and therefore is a minor injury.
32Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the applicant has shown my interpretation to be “illogical, incoherent and incompatible with the definition of catastrophic impairment”.
Legislature did not include “intracranial contusions” in “minor injury”
33The applicant submits that if the legislature had intended contusions to include brain contusions it would have specified “intracranial contusions” in the definition of minor injury. Since the legislature specified intracranial contusions in section 3.1(1) 4 but not in the minor injury definition this suggests that they do not qualify as a minor injury. The applicant submits that the legislature is presumed to not legislate in vain, and that every word in a statute has been included for a reason and is intended to have a purpose.
34The respondent submits that a “minor injury” includes a “contusion” and is not limited in the Schedule, and therefore includes all types of contusions, including a brain contusion.
35I am not persuaded by the applicant’s submissions.
36Firstly, I begin with the text in the section entitled “Definitions and interpretation” in section 3(1) of the Schedule, where the term “minor injury” is defined as “one or more of a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury”. The legislature was clear and precise in including “contusion” in the definition of “minor injury”, and it was equally clear and precise in not defining it nor excluding anything from this word. So, the legislative intent is that a contusion is a minor injury, and since “contusion” was not defined the word should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and interpreted broadly to include all types of contusions, including a brain contusion. It would be inappropriate to not give effect to the legislature’s clearly expressed intent.
37Secondly, the inclusion of “intracranial contusions” in the catastrophic impairment definition does not preclude a brain contusion from being a minor injury. As explained earlier, the legislature recognized that an intracranial contusion itself is the injury mechanism that results in the impairment, and it is the severity of the impairment that is determinative of whether an intracranial contusion is a minor injury or not. A brain contusion is a minor injury unless it resulted in a non-minor impairment.
38Thirdly, if the legislature had wanted to exclude all intracranial contusions from the minor injury definition it could have done so expressly, like it did for other types of minor injuries, such as “sprain”, “strain”, “subluxation” and “whiplash associated disorder”.
39In conclusion, the applicant has not persuaded me that the legislature’s failure to include “intracranial contusions” in the definition of minor injury precludes all brain contusions from being minor injuries.
Context and Purpose
40The applicant submits that I erred in law by holding a contusion includes all types of contusions, including brain contusions based upon the plain text. The applicant submits that after considering the ordinary meaning of “contusion” the context in which the language is found, and the purpose of the legislation, must be considered.
41The applicant submits that “contusion” in “minor injury” cannot be interpreted in isolation. The minor injury definition gives effect to the statutory scheme created by the Schedule which is set out in sections 18(1) and (2) and clarified in the MIG. Medical and rehabilitation benefits are limited to $3,500.00 and the MIG’s objective is to provide speedy access to rehabilitation for persons who sustain minor injuries.
42The applicant also submits that the definitions of “sprain”, “strain”, “subluxation”, “whiplash injury” and “whiplash associated disorder” place a limit on the interpretive breadth of each of the components on a “minor injury” to ensure that only the most minor injuries are captured. Furthermore, since an intracranial contusion is a type of intracranial pathology which forms part of the definition of catastrophic impairment in section 3.1(1) 4, it cannot be a minor injury. If complete tears of tendons, ligaments and muscles, complete joint dislocation, spinal fractures and dislocations, and clinically relevant neurological impairments are excluded from the definition of minor injury, then an intracranial pathology (i.e. intracranial contusions) ought to also be excluded because it is not amenable to speedy treatment which is the express objective of the MIG. So, considering the entire context, the applicant submits that my conclusion that “contusion” in the definition of “minor injury” is “not limited” and “includes all types of contusions, including a brain contusion” is not a plausible interpretation.
43The respondent points out that, at paragraph 23 of the applicant’s reconsideration submissions, she highlights that the definitions of “sprain”, “strain”, “subluxation”, “whiplash injury” and “whiplash associated disorder” expressly exclude certain impairments from the definition of “minor injury”. However, there are no exclusions from the word “contusion”. The respondent submits that if the legislature had intended to have exclusions to “contusion”, it would have stated so. Therefore, the type of contusion the applicant had fits within the definition of “minor” by virtue of it being a “contusion”.
