Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Melissa Huntington

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Jan Dymond, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Melissa Huntington, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference: May 22, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Melissa Huntington (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2012 Porsche Cayenne (“the vehicle”) under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on April 20, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while her licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that her driver’s licence did not have a condition on it requiring an ignition interlock device (“IID”) and that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

3Although the appellant has raised as a ground of appeal that her licence is not subject to the interlock condition, the respondent’s position is that this is not relevant because the reason for the impoundment was that the appellant’s licence was suspended and not because she was driving without an IID.

4The Registrar submitted documents confirming that the driver’s licence of the driver of the vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was under suspension. Accordingly, I find that the vehicle was lawfully impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act.

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

5Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal. That section limits the grounds upon which the Tribunal can order the release of the vehicle. The appellant’s appeal is based on the grounds that the impounded did not have a condition prohibiting the driver from driving a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device under s.50.2(3)(b.1) of the Act and that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

6For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant’s appeal under s.50.2(3)(b.1) of the Act is not relevant to the circumstances of the impoundment and that the appellant has failed to establish that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE:

7At the hearing, the respondent filed a motion that the application be dismissed on the ground that the appellant is not the owner of the motor vehicle as defined under s.50.2(11) of the Act and therefore she is not entitled to appeal the impoundment of the motor vehicle under s.50.2 of the Act.

8In cross-examination of the appellant, the respondent notes that the registered owner of the vehicle according to Ministry of Transportation (“Ministry”) records is a company, CTD Auto Silver and Transport Inc. (“CTD”). The appellant testifies that she is not an owner of CTD.

9The appellant testifies that she has leased the vehicle on a lease-to-buy basis from CTD since 2021 and that the vehicle will be transferred to her name in August of 2025. She testified that at the time she leased the vehicle and until January 2025, she was living in Quebec. She also confirmed that she had an ignition interlock device installed on the vehicle from the start of the leasing period until the removal of the IID requirement in Quebec in June 2024. She submits that as a lessee, her appeal should be heard.

10The respondent produced a Registrant Identification summary listing CTD as the owner of the vehicle. The appellant is not listed a lessee on Ministry records. The respondent confirmed that a leasing company is not required to notify the Ministry when a vehicle is leased but submits that without such a listing, the appellant does not meet the definition of owner under s.50.2(11) of the Act and, therefore, is ineligible to appeal.

11I reserved my decision and invited the parties to submit any documentary evidence in support of their respective positions by 5:00 p.m. on Friday, May 23, 2025.

12The respondent objected to my Order to provide the parties with time to file additional documents. They submitted that the respondent had provided documentary proof of their position and that to provide the appellant with additional time to submit documents would be prejudicial to the respondent. The respondent did not elaborate as to how the respondent would be prejudiced.

13I considered the respondent’s objection and confirmed my Order for the following reasons. Although the respondent was aware of the ownership registration in advance of the hearing, they did not notify the appellant of their intention to raise ownership as an issue in advance of the hearing. I do not find any prejudice to the respondent in allowing the parties a brief time to submit documentary evidence with respect to the respondent’s motion. On the other hand, the appellant was not aware of the respondent’s intention to raise ownership as an issue and, therefore, did not have an opportunity to submit evidence to address the respondent’s claim in advance of the hearing. As a result, I find that procedural fairness requires that the appellant be provided with time to provide documentary evidence to address the respondent’s motion. In my opinion, to do otherwise would significantly prejudice the appellant.

14The respondent did not submit additional documents.

15The appellant submitted copies of a service contract in her name with a Quebec-based IID provider, Smart Start, dated September 3, 2021 and monthly statements from Smart Start that confirmed an IID was installed on the impounded motor vehicle from September 2021 to May 31, 2024. The appellant also submitted a copy of her lease agreement with CTD Auto Silver and Transport Inc. confirming that she leased the impounded motor vehicle on August 31, 2021. I note that the lease agreement was received by the Tribunal past the 5:00 p.m. deadline at 5:28 p.m.; however, I find that it was not egregiously late-filed and that its direct bearing on the issue in dispute argues in favour of its acceptance.

16I am persuaded by the appellant’s oral testimony and supporting documentary evidence that she was the lessee of the vehicle at the time it was impounded. I find, therefore, that she is the beneficial owner of the vehicle. I next must determine whether the appellant’s status as the lessee/beneficial owner entitles her to appeal the impoundment under s.50.2 of the Act.

17In Davis v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2021 CanLII 114048 (ON LAT), Vice Chair Osterberg found that “while s. 50.2(11) states that “owner” means “persons whose names appear on the certificate of registration,” it does not limit the meaning to only those persons. I find that the word “owner”, as it appears in s. 50.2(1), may include the actual owner and the beneficial owner in addition to the registered owner, depending on the circumstances under consideration.”

18Vice Chair Osterberg notes as follows: ”The purpose of s. 50.2 is to provide the owner of a motor vehicle the right to appeal an impoundment for certain specified grounds,” and further that, “the Legislature provided for the right to appeal so that the owner is not required to bear the consequences of impoundment.”

