Jonathan Rusnak v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 5864

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16452/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Jonathan Rusnak

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS:

Dr. Kailey Minnings, Member Jeffery Campbell, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Jonathan Rusnak, Appellant

For the Respondent:

Melissa Litrenta, Representative

Heard by teleconference:

January 9, 2025

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

1Jonathan Rusnak (the “appellant”) appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to suspend the driver’s licence for medical reasons.

2The Registrar sent the appellant a letter dated June 20, 2024, indicating his driver’s licence was suspended. This was following the receipt of an unsolicited Medical Condition Report dated June 16, 2024.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant is suffering from medical conditions, namely, mental health condition and substance use disorder that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

4The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1) of the Act to suspend a person’s driver’s licence. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that he or she is able to drive safely.

5The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act.

6Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing, the Tribunal may confirm, modify or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

7On December 27, 2024, the appellant filed with the Tribunal a Notice of Motion requesting that he be permitted to audio record the hearing. By way of directive from the Tribunal, dated January 3, 2025, the parties were advised that the motion would be heard at the commencement of the hearing.

8The Registrar took no position with respect to the motion to record.

9Upon questioning, the appellant advised that he wished to record the hearing in order to “show the media and to post the recording on his Twitter account”.

10Rule 13.3 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”) states that a party who wishes to make his or her own recording of a hearing may do so if authorized by the Tribunal and subject to the party undertaking to comply with any restrictions on use of the recordings specified by the Tribunal.

11The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O., 1990, c.S.22, (“SPPA”) section 29 sets forth the parameters in which a recording of a hearing before the Tribunal may be permitted. Section 29(1) states that no hearing shall be recorded, published, broadcasted, or reproduced. Section 29(2) states the exceptions to subsection (1) Subsection (2) states:

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply with respect to,

(a) the unobtrusive making of notes or sketches of events at a hearing by a person;

(b) the making of an audio recording at a hearing, unobtrusively and in a manner authorized by the tribunal, by a representative, a party acting on their own behalf or a journalist, for the sole purpose of supplementing or replacing notes; or

(c) subject to the authorization of the tribunal, any act referred to in subsection (1),

(i) if it is required for the presentation of evidence, the making of a record or any other purpose of the hearing,

(ii) with the consent of the parties and witnesses, or

(iii) in connection with any ceremonial proceeding.

12The Appellant was advised of the contents of subsections 29(1) and (2) of the SPPA and was asked again as to his purpose for recording the hearing. The Appellant again advised that his purpose was to “show the media and to post on Twitter”.

13It is clear from the Appellant’s responses that the purpose of recording the hearing does not comply with s. 29(2) of the SPPA. As such, the motion to record the hearing is denied.

ISSUE IN DISPUTE:

14The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.

15To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:

a. Does the appellant suffer from medical conditions, namely mental health condition and substance use disorder?

b. If the appellant does suffer from the above conditions, or either of them, is it or are they likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of applicable class safely?

RESULT

16For the reasons set out below, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

a. Does the appellant suffer from medical conditions?

17The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from both medical conditions alleged, namely mental health condition and substance use disorder.

18In support of its allegation that the appellant suffers from these medical conditions, the Registrar relies on a Medical Condition Report (“MCR”) dated June 12, 2024. Although the signature on the MCR is illegible, the identification stamp indicates that the MCR originates from the Central Hastings Family Health Clinic. The MCR also indicates that the appellant’s family/treating physician completed the form.

19The MCR states that the appellant is suffering from a psychiatric condition due to acute psychosis. The physician also noted “psychosis, no insight”.

20Following the receipt of the MCR, the Registrar, by letter to the appellant dated June 20, 2024, notified that the appellant’s driver’s licence is suspended due to a Mental Health Condition. The Registrar required the appellant to have a medical professional complete the enclosed Mental Health Disorder form (“MHD form”).

