Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 23-005348/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Sonnet Insurance Company
Applicant
and
Iqlass Aden
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR: Tanjoyt Deol
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Pina Carusone, Counsel
For the Respondent: Iqlass Aden, respondent, no submissions provided
HEARD: By way of written submissions
OVERVIEW
1Iqlass Aden (the “respondent”) alleges that she was involved in an automobile accident on October 28, 2020, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). Sonnet Insurance Company (“the applicant”) has applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) as it takes the position that the respondent was not involved in an accident, wilfully misrepresented material facts, and seeks its costs.
ISSUES
2The issues in dispute are:
i. Was the respondent involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule?
ii. Is the applicant entitled to terminate the payment of benefits because the respondent wilfully misrepresented material facts with respect to the “accident” and her application for benefits under s. 53 of the Schedule?
iii. Is the respondent liable to pay costs pursuant to Rule 19 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023, (the “Rules”)?
3I note that both in the Case Conference Report and Order (“CCRO”) released on January 8, 2024, and in the applicant’s written submissions, it submits that one of the issues in dispute is whether the respondent is barred from proceeding to a hearing because she made fraudulent and/or wilful misrepresentations to the applicant and received accident benefits payments because of these misrepresentations. Confusingly, the applicant refers to section 52 of the Schedule when seeking this relief. However, as acknowledged by the applicant in its submissions, section 52 pertains to repayments by insured persons to insurers in certain circumstances, but it does not allow the Tribunal to bar the respondent from proceeding to a hearing. In a similar vein, the applicant seeks relief under section 53 of the Schedule that it was entitled to terminate the payment of benefits to the respondent because she made wilful misrepresentations. Therefore, in my view, it seems that the applicant is not seeking an order that the respondent be barred from proceeding to a hearing, but rather seeks repayment under s. 52 and a termination of benefits under s. 53. As such, these issues have been reflected above.
4In the event that the applicant is seeking an Order that the respondent be barred from proceeding to a hearing, I find that it has not met its onus because it has not referred me to any section of the Schedule that supports such a relief. Notably, section 55 of the Schedule outlines the three circumstances where the Tribunal can bar an insured person from proceeding; however, making fraudulent and/or wilful misrepresentations is not listed as one of the circumstances. Therefore, I cannot grant a remedy that does not exist in the Schedule.
RESULT
5For the reasons outlined below, I find that:
I. The respondent has not established that she was involved in an “accident” pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
II. The applicant is entitled to terminate the payment of benefits to the respondent pursuant to s. 53 of the Schedule.
III. The respondent is not liable to pay costs.
ANALYSIS
Can the Tribunal Proceed in Absence of the Respondent’s Submissions?
6The respondent did not provide written submissions for this hearing. Accordingly, I must be satisfied that the respondent received notice of this written hearing, in compliance with the Statutory Powers Procedure Act (“SPPA”) R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.
7Section 7(2) of the SPPA allows this Tribunal to proceed with a scheduled written hearing in the absence of a party if it is satisfied that the absent party was given proper notice of the written hearing. On March 27, 2025, I issued an Order for the Tribunal to provide a copy of the Notice of Written Hearing to a further address and to allow the respondent an opportunity to provide written submissions by April 28, 2025. This was done as there were concerns that the respondent had not received the previous Notice of Written Hearing as it had been returned to the Tribunal with a notation that it was sent to the wrong address for the respondent. I am now satisfied that the respondent was served notice, by way of mail, of the written hearing to the address set out on the applicant’s Affidavit of Service dated July 10, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with s. 7(2) of the SPPA, I may proceed with this hearing in her absence.
Was the respondent involved in an “accident”?
8I find that the respondent has not met her onus to prove that she was involved in an “accident” pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
9Section 3(1) of the Schedule defines an “accident” as “an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment.”
10In Greenhalgh v. ING Halifax Insurance Co., 2004 CanLII 21045 (ON CA) (“Greenhalgh”), the Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the caselaw and determined that, in order to satisfy the definition of an “accident” under the Schedule, an insured person must meet the purpose test as set out in Amos v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 1995 CanLII 66 (SCC), as well as the causation test as set out in Chisholm v. Liberty Mutual Group, 2002 CanLII 45020 (ON CA). This test was adopted and amended to meet the Schedule’s current and more narrow definition, requiring an insured person to satisfy the following tests:
i. Purpose test: Did the incident arise out of the use or operation of an automobile?
ii. Causation test: Did the use or operation of an automobile directly cause the impairment?
11The causation test then requires the adjudicator to determine if these “ordinary and well-known activities” were the direct cause of the insured person’s impairments by focusing on the following considerations in sequential order:
i. The “but for” consideration;
ii. The “intervening act” consideration, which may be used to determine if some other event took place that cannot be said to be part of the ordinary course of use or operation of the vehicle; and,
iii. When faced with a number of possible causes, the “dominant feature” consideration focuses on whether the ordinary and well-known activity is what “most directly caused the injury”.
