RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 25-002718/AABS
Case Name: Harpreet Grewal v. Peel Mutual Insurance Company et al.
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Imtiaz Hosein, Counsel Christos P. Kakaletris, Articling Student
For Peel Mutual Insurance Company: Jonathan Schrieder, Counsel
For Joan Saunders: Melinda Baxter, Counsel
For Dynamic Functional Solutions Inc.: Nicholas R. Carmichael, Counsel
For Dr. Velan Sivasubramanian, Dr. Gilbert Yu Ming Yee, Dr. James Kenneth Stewart, and Dr. Mohamed Bahaa Khaled: Ian MacLeod, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On April 17, 2025, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s order dated April 14, 2025 (the “decision”).
2In accordance with Rule 3.4(b) of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”), the decision ordered that the applicant’s application was dismissed without a hearing.
3Briefly, the applicant named Peel Mutual Insurance Company, Dynamic Functional Solutions Inc., Dr. Gilbert Yu Ming Yee, Dr. Velan Sivasubramanian, Dr. James Kenneth Stewart, Dr. Mohamed Bahaa Khaled, Joan Saunders, and Jennifer O’Keefe as respondents to the application (“named respondents”). Through this application, she is seeking damages (with interest) from the named respondents, as well as a declaration that Peel Mutual Insurance Company has breached O. Reg. 534/06, “Prescribed Information for the Purposes of Section 101.1 of the Act”.
4In the decision, I found that none of the relief sought by the applicant could be granted by the Tribunal (at paragraph 15): “Regardless of whether they can be added as parties is immaterial, as the relief being sought from the named respondents is not available from the Tribunal.” Therefore, the application was dismissed without a hearing as it “relates to matters that are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction”, pursuant to Rule 3.4(b).
5The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
6The applicant relies on Rule 18.2(b) in her request for reconsideration. She is seeking an order to have the Tribunal “process and hear” the application.
7All the named respondents, save for Jennifer O’Keefe, provided responding submissions. They ask the Tribunal to dismiss this request for reconsideration.
RESULT
8The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
9I find the applicant has not demonstrated how I erred in fact or law, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
10The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
11The applicant argues that the following findings are incorrect: my conclusion that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to order damages; my interpretation of the purpose of an award claim within the larger accident benefits regime; and my determination that the Tribunal’s remedial powers are limited to the payment of accident benefits. The applicant also takes issue with the comments I made about the potential overlap between the tort of intimidation and an award claim.
12I find many of the arguments raised by the applicant are attempts to re-litigate positions that were not successful at first instance. For example, the applicant claims that I erred by determining that “the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to award the remedies she seeks – damages for the torts committed against her.” This question was central to the decision, and many of the arguments made in her reconsideration submissions were addressed during the initial hearing. Re-litigation is not a proper use of the reconsideration process.
13Further, I find the applicant has not shown how my analysis about the Tribunal’s remedial powers is incorrect in law or fact. Though the applicant once again relies on Yang v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 ONCA 178 (“Yang”); Dorman v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2021 ONCA 314; and Stegenga v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 615 (“Stegenga”) to support her position, there is no explanation about why my reliance on Keulen v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 2033 (“Keulen”) and Grewal v. Peel Mutual Insurance Company, 2024 ONSC 2085 (“Grewal”) is incorrect. As I noted in the decision, I found these recent cases were of particular import, as the Divisional Court held that the Tribunal did not have the authority to grant the kind of remedies sought by the applicant. This finding was essential to my dismissal of the application, yet the applicant does not establish how this part of my analysis is incorrect in law or fact.
14Similarly, though the applicant argues that my decision “misinterprets a permissive grant of statutory authority to confer a special award, interest and/or costs, as a restriction on the availability of common law damages in the Tribunal”, this argument runs counter to the findings in Keulen and Grewal. For instance, Justice Corbett states at paragraph 4 of Grewal:
The LAT has not been granted authority to award punitive damages; it has been granted authority to deem benefits incurred, to make a “special award”, and to award interest and/or costs, all remedies that may be used to respond to insurer misconduct. There is nothing unclear or ambiguous about these provisions.
15Therefore, while the applicant may cite Owners, Strata Plan LMS 3905 v. Crystal Square Parking Corp., 2020 SCC 29 and ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4 as interpretative guides for their preferred analysis, the fact remains that there are recent, binding determinations on the core question before the Tribunal that state the type of remedy being sought is not available.
16The Divisional Court’s comment about the Legislature’s “policy choice” in Keulen is also an important answer to some of the claims made by the applicant. For instance, the applicant submits that limiting the scope of s. 280 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 “solely to ‘benefits’ and ‘amounts’” is “contrary to the interpretative approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Stegenga”. However, this argument runs counter to the Divisional Court’s observations at paragraph 15 of Keulen:
These are “different remedies” than an award of punitive damages, a “policy choice” made the Legislature. I conclude that the LAT was correct in finding that Stegenga is binding authority establishing that the LAT has no jurisdiction to award punitive damages in SABS cases.
17In other words, though the applicant may argue about whether her claims against the named respondents fall under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, her arguments ignore the core finding of the decision—my conclusion (based on binding case law) that the Tribunal cannot grant the remedies being sought. Without showing how this determination (or a constituent finding) amounts to an error, I find that Rule 18.2(b) is not engaged.
18Finally, the applicant challenges this finding from paragraph 19 of the decision:
Finally, I do note that a reading of Yang could support an interpretation that the claim against Peel Mutual Insurance Company for intimidation might be considered an aspect of the adjusting process. As such, it might be captured under an award request. However, as the applicant indicated on her application, she is not seeking an award.
19Specifically, the applicant claims I erred by finding that the supposed overlap between the tort of intimidation and an award claim should not mean that her request for damages is unavailable. Even if I accepted that there was an error in this part of my decision, I find the applicant has not shown how remedying the error would have changed the outcome.
20As quoted above, I determined that there may be some aspect of the adjusting process that could be captured under a claim of intimidation, such that any of the underlying, alleged misconduct could be addressed through an award. However, as no award is being sought by the applicant, I ultimately found it was irrelevant to the decision whether such an overlap existed or not. As such, even if I now determined that there is no overlap between an award and the tort of intimidation, I do not see how I would have reached a different conclusion in the decision. Put another way, this finding was an opening that could have allowed a part of the application to proceed. Therefore, if I now close this door, I will arrive at the same result—dismissing the entire application without a hearing.
21Taken together, I find the applicant has not demonstrated how I erred in fact or law, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b). As such, the applicant has not met her onus on reconsideration.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
22The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle Vice-Chair Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: June 11, 2025