44I am not persuaded by the applicant’s submissions.
Context
45Firstly, section 3(1) defines certain terms in the minor injury definition, but not all terms. The words “sprain”, “strain”, “subluxation” and “whiplash associated disorder” are defined, but “contusion”, “abrasion” and “laceration” are not. The definitions of “sprain”, “strain”, “subluxation” and “whiplash associated disorder” expressly state a point at which they are no longer minor injuries, as shown below (underlining added):
i. “sprain” means an injury to one or more tendons or ligaments or to one or more of each, including a partial but not a complete tear.
ii. “strain” means an injury to one or more muscles, including a partial but not a complete tear.
iii. “subluxation” means a partial but not a complete dislocation of a joint.
iv. “whiplash associated disorder” means a whiplash injury that,
a. does not exhibit objective, demonstrable, definable and clinically relevant neurological signs, and
b. does not exhibit a fracture in or dislocation of the spine.
46However, unlike the foregoing terms, the legislature did not define “contusion”, “abrasion” and “laceration”, and therefore did not set a threshold as to when a contusion, abrasion and laceration cease to be a minor injury. Accordingly, the word “contusion” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and it should be interpreted broadly to include all types of contusions, including a brain contusion.
47Secondly, I am not persuaded by the submission that the legislature was intending to limit the interpretation of undefined terms (i.e. contusion, abrasion, laceration) by defining and stating very specific tailored limitations to the defined terms (i.e. sprain, strain, sublaxation, whiplash associated disorder). This would be a very unorthodox method of limiting interpretation, especially considering that the legislature could have defined “contusion” and expressly limited it, as it did with “sprain”, “strain”,” “sublaxation” and “whiplash associated disorder”.
Purpose
48The applicant submits that an intracranial contusion is not amenable to speedy treatment which is the express objective of the MIG, so my interpretation that a contusion includes a brain contusion is not consistent with that purpose.
49As explained earlier, a brain contusion can result in impairments of varying degrees of severity, from minor to catastrophic. A brain contusion is a minor injury if it does not result in a non-minor impairment, and therefore, is amenable to speedy treatment within the MIG. However, on the other hand, a brain contusion that results in a non-minor impairment would not be a minor injury and would be treated outside of the MIG.
50In the applicant’s case, she was found to have a brain contusion that was a minor injury, and it was amenable to speedy treatment within the MIG. The applicant received treatment within the MIG, and the evidence showed that she did not report any head-related issues to her family doctor after approximately 3 weeks from the accident, she returned to work within 2 months after the accident without modifications, she did not report to her family doctor any pain or impact from working, she did not have chronic pain and did not have a pre-existing medical condition that took her out of the MIG. Accordingly, the applicant’s brain contusion was amenable to speedy treatment within the MIG.
51I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b), based on my interpretation of “contusion” in the decision.
Rule 18.2(b) – Error of fact by failing to find an intracranial pathology significant for traumatic brain injury.
52I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
53The applicant notes that I placed little weight on the opinion letter of Dr. Lisa Becker and Dr. Harold Becker dated November 18, 2022, and the applicant refers to paragraph 23 of my decision:
Sixthly, the letter dated November 18, 2022 from Dr. Lisa Becker and Dr. Harold Becker opining that the applicant sustained a traumatic brain injury is not persuasive. Doctors Becker rendered their diagnosis 3 years and 2 months after the accident. They never examined the applicant but instead rendered their opinion based upon a review of a “medical brief”, but the letter does not tell us what was in the “medical brief”. They refer to the CT scan which Dr. Leung described was a cerebral contusion. They then interpret the cerebral contusion to represent an intracranial pathology, and conclude “Taken together, file records indicate that Ms. Marcelo sustained a traumatic brain injury as a result of the accident.” I am not persuaded by the letter from Doctors Becker and their diagnosis because they do not explain what was in the medical brief and they have not explained why their diagnosis should be preferred over Dr. Leung’s finding of a cerebral contusion. Accordingly, I place little weight upon the diagnosis from Doctors Becker.
