Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16631/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Millennium Car and Truck Rentals Inc.

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Jan Dymond

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Rajesh Singh on behalf of Millennium Car and Truck Rentals, Self-Represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

Heard by Teleconference: January 23, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Rajesh Singh on behalf of Millennium Car and Truck Rentals, the appellant, appeals from the 180-day impoundment of their 2016 Honda CRV under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on January 6, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Moin Khan, an employee of the appellant, was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. Does s. 50.2(4) of the Act apply because there has been at least one previous impoundment of a motor vehicle owned by the appellant prior to the date of the impoundment that is under appeal and, if not,

ii. Will the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act?

RESULT

4I find that vehicles owned by the appellant were impounded on May 16, 2023 and March 30, 2024, which precludes the appellant from appealing on the grounds of exceptional hardship. As this was the only ground of appeal asserted by the appellant, his appeal must fail. Accordingly, I confirm the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2 (3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act. The appellant appeals on ground (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship; however, under s. 50.2(4) of the Act, the right to appeal on the ground of exceptional hardship is not available to an owner of an impounded vehicle “…if there was a previous impoundment under s. 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the same owner.”

Is the exceptional hardship ground of appeal available to the appellant?

7Documentary evidence filed by the respondent establishes that the appellant was the registered owner but not the driver of two previously impounded vehicles:

i. a 2012 Dodge RPC impounded on May 16, 2023 for a minimum of 45 days as a result of a Criminal Code related driver suspension, and

ii. a 2008 Acura TYS impounded on March 30, 2024 for a minimum of 45 days as a result of a Criminal Code related driver suspension (extended to 90 days as a second impoundment within two years).

8Section 55.1(3) of the Act requires that a vehicle impounded under subsection (1) shall be impounded “for 180 days if there have been two or more previous impoundments under this section within a prescribed period with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the owner of the vehicle currently being impounded.” Regulation 631/98 (1) states that “for the purpose of subsection 55.1(3) of the Act, the prescribed period is two years.”

9The vehicle impoundment currently under appeal is for a period of 180 days.

10The Registrar submits that as a result of these two previous impoundments, exceptional hardship is not available as a ground for appeal pursuant to section 50.2(4) of the Act.

11Mr. Singh testified that they did not recall being made aware of the previous impoundments. They further submitted that the police officer who advised them of the impoundment currently under appeal told them that the impoundment was only related to the driving record of the driver and had nothing to do with the vehicle itself or the owner. They submitted that they had appealed under section 50.2(3)(d) as a result of the information provided by the officer. The appellant submitted that they were given incorrect information by the police and that, as a result, section 50.2(4) should not apply. The appellant could not point me to any authority that would allow the Tribunal to waive section 50.2(4).

12The impoundment of the vehicle on January 6, 2025 is the third impoundment of a vehicle registered to the appellant. As a result, I find that s. 50.2(4) of the Act applies to this appeal.

13The Tribunal’s powers with respect to appeals are set out in the Act and Licence Tribunal Act, 1999. The appellant could not point me to, nor am I aware of, a statute or jurisprudence that would allow the Tribunal to waive the requirement of s. 50.2(4). The statement allegedly made to the appellant by the police officer is irrelevant to the interpretation of s.50.2(4) of the Act.

14I find, therefore, that the exceptional hardship ground of appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) is not available to the appellant because they were the owner of two motor vehicles previously impounded under s. 55.1 of the Act.

Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?

15Given that I have found that the exceptional hardship ground of appeal is not available to the appellant, I need not determine the second issue.

ORDER

16Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.