Maurice Champagne v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 58801

Appeal under section 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a driver’s licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act

Between:

Maurice Champagne

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS: Dr. Peter Savage, Member Geneviève Painchaud, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Maurice Champagne, Self-represented For the Respondent: Steve Grootenboer, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: June 16, 2025

BACKGROUND

1Maurice N. Champagne (the “appellant”) appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “respondent” or the “Registrar”) to suspend his driver’s licence for medical reasons.

2On September 3, 2024, the respondent suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The respondent takes the position that the appellant suffers from a cognitive impairment that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. The appellant appeals the suspension and asks the Tribunal to reinstate his licence.

3Having considered all the evidence and for the reasons that follow, we confirm the respondent’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence for medical reasons.

ISSUES

4The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

5To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:

1. Does the appellant suffer from a cognitive impairment?
2. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

LAW

6Under the Act, the respondent is responsible for ensuring that drivers are medically fit to drive vehicles on highways. In this case, the respondent acted pursuant to s. 47(1) of the Act and s. 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 (the “Regulation”) under the Act.

7Subsection 14(1)(a) of the Regulation states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Registrar may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that he or she is able to drive safely.

8Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers (the “CCMTA Standards”) when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration, although they are not binding on us.

9A person whose licence is suspended under these provisions may appeal to the Tribunal under s. 50(1) of the Act.

10On appeal, the Registrar has the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s ability to drive safely is likely to be significantly interfered with by a medical condition.

11Following a hearing, the Tribunal may, under s. 50(2) of the Act, confirm, modify or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from a cognitive impairment?

12In support of its allegation that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely a cognitive impairment, the Registrar relies on an unsolicited Medical Condition Report (“MCR”) dated August 27, 2024, and a Cognitive Disorder form (“CDF”) dated September 30, 2024.

13The appellant argues that he does not suffer from a cognitive disorder, and that his temporary health issue in August 2024, was a result of a urinary tract infection and medication he was given in the Cornwall hospital.

14The appellant submits that on August 19 or 20th, 2024, he felt very ill after bending down to clean the cat litter, was unable to get back up and was sent to the hospital as a result. Discharge documents demonstrate, and the parties do not dispute, that he was in the hospital until August 27th due to sepsis.

15Upon the appellant being discharged on August 27, 2024, the hospital physician responsible for his care, Dr. Zaid, submitted an MCR in compliance with s. 203(1) or s. 203(2) of the Act which require medical practitioners to report persons with certain prescribed medical conditions or permit them to report persons who appear to have medical conditions which may make it dangerous for the person to operate a motor vehicle to the respondent.

16In the MCR, Dr. Zaid indicated “88-year-old male, confused, dementia, still drives, concern safety”.

17The Registrar then proceeded to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence on September 3, 2024, and indicated that a CDF, which was included, be filled out and returned to them.

18On September 30, 2024, the appellant’s family physician, Dr. Tremblay, completed a CDF which indicated:

1. That the appellant had “mild cognitive impairment/mild dementia”;
2. To the question of if the patient requires a functional driving assessment (“FDA”), Dr. Tremblay checked off “unknown”; and
3. Comments: “Patient had acute illness. Was confused in hospital (sepsis). Better now. Oriented. Clock test normal.”

19A second version of only page 1 of a CDF was produced by the appellant and submitted into evidence for the hearing. It appeared exactly the same as the CDF completed by Dr. Tremblay which was submitted into evidence by the respondent, except for a few alterations:

1. Both “mild cognitive impairment/mild dementia”, and “no impairment” were checked off;
2. To the question of if the patient requires a FDA, “unknown” and “no” were both checked off; and
3. The second page with the doctor’s notes and signature was missing.

20On October 11, 2024, upon receipt of the CDF, the Registrar advised the appellant that his licence remained suspended due to cognitive impairment, and that it required a satisfactory FDA to reinstate it.

