Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17032/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Christopher Natos
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATORS: Emily Morton, Member Laura Hodgson, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Christopher Natos, Self-represented For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative
Held by teleconference: June 11, 2025
BACKGROUND
1On March 31, 2025, a 2008 Jeep was impounded for 45 days pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“respondent”) sent the appellant, Christopher Natos, a Notice of Impoundment and Release dated April 3, 2025, as the appellant was listed in the Registrar’s records as the owner of the vehicle. At the time of the impoundment, a different person to whom the appellant claims he had sold the vehicle on March 31, 2025 (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle.
2The appellant appeals to this Tribunal from the impoundment of the vehicle pursuant to s. 50.2 of the Act. The appellant’s Notice of Appeal (“Notice”) does not identify the grounds under s. 50.2(3) upon which he appeals the impoundment. When the hearing of the s. 50.2 appeal commenced on May 27, 2025, the presiding adjudicator identified the issues to be determined on appeal as follows:
i. whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not under suspension pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act;
ii. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
3At the commencement of the appeal hearing on May 27, 2025, the Respondent moved for an order that the appeal be dismissed because the appellant filed the Notice after the 15 days of the impoundment, contrary to s. 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 under the Act. The presiding adjudicator gave the appellant leave to file a motion to extend the time to file his appeal and adjourned the hearing. The appellant filed his motion in accordance with the adjudicator’s order, and the hearing resumed on June 9, 2025.
4On June 9, 2025 the Tribunal held a blended hearing on the motion and the merits of the appellant’s appeal.
ISSUES
5The issues in dispute are:
i. Should the Tribunal extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal?
ii. Did the appellant exercise due diligence in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act?
iii. Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act and s. 10 of the Regulation?
6It is apparent in the grounds stated in the Notice and through the appellant’s submissions at the hearing that he seeks a ruling on the issue of whether he was the “owner” of the vehicle at the time it was impounded. Therefore, though not identified as an issue in dispute by the adjudicator on May 27, 2025, these reasons also address the issue of whether the appellant’s status of “owner” of the impounded vehicle can be considered on this appeal.
RESULT
7For the reasons below, we find that the justice of the case does not warrant an extension of time for filing the appeal. The appellant’s motion, and therefore his appeal, is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
Motion for Extension of Time Denied
8An appeal of an impoundment under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days (s. 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 under the Act (“the Regulation”) by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Tribunal. However, s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G, gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.
9In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (“Manuel”) the Divisional Court held that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:
a. the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal;
b. the length of the delay;
c. prejudice to the other party;
d. the merits of the appeal.
10All four elements of the test are to be considered, and no one element is necessarily determinative. The appellant bears the burden of establishing that there are reasonable grounds for granting the extension.
Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period
11We find the appellant has demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal the impoundment within the appeal period.
12The appellant testified that he sold the vehicle to the driver on March 31, 2025 and the police contacted him the next day and advised him orally the vehicle was impounded as the driver was subject to a Criminal Code licence suspension while he was driving the vehicle. The appellant’s evidence was that on April 3 or 4, 2025, he received correspondence from the impound operator, indicating where the vehicle was impounded. He testified that it was not until April 10, 2025, that he received the Notice of Impoundment and Release, which is dated April 3, 2025, in the regular mail.
13As the vehicle was detained under subsection 55.1 on March 31, 2025, the appellant had until April 15, 2025 to file a Notice of Appeal with Tribunal. The appellant testified that after receiving the notice dated April 3, 2025, in the mail he began to take steps to appeal. He had friends with a computer assist him with accessing the appropriate forms and reading the public facing information on the Tribunal website. He eventually drafted the Notice and believed he sent it by regular mail on Good Friday - April 18, 2025. He mistakenly believed that by mailing the Notice (rather than filing it with the Tribunal) within the 15 day period from the date on the Notice (rather than from the date of impoundment) he had met the appeal deadline.
14The Court in Manuel held that a person satisfied this element of the analysis if an intention to appeal is demonstrated during the appeal period. Considering the appellant’s understanding that he had 15 days from the April 3, 2025 date of the Notice to mail his Notice of Appeal, albeit mistaken, and the immediate steps he took after receiving the Notice in the regular mail, we find he demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal the impoundment during the 15-day appeal period.