21The Registrar presented an MHD form, which indicates the appellant’s psychiatric disorders as Major Depressive Disorder and Anxiety Disorder. That MHD form indicates that the appellant underwent a Functional Assessment, including a functional driving assessment, and had passed that assessment. However, we find this report unreliable because: it is only partially completed; it is undated; it lacks both the name and signature of the person who completed it; and it is missing page 4 entirely. Further, the information included on the form is contradictory: it indicates that the current status of the patient’s condition is stable with symptoms resolved, stable with ongoing symptoms, and deteriorating. For these reasons, we do not assign weight to this form.

22The Registrar also submitted a copy of a Form 42 - Notice to Patient Under Section 38(1) [of the Mental Health Act] dated July 18, 2024 and signed by Dr. Swartz, an emergency room physician. The Form 42 states that the examining physician has reasonable cause to believe that the appellant has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself, and that he is suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious physical impairment and has made an application for a psychiatric assessment.

23The Registrar also presented two Form 30s – Notice to Patient under Subsection 38(1) [of the Mental Health Act] which inform the appellant of involuntary admission to hospital. The first Form 30 dated July 21, 2024 and signed by Dr. G. Villella, psychiatrist at Windsor Regional Hospital, indicates an opinion that the appellant is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious physical impairment of himself, unless he remains in the custody of a psychiatric facility. The second Form 30 is dated August 8, 2024 and is signed by psychiatrist Dr. C. Velehorschi. It indicates that Dr. Velehorschi is of the opinion that the appellant is suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious bodily harm to another person. The appellant was subsequently discharged on August 20, 2024.

24The Registrar points to one page of an August 20, 2024 discharge summary, which indicates a discharge diagnosis of psychosis and contains details of a scheduled follow up appointment with a psychiatrist at the Mental Health Post Discharge Clinic at Ouellette Hospital. Also included in the Registrar’s submissions is a discharge prescription for olanzapine tablets, which Dr. Minnings notes is a medication used to treat psychosis. She takes note of this as a licensed physician in Ontario, and as authorized by s.16 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22

25A second Mental Health Disorder form (“MHD form 2) completed by the appellant’s family physician Dr. Geoffrey Sinton dated September 11, 2024 was submitted by the Registrar. In that form, Dr. Sinton indicated that the appellant is suffering from Schizophrenia or other Psychotic Disorder. Dr. Sinton further indicated that the appellant suffers from delusions, agitation, difficulty with judgement, with the most recent illness episode occurring 3-6 months ago. When asked whether the patient has appropriate insight/sufficient understanding of his medical condition and the impacts on his functional ability to drive, Dr. Sinton indicated no. Although the form also indicates that the appellant’s ongoing symptoms were moderate and improving, that he was adhering to recommended treatment and did not require a functional driving assessment, it also states that the appellant had been admitted to hospital two or more times in the previous 12 months due to psychiatric illness. The form also indicates that the appellant has had an active Substance Use Disorder within the last 12 months.

26On October 2, 2024 the Registrar notified the appellant by letter that, due to the receipt of the MHD form 2, his medical conditions now include Substance Use Disorder and require further information. They requested that the enclosed Substance Use Assessment form (“SUA form”) be completed by a medical professional who would then submit it to the Registrar. No completed SUA form was subsequently received by the Registrar.

27The appellant did not present any medical documentation to contradict the indications of the MCR form or the September 11, 2024 MHD form. While he testified that his most recent admission to hospital included a stay in the psychiatric intensive care unit, the appellant denies that he suffers from psychosis, or any mental health condition. He did testify that he does not drink alcohol or take drugs. He further testified that he currently does not take prescribed medication, as he is a naturopath and does not take pharmaceutical medications. He testified that he is currently not under the care of a psychiatrist.