12The applicant argues that the respondent was not involved in an “accident” as defined within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Schedule. Ultimately, the applicant’s position is that the accident did not occur as alleged by the respondent.
13The applicant notes that the respondent testified at an Examination under Oath (“EUO”) on March 12, 2021 that the 2004 Nissan Truck Murano (“Nissan”) was rear-ended, causing it to spin and be struck again on the driver’s side by an unidentified vehicle. The applicant argues that Mr. Harrison Griffiths, engineer, in his Engineering Assessment Report, dated April 26, 2021, opined that the rear-end damage to the Nissan was inconsistent with vehicle-to-vehicle contact, that the damage to the left side of the Nissan was more consistent with impacts from a square metal tubing, and the damage to the driver’s side door was consistent with low-speed sideswipe with the edge of an open front door or with a vehicle that may have been stationary.
The Purpose Test
14Neither the applicant nor respondent made submissions on whether the purpose test was met. However, as Greenhalgh instructs me, the insured person bears the onus of meeting the purpose test.
15The purpose test is a determination of whether the incident resulted from “the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles are put” See: Greenhalgh v. Put another way, for what “purpose” was the vehicle being used at the time of the incident?
16In both the Application for Accident Benefits (“OCF-1”) and at her EUO on March 12, 2021, the respondent has maintained that she was a back seat passenger in the Nissan when it was rear-ended by an unidentified vehicle, spun, and struck again by the same unidentified vehicle on the driver’s side door. Subsequently, the unidentified vehicle fled the scene of the accident.
17The applicant disagrees that an accident occurred as reported by the respondent. It relies upon the report of Mr. Griffiths, who concluded that the rear end damage to the Nissan was inconsistent with vehicle-to-vehicle contact and instead could be attributed to multiple separate impacts from the end of a square metal tubing, and that there was no mechanism to induce the loss of control or spin reported. Mr. Griffiths also opined that the various impact and set of damage to the left side of the Nissan could be attributed to various causes such as impacts from square metal tubing and/or separate impacts from a narrow rigid object, and door-opening impacts from the front and rear doors of an unidentified vehicle. Furthermore the damage to the driver’s door was consistent with a low-speed sideswipe engagement with either the edge of an open front door or a vehicle that may have been stationary. With respect to the right front corner damage, Mr. Griffiths concluded that the damage was inconsistent with the reported vehicle motions and was more characteristic of an impact with a short, rigid, abrasive object.
18To summarize, Mr. Griffiths concluded that there was no damage to the Nissan to support that it was rear-ended by another vehicle or that the left side driver’s door was impacted by a moving vehicle at a highway speed, as reported by the respondent.
19In order to support his proposition, Mr. Griffiths inspected the Nissan, he purchased metal tubing and conducted impact testing on a test vehicle that was of a similar model and year to the Nissan, took photographs of both the damage to the Nissan and test vehicle, reviewed a documented real-world collision between a 2003 Nissan Murano that was rear ended by a 2005 Lincoln Continental, and conducted door ding contact testing and contact with an open front door edge testing on the test vehicle.
20I find that the respondent has not met her onus to establish that the accident occurred as she described. If the accident occurred as she described, I would have been satisfied on, a balance of probabilities, that the purpose test was met because the accident would have occurred with the use of a vehicle on a highway on the way to get food from a restaurant, as testified by the respondent at her EUO which is an ordinary and well-known activity for which automobiles are put.
21However, I find that based on the evidence before me, I am unable to conclude that the accident occurred as reported, and I instead find, on a balance of probabilities, that the damage occurred as a result of separate multiple impacts with metal tubing, a low-speed sideswipe engagement with either the edge of an open front door or a vehicle that may have been stationary. This is because the description provided in the OCF-1 and the respondent’s EUO evidence is at odds with Mr. Griffiths’ opinion. As noted above, the respondent has maintained that the Nissan was rear-ended, spun and struck again by the same unidentified vehicle on the driver’s side door. In contrast, Mr. Griffiths concluded that the damage to the rear of the Nissan was not caused by another vehicle but rather multiple separate impacts from the end of a square metal tubing and the damage to the driver’s door was consistent with a low-speed sideswipe engagement with either the edge of an open front door or a vehicle that may have been stationary.
22I prefer the opinion of Mr. Griffiths over the EUO testimony of the respondent and the OCF-1 because Mr. Griffiths is a professional engineer who has investigation expertise with respect to motor vehicle collisions and accident reconstruction. Further, his opinion is supported by corroborating evidence, such as impact testing and a review of a real-world collision with similar vehicles. Moreover, Mr. Griffiths enclosed several photographs of the test vehicle after the testing was completed which showed similar damage to the one seen on the Nissan.