19If the Registrar’s interpretation is correct, then a lessee who is a beneficial owner can only appeal if the lessor registers the lessee with the Ministry. I do not accept that the Legislature intended to provide the beneficial owner of such a vehicle no means of appealing an impoundment.

20I agree with Vice Chair Osterberg’s analysis that it is more likely that the intention of the Legislature in s. 50.2(11) was to simplify appeals where a vehicle is actually registered and where there might otherwise be an issue as to whether the appellant is the owner of the vehicle. In other words, where the vehicle has been registered in the appellant’s name, the Registrar cannot argue that the appellant is precluded from appealing because he or she is not the actual owner of the impounded vehicle. Where the vehicle has not been registered in the name of the appellant, it would be open for the Registrar to require that the appellant prove ownership as a prerequisite to appealing the impoundment.

21I find that, in this case, the appellant has demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities that she is an owner of the vehicle and entitled to file an appeal of the impoundment under s.50.2 of the Act.

The appellant’s appeal under s.50.2(3)(b1)) of the Act is dismissed.

22The appellant’s appeal on the ground that the impounded did not have a condition prohibiting the driver from driving a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device under s.50.2(3)(b.1) of the Act is dismissed.

23The appellant submits that the vehicle should not have been impounded because she made efforts from September of 2024 to March 2025 to have her licence reinstated based on her successful completion of an IID requirement and remedial program in Quebec. She testifies that she applied for reinstatement of her driver’s licence and paid a reinstatement fee on September 13, 2024 when visiting Ontario and after being advised by an OPP officer that her Quebec driver’s licence was not valid in Ontario because of an outstanding Ontario licence suspension. She further testifies that she moved back to Ontario in January 2025 and, on March 19, 2025 she inquired with Service Ontario about the status of her reinstatement application, at which time she says she was advised to submit her Quebec documents and told that reinstatement would take approximately 15 days. She testifies that she again contacted Service Ontario on April 21, 2025, one day following the impoundment of the vehicle. She was notified on April 28, 2025 that her driver’s licence was reinstated. The appellant acknowledges that she continued to drive her vehicle while awaiting reinstatement.

24I acknowledge the appellant’s efforts to reinstate her driver’s licence, the delays she experienced and the unfortunate timing of the vehicle being impounded just days before her licence was reinstated. Nonetheless, the appellant’s licence remained suspended when she made the decision to drive her vehicle.

25The registrar submitted documents establishing that the Ontario driver’s licence of the driver at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded was suspended in 2015 and remained suspended until April 28, 2025 for failure to complete a remedial program. Section 1, Driver Information, of the Notice to Registrar indicates the code ‘N” under Restrictions. The respondent’s representative testifies that the Restrictions box would indicate “Y” if the driver’s licence of the driver is subject to an IID restriction. In other words, the Notice to Registrar does not indicate that the impoundment is a result of driving a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device. The respondent also submitted the driver’s record of the driver which does not indicate that the driver’s licence of the driver ever required the use of an IID.

26I find that the vehicle was not impounded because the driver’s licence of the driver is subject to an IID requirement but because it was suspended, and, therefore, the ground is not relevant to the appeal. As result, the appellant’s appeal under s.50.2(3)(b1)) is dismissed.

The appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s.50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

27I find that the appellant has not established exceptional hardship under the Act and the appeal must be dismissed as a result.

28The burden is on the appellant to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as defined in the Act and regulations.

29Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

30Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

31If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

32If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3) of the Regulation, if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

33The appellant testifies that she lives in a smaller community and needed her vehicle to get to work. She further testifies that, as a result of the impoundment, she was unable to get to work and was terminated by her employer. She testifies that she decided to move back to Quebec to live with family on a temporary basis to save money to pay the impoundment fees and mitigate the financial impact of the impoundment. She testifies that she used a ride-share to travel from Ontario to Quebec. She testifies that she has been able to secure other employment in Ontario and would rent a vehicle to return to Ontario if the vehicle is not released.

34The respondent submits that the appellant has not met her onus to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available because she has been able to meet her day-to-day needs by relying on family and through alternatives such as ride-shares and that she is able to rent a vehicle, if necessary. The respondent submits, therefore, that the impoundment is an inconvenience rather than a hardship and requests that the impoundment be confirmed.

35I find that the appellant has been able to meet her day-to-day needs by staying with family members and through the use of ride-share services rental vehicles. For these reasons, I find that the appellant has been able to mitigate her loss of access to the impounded vehicle.

36For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that she has no alternatives to the impounded vehicle during the impound period, under s.10(1) of the Regulation.

37As a result of the above finding, I find the appellant has failed to establish exceptional hardship as a ground for releasing the appellant’s vehicle under 50.(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

38The Act permits impacts of an impoundment such as economic loss/financial hardship to be considered only under limited circumstances and only if there is first a finding that no alternative vehicle is available. As I have found that the appellant has failed to establish that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle, I need not consider the ground of financial/economic hardship.

ORDER

39On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing and the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.