54The applicant submits that I erred in fact by failing to accept that her intracranial contusion represents intracranial pathology significant for traumatic brain injury. The applicant submits that a cerebral contusion is an intracranial pathology, and it is not open to interpretation. The applicant also submits that I erred in fact by failing to accept that the applicant’s intracranial contusion represents intracranial pathology, which is indicative of traumatic brain injury, and which is further accepted as part of the criteria for catastrophic determination.
55Finally, the applicant submits that holding that Doctors Becker and Becker should have to explain why their diagnosis of traumatic brain injury should be preferred over Dr. Leung’s finding of a cerebral contusion is an error in fact and a misapprehension of the science of brain injury. Furthermore, the applicant submits that I appear to have characterized Doctors Becker and Becker as making a final diagnosis, but it was only a diagnosis based on file records. They were requesting approval of a Neuropsychological Assessment for further evaluation.
56The respondent submits that the applicant does not provide any evidence of a factual error and contends that the applicant is claiming that I made an error in the weight I gave to the opinion letter of Doctors Becker and Becker. According to the respondent, I found that the opinion letter was not persuasive and gave reasons for this determination in my decision. Also, the respondent points out that it is clear, based upon paragraph 34 of the applicant’s reconsideration submissions, that she is seeking a “do-over”, namely a rehearing on the issue of whether the applicant’s intracranial contusion removes her from the MIG.
57I am not persuaded by the applicant’s submissions.
58I agree with the respondent that the applicant’s submissions do not identify an error in fact. In substance, the applicant disagrees with my decision, and in particular, with my decision to place little weight on the opinion letter of Doctors Becker and Becker.
59In paragraph 23 of my decision, I explained why I placed little weight upon the opinion letter of Doctors Becker and Becker. I was not persuaded by their opinion including their conclusion that “Taken together, file records indicate that Ms. Marcelo sustained a traumatic brain injury as a result of the accident. As such, her injuries fall outside the Minor Injury Guidelines.” The second sentence was inadvertently left out of my decision but was in their opinion letter. They concluded that the applicant’s injuries were outside of the MIG. They did not examine the applicant, nor disclose what “medical brief” they looked at, nor identify the file records that indicated she had a traumatic brain injury, nor identify the non-minor impairment that took her out of the MIG. Accordingly, I was not persuaded by their opinion.
60I preferred the opinion of Dr. Leung that the applicant had a brain contusion. I found the applicant’s brain contusion to be minor because the applicant did not prove that her brain contusion resulted in a non-minor impairment.
61Contrary to the applicant’s suggestion, I did not make a finding that a brain contusion and an intracranial pathology are different. Also, I did not make a finding that the applicant’s intracranial contusion did not represent intracranial pathology and is not indicative of a traumatic brain injury which is part of the criteria for catastrophic impairment. The applicant has not persuaded me that not making the specific findings that she is requesting amounts to an error in fact. It was unnecessary for me to make those findings. As I already stated, I found the applicant to have a brain contusion based upon Dr. Leung’s opinion, and I found the applicant’s brain contusion to be minor because the applicant did not present evidence that her brain contusion resulted in a non-minor impairment.
62Lastly, the applicant submits that I appear to have characterized Doctors Becker and Becker as making a final diagnosis, but it was only a diagnosis based on file records. The applicant did not explain how she arrived at this supposition, and in any event, she does not explain why this would constitute an error.
63The applicant has not persuaded me that she identified any error in fact.
64The applicant may disagree with my finding, but the reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate their position where they disagree with the decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
65I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
66The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Nick Iannazzo
Adjudicator
Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: July 9, 2025