23Meanwhile, the respondent has not produced corroborating evidence to support her version of events, such as an expert engineer report, a property damage file, a motor vehicle accident report, or independent witness statements. Nor did the respondent provide any submissions or tender evidence to try and discount the findings of Mr. Griffiths. Therefore, I find that it is more likely that the damage to the Nissan occurred as opined by Mr. Griffiths, and not the way the respondent reported it.
24I also find that if the accident occurred as concluded by Mr. Griffiths, it would not meet the purpose test. This is based on the fact the respondent has provided no evidence or submissions on what purpose the vehicle was being used at the time of each impact between the Nissan and the end of a square metal tubing. Thus, I am unable to make a factual finding that the vehicle was being used for the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles are put.
25In a similar vein, Mr. Griffiths concluded that the damage to the driver’s side door was consistent with a low-speed sideswipe engagement with either the edge of an open front door or a vehicle that may have been stationary. However, once again, I do not have evidence from the respondent what purpose the vehicle was being used for at the time of a engagement with the edge of an open front door or a vehicle that may have been stationary. Without evidence or submissions from the respondent, I am unable to determine whether the vehicle was being used for the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles are put.
26In conclusion, I find that the respondent has not met her onus to establish that she was involved in an accident as described, which would have met the purpose test. Instead, I find that the damage to the Nissan occurred as opined by Mr. Griffiths, which the respondent has not established meets the purpose test. As such, on a balance of probabilities, I find that the respondent has not met her onus in proving that she was involved in an “accident” pursuant to s. 3(1).
The Direct Causation Test
27As I have determined that the purpose test has not been met, I do not need to engage whether the direct causation test would be met.
Did the respondent commit wilful misrepresentation and fraud?
28Section 53 of the Schedule allows an insurer to terminate the payment of benefits if the insured person has wilfully misrepresented material facts with respect to the application for the benefit, and if the insurer provides the insured person with a notice setting out the reasons for the termination.
29The applicant submits that the respondent wilfully misrepresented the material facts of how the accident occurred, and therefore the applicant was entitled to terminate her benefits on May 26, 2021.
30I find that the applicant was entitled to terminate the benefits on May 26, 2021 under s. 53, as the respondent committed wilful misrepresentation because I find the respondent’s reported version of events is not supported by evidence presented to me. The discrepancies between her evidence and Mr. Griffiths’ opinion of how the collision occurred were significant and have not been adequately explained. On a balance of probabilities, I find that the applicant has proven that the respondent misrepresented critical facts regarding the collision. This misrepresentation was material, as it allowed the respondent to receive accident benefits from the applicant. The misrepresentation was also wilful, as the respondent described an inaccurate version of the collision to the applicant.
31I also find that the applicant provided compliant notice under s. 53, on May 26, 2021, as it advised the respondent that it was terminating her benefits because of her evidence which was not supported by the report of Mr. Griffiths.
The respondent is not liable to pay costs
32I find that the respondent is not liable to pay costs to the applicant.
33According to the provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules, a party may make a request to the Tribunal for costs if it believes that the other party in a proceeding has acted unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously, or in bad faith. Such a request for costs may be made to the Tribunal in writing or orally at a case conference or hearing at any time before a decision or order is released. It is the burden of the party that raises a request for costs to support allegations of misconduct.
34The applicant seeks $1,000.00 in costs because it was not able to obtain consent from the respondent for its motion to combine this file with the four related files. The applicant argues that since it was unable to obtain consent, the Tribunal denied its motion at the case conference to combine the files. It argues that as a result, it had to submit separate submissions which increased its legal costs. The applicant further argues that the Tribunal in its CCRO noted that the respondent delayed the proceeding by eight months. Thus, it argues costs are warranted in these circumstances.
35I find that the applicant has not established costs are warranted under these circumstances. While it argues that it was impossible to obtain consent from the respondent with respect to its motion because she has been evasive, it has not referred me to any evidence to support that it took any steps to obtain consent prior to the case conference. It is well-settled that submissions are not evidence. Likewise, the purpose of Rule 19 is to award costs when it has been established that the party has behaved unreasonably, frivolously, vexatiously, or in bad faith, not to award parties their costs for the proceedings. Finally, contrary to the applicant’s position, the Tribunal in the CCRO did not make a finding that the respondent delayed the proceeding by eight months, rather the Vice Chair noted that the application was filed eight months ago, and this was her basis for proceeding with the case conference without the respondent’s participation.
ORDER
36For the reasons outlined above, I grant the application and find that:
i. The respondent has not established that she was involved in an “accident” pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
ii. The applicant is entitled to terminate the payment of benefits to the respondent pursuant to s. 53 of the Schedule.
iii. The respondent is not liable to pay costs.
Released: May 23, 2025
Tanjoyt Deol
Adjudicator