Length of the delay
15The deadline for the appellant to appeal was April 15, 2025 and his notice of appeal, which is undated, is marked as received by the Tribunal on April 25, 2025. In our view, while 10 days could be a concerning amount of time in different circumstances, we found the appellant’s evidence that he mailed the notice on the first day of a four-day weekend accounts for some of the 10-day delay. We find the length of delay is not significant in the analysis.
Prejudice
16Though the Registrar opposed the appellant’s motion to extend time, its representative did not argue it was prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, we find this is also not a significant factor.
The merits of the appeal
17On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish his case on a balance of probabilities but is required to demonstrate that the appeal has some merit. In our view the appellant can not establish this.
Issue of whether the appellant was the “owner” at the time of impoundment
18The appellant’s focus in his Notice and in his evidence at the hearing was on his argument that he should not be liable for the risk and cost of the impoundment of the vehicle as he was not the “owner” at the time the police detained and impounded it. The appellant submits he completed all necessary steps to effect a transfer of ownership to the driver before the vehicle was impounded. In his submission it is the driver who was actually the owner for the purpose of s. 55.1 of the Act at the time the vehicle was detained and impounded. The respondent submits the appellant did not complete all required steps to transfer ownership of the vehicle. As, according to Ministry records, the appellant was the owner at the time of the impoundment, he is liable for the risk and cost of the impoundment, unless this Tribunal grants his appeal and orders the release of the vehicle, which obligates the respondent to pay the owner the amount incurred as a result of the impoundment on behalf of the owner (s.50.2(7) of the Act).
19Briefly, the appellant’s evidence in support of his position that he is not the owner is as follows. On March 31, 2025 he met the driver in the parking lot of a garage to sell the vehicle to him. The appellant and the driver were strangers. The appellant had attended Service Ontario earlier that morning and obtained a Used Vehicle Information Package, which he gave to the driver without retaining a copy or the receipt portion of the package. The driver paid the appellant in cash and the appellant gave the driver a handwritten bill of sale, which was made an exhibit at the hearing. The appellant took possession of the licence plates and brought those to Service Ontario later that day. According to the appellant, the clerk at the Service Ontario counter told him he did not have to take any further steps to transfer ownership and he left. The next day, the police contacted the appellant and told him the vehicle was impounded as the driver was under a Criminal Code suspension.
20The respondent does not agree the appellant took the requisite steps to transfer ownership of the vehicle to the driver on March 31, 2025, prior to the vehicle’s impoundment. However, it is not necessary to embark on an analysis of the merits, as the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in a s.50.2 appeal to grant the appellant relief on the basis he was not the owner of the vehicle.
21The heart of this dispute is whether the appellant is liable for the cost and risk of the impoundment of the vehicle. Section 55.1(2) provides that where a vehicle has been detained under s. 55.1(1), “the detained vehicle shall, at the cost and risk of the owner” be removed to an impound facility and be impounded for the time prescribed by s. 55.1(3) which in this case was 45 days.
22The appellant’s right of appeal to this Tribunal is circumscribed by two important features of s. 50.2. First, an appellant must be an “owner” to have a right of appeal. Section 50.2(1) provides:
50.2(1) The owner of a motor vehicle that is impounded under section 55.1 may, upon paying the fee established by the Tribunal, appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal.
(2) The owner and the Registrar are the parties to an appeal under this section.
23Second, s. 50.2(3) of the Act sets out the only grounds on which an owner may appeal under subsection (1) and the only grounds on which the Tribunal may order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle:,
a) that the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;
b) that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained on order to be impounded was not then under suspension;
(b.1) that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);
(c) that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that that driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); or
(d) that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
24The Tribunal understands the appellant’s concern is his liability for the risk and cost of the impoundment of the vehicle when he takes the position, he transferred ownership and was not the owner at the time of impoundment. The Act, however, does not give this Tribunal jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an impoundment under s. 55.1 from a party that is not the “owner” or the respondent. The appellant’s right of appeal is premised on the fact he is the owner of the vehicle yet he seeks relief through appeal from this Tribunal on the ground that he is not the owner.