21The appellant could not recall either version of the CDFs and could not recall having the initial form completed by Dr. Tremblay. He denied altering the second version. The respondent submits that the second version of the form, which only included one page, was tampered by the appellant. We agree with the respondent that the second version of the form has been tampered with because it is clearly an altered copy of the same form, and because checking off two contradictory boxes, twice, is unlikely to be done by a physician. Accordingly, we accord little weight to the second version of the CDF.

22The appellant submits that at the hospital, when he woke up after three days, he needed a towel and not pills as the pills caused the impairment. Also, when he went to see his family doctor a month later, Dr. Tremblay was confused because of his French and translated that to mild dementia. He does not recall doing a clock test for Dr. Tremblay.

23The appellant provided his discharge chart from the Cornwall hospital stay but believes we are missing two pages, that someone stole those two pages, and suggests that Dr. Zaid was responsible for their unavailability and trying to do a cover-up. We do not have any convincing evidence to support this position nor how this would impact our determination.

24The respondent submits that we must rely on the MCR and CDF as medical evidence which both mention a cognitive impairment, and that we should take note that the appellant does not recall having Dr. Tremblay fill out the CDF nor completing the clock test with him.

25Section 16 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, permits the Tribunal to take notice of any generally recognized scientific or technical facts, information or opinions within its scientific or specialized knowledge.

26A member of the panel, Dr. Peter Savage, is a licensed physician in Ontario.

27It is a generally recognized fact within the physician panelist’s specialized knowledge that allows him to accept that the physician who filled the MCR examined the appellant over several days to make his determination. Also, Dr. Tremblay’s conclusions in the CDF filled one month later concur with it, even if the appellant has no recollection of it. Therefore, we find that the evidence demonstrates that the appellant likely suffers from a cognitive disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a vehicle safely?

28The respondent has the burden of establishing that the appellant’s cognitive impairment is likely to significantly interfere with the appellant’s ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. We find that the respondent has satisfied this burden on a balance of probabilities.

29The respondent asserts that the appellant’s medical condition significantly interferes with his ability to drive safely and relies on the medical evidence presented. It requires a satisfactory FDA to reinstate it. Although Dr. Tremblay indicated “unknown” to the question relating to the need for a FDA, the respondent submits that this means the doctor had doubts and could have checked off “no” if he felt it was not needed.

30The respondent relies on Chapter 6 of the CCMTA Standards for the proposition that as a group, those with dementia are at higher risk of adverse driving outcomes. Cognitive impairments of any nature may, or may not, affect driver fitness since there is no uniform range of effects. There is no standard set of limitations, and they can vary from one person to another. Judgement and insight are important for driving yet the usual battery of tests used to assess the extent of cognitive limitations do not evaluate these functions. Hence, an FDA is usually the most appropriate means of assessing the effects of the cognitive limitations upon driving unless severe dementia has been demonstrated, which was not the case with the appellant.

31The Respondent argues even with a mild cognitive impairment the appellant may be a safety risk to himself and others and as such an FDA is the only reliable test to ensure safety to all road users.

32The appellant argues that he does not have a cognitive impairment.

33The appellant testifies that Dr. Tremblay did not recommend or support the appellant’s return to driving.

34The appellant submits that he attempted to call the Cornwall Centre approved to perform an FDA, but that there were no more appointments in Cornwall. We have no further evidence supporting this. He also adds that his son and daughter drive him when needed and that he walks to the grocery store.

35While we recognize that the CCMTA Standards are not binding upon us, we find that their application is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The CCMTA Standards speak to the negative impact a cognitive impairment is likely to have on his ability to drive safely and we agree that they apply in this case. We do agree that a satisfactory FDA is appropriate based on our finding that the appellant suffers from a cognitive impairment.

36We find that the respondent has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s cognitive impairment is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely, and unless he can provide a satisfactory FDA, his driver’s licence should remain suspended.

ORDER

37For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the respondent’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Dr. Peter Savage, Member

Geneviève Painchaud, Vice-Chair