Tribunals Ontario
Licence Appeal Tribunal
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17185/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Dhelia Baldwin
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Dhelia Baldwin, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative
HEARD: June 12, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Dhelia Baldwin, the appellant, appeals from the impoundment of her 2018 Chevrolet, the vehicle, on May 21, 2025 for 45 days. At the time of the impoundment the appellant’s estranged husband Donovan Baldwin (“driver”) was found to be driving the vehicle in contravention of a condition on his driver’s licence requiring an ignition interlock device (“IID”).
2The appellant appeals on three grounds: that her vehicle was stolen at the time of impoundment, that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence did not have a condition prohibiting the driver from driving the vehicle without an IID, and that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship to her as set out in her Notice of Appeal.
ISSUES
3The issues in dispute are:
i. Issue 1: Was the appellant’s vehicle stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA?
ii. Issue 2: Did the appellant exercise due diligence in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(c) of the HTA?
iii. Issue 3: Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation?
RESULT
4I find that the appellant’s vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA. As a result, it is unnecessary to consider the appellant’s due diligence and exceptional hardship grounds of appeal.
ANALYSIS
5The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.
6An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on grounds (a) that the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, and (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
7Section 55.1(1) provides that where an officer is satisfied that a person driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his or her driver’s licence is under suspension, or in contravention of a condition that prohibits him or her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device, shall detain the vehicle and shall impound it under s. 55.1(3).
Issue 1: Was the appellant’s vehicle stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA
8I find the appellant’s vehicle was stolen at the time it was impounded. The burden is on the appellant to establish that her vehicle was stolen on a balance of probabilities, and she has done so for the following reasons.
9The appellant testified that she and the driver do not live together and have been separated since 2024. Given that the appellant and the driver are the parents of a young child and given that the driver often cares for their child when the appellant is working, and for other reasons not relevant here, the driver had a key to the appellant’s home on the day of the impoundment.
10The appellant testified that she keeps the keys to the vehicle in a particular place in her home. Because the driver has been aware since about 2019 that he is not to drive the vehicle, she did not believe the driver would take the keys and he has never done so before. In cross-examination the appellant conceded that she knew that the driver had driven a vehicle owned by someone else in 2024 that he was not permitted to drive but testified that the driver has never driven the vehicle owned by her before.
11The appellant testified that she was expecting the driver to come to her home to care for their child later that evening about 9:00 p.m., and that in the afternoon, the appellant and the child took a nap as it had been a difficult day for both of them.
12The appellant testified that she was unaware that the driver had come to her home on the day of the impoundment and taken the keys while she and the child were asleep until she learned this from the police after the impoundment that the driver had been driving the vehicle that evening. The vehicle is not equipped with an IID.
13The appellant testified that she asked the police to charge the driver with stealing the vehicle but they declined to do so. The appellant testified that the driver also told the police that he had stolen the vehicle.
14Donovan Baldwin, the driver, testified that the appellant had never let him drive the vehicle, he was well aware that he was not allowed to do so, took the keys to the vehicle while she was asleep, and said that he had stolen her vehicle, a choice he now regrets.
15I find the appellant’s testimony and that of the driver to be credible on this point.
16The appellant’s testimony is corroborated by that of the driver. The admission of the driver is against his own interest, lending credence to his testimony.
17The term “stolen” is not defined in the HTA. The Criminal Code definition of “theft” provides some guidance as follows:
322 (1) Everyone commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of the things or of his property or interest in it;
(b) to pledge it or deposit it as security;
(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the person who parts with it may be unable to perform; or
(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.
18The Divisional Court held in Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Crt), that the Tribunal should not limit the meaning of “stolen” only to an intention to take the vehicle permanently. The Court stated that the word “stolen” could also apply to an intention to take the vehicle temporarily.
19Within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA, “stolen” does not mean the use of an owner’s vehicle contrary to the owner’s instructions: See Auto Zone & Rentals Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2016 ONLAT 10149, para. 16 (Exec. Chair).
20Here, I am satisfied that the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the use of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently.
21Both the driver and the appellant testified that he was well aware that he was not to drive the vehicle, yet did so. The appellant said that she asked the police to charge the driver with stealing the vehicle but they declined to do so. I find the appellant’s testimony on this point to be credible.
22Although the Registrar submitted that the appellant was aware that the driver had taken the vehicle of another person in 2024 and should have concealed the keys to her vehicle from the driver as a result, I find based on the evidence of both the appellant and the driver that there was no reason for the appellant to believe that the driver would drive her vehicle given that he had not done so since 2019.
23Taken in totality, the evidence presented at the hearing satisfies me that the vehicle was stolen on the day it was impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA. The appellant has proven this ground of appeal.
Issue 2: Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation; and
Issue 3: Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation
24I have found that the appellant’s evidence supports a finding that her vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA. Given this finding, there is no need to consider the appellant’s second and third grounds of appeal.
Conclusion
25The appellant has established that her vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA. As a result, it is unnecessary to consider the appellant’s due diligence and exceptional hardship grounds of appeal.
ORDER
26Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I order the Registrar to release the appellant’s impounded vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
Released: June 16, 2025