Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17022/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
Maria Mastronardi
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR:
Jan Dymond
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Maria Mastronardi, appellant
Alexandra Cardella, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Leila Pereira, Representative
HEARD: May 15, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Maria Mastronardi (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2022 Lincoln Corsair motor vehicle (“the vehicle”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on April 17, 2025.
2At the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by Cordel Valentine (“the driver”) who was subject to a condition on their driver’s licence, imposed for a prescribed reason, prohibiting driving a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device (“IID”). The impounded vehicle was not equipped with an IID.
3The appellant appeals on the grounds that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained for impoundment and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship. An additional ground for appeal of due diligence was withdrawn at the hearing.
4The Registrar submitted documentation confirming that the driver’s licence of the driver was subject to an IID condition for a prescribed reason at the time the vehicle was detained for impoundment. Accordingly, I find that the vehicle was lawfully impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act.
ISSUES
5The issues in dispute are:
i. whether the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded in accordance with section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act; or
ii. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
6I find the appellant has not established that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded in accordance with section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, or that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ANALYSIS
The vehicle was not stolen
7The burden is on the appellant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the vehicle was stolen. I am not satisfied that the appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.
8The word “stolen” is not defined in the Act.
9The Divisional Court in Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 2002 O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, either permanently or temporarily.
10The appellant testifies that the impounded vehicle is leased by her for the exclusive use of her daughter. She testifies that she instructed her daughter on several occasions that only her daughter was to drive the vehicle and that no one else was to drive it. She further testifies that the driver is not known to her and that she did not give her permission for the driver to drive the car.
11The appellant further submits that although the driver is a friend of her daughter’s, she does not know the nature of their relationship and her daughter does not reside with her.
12The appellant testifies that she was told by her daughter that she was unaware that the driver had taken the vehicle. Her daughter had not provided any further information as to how the driver had acquired access to the vehicle or whether the daughter was present at the time the vehicle was impounded.
13In response to a question from the respondent, the appellant acknowledged that she had not asked the police to charge the driver with theft of the vehicle.
14Counsel for the appellant submits that the Tribunal should find that the vehicle was stolen because the appellant did not give the driver permission to drive the vehicle; did not authorize her daughter to permit such use; and had no ability to stop the driver from taking the vehicle.
15I find that the appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. The appellant acknowledges that the vehicle is used 100% by her daughter who does not live with the appellant. The appellant was unable to provide evidence as to how the driver accessed the keys to the vehicle, the relationship between her daughter and the driver, or whether the daughter was present at the time of the impoundment.
16I acknowledge the appellant’s testimony that she had told her daughter not to let anyone drive the vehicle and that the driver did not have the appellant’s consent to drive the vehicle; however, it appears that the appellant has effectively relinquished oversight of the vehicle to her daughter. As a result, I do not find that the absence of the appellant’s consent meets part one of the test under Marshall that, on a balance of probabilities, the vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. Further, the appellant was not able to provide evidence as to whether the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle temporarily or permanently.
The appellant has not established exceptional hardship according to the Act
17The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find that the appellant has not met her burden.
18Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.
19Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
20If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.
21If the owner is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. Pursuant to s.10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.
22The appellant testifies that, with the impoundment of the vehicle, her daughter has no alternative means of transportation. She testifies that her daughter has taken a leave of absence from her job during the impoundment and is using taxis and ride-share services for her daily needs.
23The appellant testifies that neither she nor her husband can lend their daughter one of their other vehicles. The appellant acknowledges that there are two other vehicles in her household – a 2024 Volkswagen driven primarily by the appellant and a pick-up truck driven by the appellant’s husband. The appellant testifies that both she and her husband are retired. She testifies that she needs the Volkswagen on a daily basis to assist with her grandchildren, attend medical appointments and to obtain necessities such as groceries, and that her husband is unwilling to lend his pick-up truck to their daughter.
24I find that the appellant and her husband have been able to use their other two vehicles to provide for their daily needs and that the appellant’s daughter has been able do without a vehicle by taking a leave of absence from her job and utilizing alternatives such as taxis and ride share services to provide for her daily needs during the impoundment.
25I find, therefore, that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available as required to establish exceptional hardship under s.10 (1) of the Regulation. Her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.
26Although the impoundment may have resulted in inconvenience and financial expense to the appellant’s daughter, the appellant has failed to prove exceptional hardship under the Act and her appeal must fail on this ground.
ORDER
27On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing and pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.
Released: May 28, 2025
Jan Dymond
Vice-Chair```