Tribunals Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal

Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16623/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Crystal Mines

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

AMENDED DECISION and ORDER

VICE-CHAIR:

Genevieve Painchaud

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Crystal Mines

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent for the Registrar

LAT Observer:

Jeremy Roberts, Vice-Chair

Heard by Teleconference:

January 20, 2025

1Crystal Mines (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2025 Acura on January 7, 2025, for 45 days under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act , R.S.O. 1990, c.H.8 (the “Act”).

2The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) that the Registrar release the vehicle.

3For the Tribunal to order the vehicle released, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she satisfies at least one of the five grounds set out in s. 50.2(3) of the Act. The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship (s. 50.2(3)(d)).

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

i. Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?

RESULT

5I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship. The Registrar’s impoundment of the vehicle is upheld.

ANALYSIS

Circumstances leading to the impoundment

6Under s. 55.1 of the Act, where a police officer is satisfied that a person was driving a motor vehicle while his or her licence was under suspension for certain Criminal Code convictions, the officer must detain and impound the vehicle.

7At the time the appellant’s vehicle was detained, it was being driven by Brandon Pratt, boyfriend of the appellant. The respondent presented unrefuted evidence that the driver’s licence was under suspension for a prescribed Criminal Code offence pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act at the time it was detained. Accordingly, the vehicle was lawfully impounded.

Exceptional Hardship

8I find the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship.

9 Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”), under the Act, sets out the criteria the Tribunal must consider in determining whether an impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

10 Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

11Only if there is no alternative may I consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle or a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.

12Further, I may only consider other consequences of the impoundment such as financial or economic loss, or loss of employment or education in determining whether the exceptional hardship test has been met, if the owner demonstrates not only that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, but also that the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting, will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, and that the impact of the loss will be upon someone other than the suspended driver.

13In order to establish that there is no alternative, s. 10(4) of the Regulation requires the owner of the impounded vehicle to demonstrate that every reasonable option has been explored and inquired into, including using another vehicle or arranging to be without any vehicle.

14The appellant testified that she shares custody of her 5-year-old son, and currently lives with Brandon Pratt who was the driver of the vehicle. She was unaware that Mr. Pratt did not hold a valid driver’s licence when she allowed him to use her car on several occasions. Her employment necessitates that she has the use of a car that is less than 5 years old, and she uses her car approximately 4 days a week to travel to see clients. She also has a second job that she needs to drive to three days per week. Since the impoundment she has relied initially on Ubers and her parents have since lent her funds for a rental car which she has for one more day. The cost of continuing to rent cars or use Ubers is something she submits she is unable to afford.

15The appellant also testified that there is minimal public transit in Winona, so that option would not be appropriate for work and driving her son to school on days he is with her as her son’s school and her work are in different cities. She does not have access to any other vehicle. The appellant states she will not be able to go to work without a car and may lose her job.

16The appellant further testified that she could lose access to her child if she cannot get him back and forth to school and to his father. She stated no other method of transportation is feasible for her circumstances as they are unaffordable. The appellant also stated she is concerned the impound fees will be detrimental to her.

17The respondent submits the appellant does not meet the criteria for exceptional hardship and seeks confirmation of the impoundment. The respondent submitted the appellant has other methods of transportation available to her as she has rented a vehicle and used Uber.

18I find the appellant has not met her burden in demonstrating exceptional hardship.

19I find the appellant has not demonstrated that there are no other alternatives to transportation available as she has been using Uber and renting a vehicle, nor demonstrated a threat to the health and safety of the appellant or her family as a result of the impoundment.

20Although there are negative financial consequences to using Uber or renting a car, the evidence did not demonstrate that these rise to the level of exceptional hardship. This is a temporary financial hardship and by accessing alternate transportation options, I find it unlikely that the appellant will risk losing her employment or custody of her child.

CONCLUSION

21I agree with the Registrar. The appellant has reasonable alternatives to the vehicle during the period of impoundment. As such, the appellant has failed to satisfy the Tribunal on a balance of probabilities that she meets the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation as she has reasonable alternatives available to her.

ORDER

22For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment order.

Released: January 28^th, 2025

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