Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16958MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

William Guyea

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Kailey Minnings, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: William Guyea

For the Respondent: Ian Sookram, Representative

HEARD: May 8, 2025

OVERVIEW

1William Guyea (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” or “respondent”) to suspend his Class DM licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received a report from a treating health care provider that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his ability to drive safely.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He acknowledges that he suffers from alcohol use disorder but denies that he suffers from a medical condition which interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

ISSUES

6The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

7To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

8The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

9Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has not satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

10The evidence presented at the hearing establishes on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder.

11The Registrar’s position that the appellant has a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder is supported by the following medical reports:

i. A Medical Report form, completed by the appellant’s family doctor, Dr. Noreen Wang, as part of the cyclical reporting requirements for commercial drivers. The Medical Report form is dated January 30, 2025 and states, “Alcohol overuse/abuse – entering treatment program next week.”

ii. A Substance Use Assessment (“SUA”) form, also completed by Dr. Wang, which is dated March 17, 2025. On the SUA form, Dr. Wang indicates that the appellant has severe substance use disorder, specifically, alcohol; that he has been abstinent for a period of less than 6 months; and that he has completed a supervised treatment program.

iii. A second SUA form completed by Dr. Wang, dated March 31, 2025, on which Dr. Wang again indicates a diagnosis of severe alcohol use disorder, and writes “This patient entered [an] alcohol treatment program Feb 3-Mar 4/2025. Thus 6m [months] from treatment entry would be Aug 3 2025. While he is abstinent from alcohol, I would support him driving.”

12The appellant acknowledges that he has alcohol use disorder. He testified that he had been drinking increasing amounts of alcohol on weekends over the past year, following a major stressor in his life. In January of 2025, he sought help from his family physician and counsellors and decided to enrol in a treatment program because he wanted to stop drinking.

13I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from alcohol use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

14I find that the Registrar has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

15The Registrar argues that alcohol use disorder interferes with the appellant’s ability to drive safely. The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [February 2021] (the “CCMTA Standards”), Chapter 15.6.3, which states that all drivers suffering from Substance Use Disorder, including alcohol, may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained for twelve months. It also states that earlier re-licencing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a rehabilitation program.

16The Registrar also relies on internal policies which assert that earlier re-licencing following completion of a treatment program may be considered after a period of six months of abstinence.

17Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.

18The respondent’s representative testified that alcohol use can significantly interfere with and impair the functions necessary for driving.

19The appellant argues that his alcohol use disorder does not impact his ability to drive safely.

20The appellant stated that he recognized that his alcohol use was becoming out of control in January 2025, and, in his view, he had been using alcohol as a way of dealing with certain emotions. He sought out help from addictions counsellors with a goal of learning to manage his emotions without using alcohol.

21He testified that his last drink of alcohol was on or around January 31, 2025 and as of the day of the hearing, he had been abstinent for more than 3 months. His goal is to remain abstinent permanently.

22He also testified that prior to January 2025, he had never been diagnosed with or treated for alcohol use disorder; he has never been admitted to hospital for reasons due to alcohol; he has never experienced or required treatment for alcohol withdrawal; he has never taken or needed to take medication for alcohol use disorder; and that he has never been charged with drinking and driving. He testified that while his alcohol use had been escalating over the course of the previous year, his alcohol use was limited to weekends, and he had never gone to work impaired.

23The appellant testified that currently, he sees his family physician at least every 3 months and undergoes regular bloodwork. He points to a narrative letter from Dr. Wang dated April 23, 2025, on which Dr. Wang writes that his MCV is 92 and his GGT is 40, which, she indicates, are both in the normal range. Dr. Wang writes “Normal values would support that he has not been drinking alcohol recently.” As a physician duly licenced to practice medicine in Ontario, I am aware that MCV is mean corpuscular volume, and GGT is gamma glutamyl transferase. Both are biochemical markers that are often used clinically as indirect markers of alcohol use, although they are not specific to alcohol and may be elevated in other conditions. I take note of these facts pursuant to s. 16(b) of the SPPA.

24The appellant also testified that he has an addictions counsellor, Mr. Matt Hutten, that he speaks to weekly. He pointed to a narrative letter from Mr. Hutten dated April 23, 2025, which states that the appellant has been engaged in counselling since January 22, 2025, shows insight into his condition, and that Mr. Hutten supports a return to driving.

25The appellant testified that, in addition to regular visits with his family doctor and weekly counselling sessions, he also attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings twice weekly and uses an app to track his recovery progress. He also speaks to a Relapse Prevention worker regularly as part of a year long continuing care program following completion of the residential treatment at Newgate180. He referred to a letter of completion dated March 4, 2025 from his Newgate180 case worker, which confirms completion of residential treatment and ongoing support.

26The appellant testified that having his driver’s licence suspended has caused significant hardship. He requires his licence for work, as his job requires him to have at least a G licence in order to drive to worksites and operate lawn mowing and maintenance equipment. He also explained that he needs his licence for family obligations and to get to and from appointments and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Further, he lives rurally where there is no public transportation and limited taxi options available.

27I acknowledge that having his licence suspended has been very challenging for the appellant. However, the issue being addressed here is whether the appellant has a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

28While the CCMTA Standards are well-reasoned and provide assistance, every case must be considered on its own facts.

29Although I am not bound by the CCMTA Standards, I find them reasonable and I have considered them here. Chapter 15.6.3 states that all drivers suffering from Substance Use Disorder, including alcohol, may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained for twelve months, and that earlier re-licencing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a rehabilitation program.

30I note that, when considering earlier re-licencing of a driver’s licence for alcohol use disorder, Chapter 15.6.3 of the CCMTA Standards does not state a specific time-period required for abstinence. The six-month period of abstinence required by the Registrar is based on an internal policy, not on the CCMTA Standards.

31I found the appellant’s testimony compelling, straightforward, and insightful regarding his condition and his recovery. The appellant testified that he has been abstinent now for 3 months and he submitted medical evidence, in the form of recent bloodwork and a narrative letter from his physician, to support his verbal testimony. He has completed a rehabilitation treatment program and has ongoing close follow up and support from a multidisciplinary team. Importantly, he has the endorsement of his family physician, who wrote on the March 31, 2025 SUA, “While he is abstinent from alcohol, I would support him driving.” I find, therefore, that the criteria set out in the CCMTA Standard have been met.

32I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

Conclusion

33I find that the Registrar has not discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

34For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.