Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17129/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Sarah M. Adamson

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Sarah M. Adamson, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: June 2, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Sarah M. Adamson, the appellant, appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on May 18, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Dacota Douglas Kidd (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. whether that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

5I find the appellant has failed to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and her appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed.

6Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

7If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

8The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

9The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

10The appellant testified that she relies on impounded vehicle to take her five-month-old son to his urgent medical appointments and to get herself to her college classes.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

11The appellant says she is on maternity leave and is receiving only 55% of her normal income. Her partner, her child’s father, lives with her and is unemployed. The appellant says that she is unable to take her son to medical appointments and she is unable to attend her collage course due to the impoundment.

12With respect to her son, the appellant says she is required to attend at her son’s pediatrician’s office once a month to get a prescription refilled for her son’s stomach ailment. She says this has to be done in the next week or so and she will have to ask her mother to take them if the impounded vehicle is not released in time. She may also “move some money around” so that she can take the Go bus if her mother cannot driver her.

13The appellant says that her son also requires tongue tie surgery which has had to be rescheduled and is due to have his 6-month vaccination appointment. Again, the appellant says that she will either have to pay for a Go bus or ask her mother for assistance in order to get her son to these appointments if her vehicle remains impounded.

14Finally, the appellant says that she has to take her son to physiotherapy to help him with a neck issue that he has had since birth. Although she has home exercises she has been shown, the appellant says that she takes her son into see the physiotherapist once a week for assessments. The appellant says that she has not investigated whether public transit is available that will get her to the physiotherapy appointments.

15The appellant says she cannot afford to take her son to his doctor appointments using Go bus since that would cost her about $30 per trip. However, the appellant acknowledges that her mother may be able to take her to at least some of the appointments. In my view, the use of public transportation along with assistance from her mother constitute reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. The appellant’s evidence that she is not able to afford to take the limited number of Go bus rides to take her son to the doctor is not supported by the evidence and I do not accept her testimony to that effect.

16I find that the appellant has reasonable alternatives available to bring her son to the doctors for the purposes described at the hearing. With respect to physiotherapy, the appellant has failed to investigate the cost of taking public transportation and I am not satisfied by the evidence that no alternatives are available for that purpose.

17With respect to college, the appellant testified that she decided to take a course while she is on maternity leave from her employment and that course requires her attendance at Seneca College on Thursdays and Fridays of every week. The appellant is able to complete her school work from home on most days and did not describe what efforts she has made to determine if her absence on Thursdays and Fridays can be accommodated in her current circumstances. In my view, the appellant has not established that she has considered or inquired into every reasonable option to mitigate her loss in this regard as is required by the Regulation.

Conclusion

18I find that the appellant has not established that there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle as set out in the Regulation and she has therefore not proven that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under the Regulation.

ORDER

19The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: June 3, 2025

__________________________

Colin Osterberg

Vice-Chair