25The Tribunal is not empowered to add a ground of appeal to s. 50.2(3) to expand its jurisdiction to consider whether the appellant was in fact the owner at the time of the impoundment. Further, the remedy the Tribunal can order is limited to the “owner” of the impounded vehicle. Section 50.2(5) only gives the Tribunal the power, on an appeal under s. 50.2(1), to “confirm the impoundment or order the Registrar to release the motor vehicle.” Section 50.2(7) provides that if the Tribunal orders the Registrar to release the motor vehicle, the Registrar shall issue an order to release the vehicle and “pay on behalf of the owner the amount incurred by the owner, as a result of the impoundment, for removing and impounding the vehicle, not including any economic losses.” (emphasis added)
26We note that elsewhere in the scheme of the Act governing impoundment of vehicles the legislature has provided for situations where there is a dispute over liability for the costs of impoundment based on ownership of the impounded vehicle. Section 55.1(16) of the Act provides the operator of the impound facility where the vehicle is impounded may recover a debt due by the owner and driver of the impounded vehicle in any court of competent jurisdiction. It may or may not be that the appellant has recourse to an argument he was not at the time of the s.55.1 impoundment the “owner” for the purpose of s. 55.1(16) of the Act before a court of competent jurisdiction that is adjudicating liability. However, that issue is not before us and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of ownership in the context of a s.50.2 appeal.
27As we find we have no jurisdiction to consider the argument that the appellant was not the “owner” of the vehicle at the time of the impoundment this basis for the appeal has no merit and weighs against granting an extension of time.
Due diligence
28This ground of appeal requires the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence was not suspended. Due diligence requires the appellant to prove that he took “all reasonable care”: R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC). The Supreme Court has also held that “the concept of diligence is based on the acceptance of a citizen’s civic duty to take action to find out what his or her obligations are.”: Levis (City) v. Tetreault, 2006 SCC 12 at para. 30.
29The Tribunal has interpreted due diligence in the context of impoundment appeals to mean the appellant owner took all reasonable steps in the circumstances to ascertain whether the licence was under suspension. The appellant’s primary position was that, as he was transferring vehicle ownership, it was unnecessary to verify the driver’s licence, however, to the extent necessary, he submits he exercised due diligence. In the circumstances here, the appellant, assuming he was the vehicle owner, did not take all reasonable steps. His evidence was simply that he asked the appellant, whom he had never met before, if he had a driver’s licence. He did not ask to see the driver’s licence and did not ask the driver if his licence was suspended. As it turned out, the driver was unlicensed and subject to several suspensions. The appellant had never met the driver before and according to him, their interaction was brief. It is not sufficient in the context of the due diligence analysis, for an appellant to rely on the word of the driver that their licence is not under suspension or subject to conditions.
30The Tribunal therefore finds there is no reasonable prospect that the appellant would be successful in establishing that he exercised due diligence in the circumstances. This weighs against granting the extension of time to file the Notice.
Exceptional hardship
31Section 10 of Ontario Reg. 631/98 sets out the criteria by which exceptional hardship is defined for the purpose of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether the appellant had alternatives to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) places the burden on the appellant to demonstrate there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which includes considering and inquiring into every reasonable option such as using another vehicle and making alternate arrangements to manage without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
32The appellant’s evidence was that around the time he sold the vehicle, he had access to another vehicle. His claim of exceptional hardship was based on the financial consequences of being liable for the cost of the impoundment as owner, not the hardship arising from loss of the vehicle. Indeed, his evidence was that he does not want to have the vehicle released to him.
33We find there is no reasonable prospect that the appellant would be successful in establishing that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship. This weighs against granting an extension of time to appeal.
Conclusion on extension of time to file appeal
34We have considered the four factors together and find that the lack of a reasonable possibility for the appeal to be successful weighs heavily in this instance. While the appellant may have an arguable issue that he was not the “owner” in a different venue, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate that issue in the context of a s. 50.2 appeal. The Tribunal also finds there is no merit to the appellant’s appeal based on s. 50(2)(3)(c) and (d) of the Act. The appellant has failed to establish there are reasonable grounds for granting the extension.
WE ORDER AS FOLLOWS:
35The motion to extend the time to appeal the impoundment is dismissed, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
____________________
Emily Morton Adjudicator
____________________
Laura Hodgson
Adjudicator
Released: July 7, 2025