Conclusion regarding Mental Health Condition

28With respect to the diagnosis of Mental Health Condition, we are satisfied that the medical documentation (the MCR form, the hospital discharge documents, as well as the September 11, 2024 MHD form) are definitive with respect to the appellant’s diagnosis of psychiatric conditions. The MCR and discharge summary relates that the appellant suffers from psychosis. The September 11, 2024 MHD form states that the appellant suffers from schizophrenia or other Psychotic Disorder. It is also evident from the documentation before us that the appellant has been hospitalized at least twice with respect to his psychiatric illness. The appellant did not present any medical evidence to dispute the diagnoses on the MCR and MHD forms.

29We conclude therefore, based upon the evidence before us, that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a Mental Health Condition.

Conclusion regarding Substance Use Disorder

30It is the testimony of the appellant that, as he is a truck driver, he does not drink or take drugs. It is the opinion of his family doctor, however, that the appellant does suffer from substance use disorder. The previously mentioned Substance Use Disorder form which was to be completed by a medical professional would have provided more insight into that disorder or would have confirmed the appellant’s assertion that he does not suffer from it. The appellant was instructed to deliver the SUA form to a medical professional, who would have submitted that to the Registrar. This did not occur. It is the submission of the Registrar that they never received the SUA form.

31We prefer the family doctor’s diagnosis that the appellant suffers from substance use disorder, over the testimony of the appellant. As stated, the diagnosis was provided, not by an ER physician or another medical professional who may have attended to the appellant once; rather, the diagnosis is from his family physician who has the most comprehensive and intimate medical knowledge of the appellant.

32We conclude based upon the evidence before us, that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from Substance Use Disorder.

b. Are either or both of the appellant’s Mental Health Condition and Substance Use Disorder likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of applicable class safely?

Mental Health Condition

33In support of their decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence due to his mental health condition, the Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators (“CCMTA”) Standard 14.6.1, which states that a driver with a psychiatric disorder is eligible for a licence if his condition is stable, he has sufficient insight to stop driving if condition becomes acute, his functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired, a treating physician supports a return to driving and the conditions for maintaining a licence are met. One of these conditions is that the driver remain under regular medical supervision and comply with the prescribed psychotropic medication regime or other recommended treatment.

34The Tribunal is entitled to take the Standards into consideration but is not bound by them. The overriding consideration in this appeal is whether the Registrar has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. While the CCMTA Standards are well-reasoned and helpful, every case must be considered on its own facts.

35The Registrar submits that the appellant’s mental health condition of psychosis is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely. The Registrar relies upon the comment of family physician, Dr. Sinton, on the MHD form 2 that the appellant does have difficulty with judgment and insight, specifically, that there is insufficient insight into his condition and the impacts on his functional ability to drive. We note that on that same form, Dr. Sinton did not state that the appellant’s condition was stable, but was improving with on-going moderate symptoms of delusions and agitation. While we also note that Dr. Sinton did not view the appellant to have difficulties with cognition, attention or memory and that he did not require a further independent functional assessment, which may include an on-road driving evaluation, he did not indicate that he supports the appellant’s return to driving.

36The appellant relies upon the appellant’s Extended Driver Record Search, submitted by the Registrar. That search reveals that the appellant held his driver’s licence from April 10, 2007 and had one speeding infraction in September, 2022. The appellant submits this as evidence that he is a safe driver.

37Although not bound by the CCMTA Standards, the Tribunal may consider them when making its decision. We find the CCMTA Standards reasonable here. These Standards are the result of a lengthy and intensive process to provide medical standards based on the best evidence available and with a focus on functional ability to drive rather than exclusively on medical diagnoses. Our review of the evidence shows that none of the conditions recommended for licensing outlined in the CCMTA Standard 14.6.1 have been met.

38We therefore conclude that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s Mental Health Condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

Substance Use Disorder

39As we have found that the appellant suffers from a Mental Health Condition and that that condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely, it is unnecessary to consider the effects of the appellant’s Substance Use Disorder on his ability to drive.

Conclusion

40We conclude that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely, a mental health condition, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

49For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

Dr. Kailey Minnings, Member

Jeffery Campbell, Vice Chair