Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17074/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
Nicholas MacArthur
Appellant
And
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION and ORDER
VICE-CHAIR:
Geneviève Painchaud
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Nicholas MacArthur, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Leila Pereira, Agent for the Registrar
LAT Observers:
Jonathon Dick Emily Morton Melissa Shea
Heard by Teleconference:
May 21, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Nicolas MacArthur (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his 2001 Chevrolet Silverado on April 26, 2025, for 45 days under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.8 (the “Act”).
2The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) that the Registrar release the vehicle.
3For the Tribunal to order the vehicle released, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he satisfies at least one of the five grounds set out in s. 50.2(3) of the Act. The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
ISSUE
4The issue in dispute is:
i. Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship?
RESULT
5Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, and for the reasons given below, I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. The Registrar’s impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ANALYSIS
Circumstances leading to the impoundment
6Under s. 55.1 of the Act, where a police officer is satisfied that a person was driving a motor vehicle while his or her licence was under suspension for certain Criminal Code convictions, the officer must detain and impound the vehicle.
7At the time the appellant’s vehicle was detained, he was the one driving it.
8The respondent presented unrefuted evidence that the appellant’s driver’s licence was under suspension for a prescribed Criminal Code offence at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Act. The suspension is in effect until September 19, 2026. Accordingly, the vehicle was lawfully impounded.
9The appellant acknowledged knowingly driving while suspended, explaining that he viewed the distance as minimal and chose not to contact his staff to drive the vehicle instead.
The impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship
10I find the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship.
11Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”), under the Act, sets out the criteria the Tribunal must consider in determining whether an impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
12Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
13Only if there is no alternative, may I consider whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, by considering whether it will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle or a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.
14The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:
a. no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
b. the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
c. the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
d. the impact of the loss,
i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in the clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
15In order to establish that there is no alternative, s. 10(4) of the Regulation requires the owner of the impounded vehicle to demonstrate that every reasonable option has been explored and inquired into, including using another vehicle or arranging to be without any vehicle.
16Pursuant to s.10 (2)(a), the Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
17The appellant submits that he is the sole owner of a concrete company engaging primarily in residential work and has three employees. He owns the company vehicle, which was impounded, and this vehicle is needed to pull heavy machinery as his employees own regular vehicles. He adds that without the vehicle, he cannot perform his work and it has caused his employees to be out of work.
18He states that he was aware his licence was under suspension and that he was not allowed to drive. He chose to drive since it was only for two hours of work and felt that did not justify contacting his staff. Also, he does not trust anyone else driving. He adds that he only owns this vehicle which is registered under his business.
19The appellant confirms that he manages daily errands by walking or taking a taxi, but states that the main issue is that he needs the vehicle for work as he needs to pull machinery. He notes that rental trucks are not a viable alternative as they cannot pull such machinery. Also, he does not believe he could rent a truck since his driver’s licence is suspended and there may be an issue with insurance of the machinery being pulled.
20However, the evidence falls short of establishing that every reasonable option has been explored.
21Since the impoundment, he states that he has been able to secure new contracts to be completed when his vehicle is released but has only been able to complete one job with the help of another contractor.
22The appellant adds that since the vehicle was registered under the incorporated business, he believed it would not impact him, and therefore the vehicle should not be impounded.
23The respondent submits the appellant does not meet the criteria for exceptional hardship and seeks confirmation of the impoundment. It argues that the appellant made a conscious decision to drive his own vehicle and he knew the potential implications for himself and his business. He has been able to walk and take cabs for essentials.
24I find the appellant has not demonstrated that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available. While it has been inconvenient, and it has impacted his business, he has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that accessing alternate transportation options amount to exceptional hardship. He has not enquired into other options such as the possibility of renting a commercial vehicle as an alternative either, undermining his claim under s. 10(4) of the Act.
25Also, as per s. 10(3)(d) of the Act, the appellant, being the driver whose suspension triggered the impoundment is precluded from relying on hardship grounds related to his economic losses.
26Lastly, the appellant made a conscious choice to drive his vehicle while suspended, mistakenly hoping that the fact it was registered to his business would mean he could not be impacted. In fact, business ownership or registration status does not exempt a vehicle from s. 55(1) impoundment if driven by a suspended person. He was not a victim of being misled by someone else and he knowingly breached a suspension order and is responsible for any hardship he is experiencing.
27Based on the evidence, I find the appellant has not met his burden in demonstrating exceptional hardship.
CONCLUSION
28I agree with the respondent. The appellant has reasonable alternatives to the vehicle during the period of impoundment. As such, the appellant has failed to satisfy the Tribunal on a balance of probabilities that he meets the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation as he has reasonable alternatives available to him.
ORDER
29For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s.50.2(5) of the Act, I confirm the impoundment order.
Geneviève Painchaud
Vice-Chair
Released: May 28, 2025