Dawn Dillon v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 49184

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16899/MVIA

An appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to Section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Dawn Dillon

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Dawn Dillon

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by Teleconference:

May 7, 2025

REASONS FOR MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Dawn Dillon, seeks an extension of time to file an appeal of the 45-day impoundment of her 2010 Hyundai Elantra (the “vehicle”). The appellant’s partner, Ronald Penney (R.P.) was operating the vehicle on November 25, 2024, when he was pulled over by police. The appellant was in the passenger seat at the time.

2Police determined that R.P. held a valid driver’s licence with a condition of a mandatory ignition interlock device. The appellant’s vehicle was not outfitted with such device leading to the impoundment of her vehicle pursuant to subsection 55.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) which allows for the impoundment of a vehicle for 45 days. The appellant appeals this impoundment based on the belief that R.P. did not have a mandatory ignition interlock condition on his driver’s licence. She now understands it to be true and would rely primarily on exceptional hardship if given the opportunity.

3However, before the matter can be considered, the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) must first deal with the substantive issue of whether the appeal can be heard since the deadline to file the appeal was December 10, 2024. The appellant filed her appeal on April 5, 2025. This is 131 days after the initial date of impoundment and 116 days past the appeal date deadline.

4The appellant filed a Notice of Motion seeking the deadline to appeal the impoundment be extended. This motion was filed on May 6, 2025.

ISSUE

5The issue to be determined is whether the appellant has established that the justice of the case requires that the time for filing the appeal be extended.

RESULT

6On the evidence before me at the hearing, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the justice of the case requires that the time for filing the appeal be extended and the motion is therefore dismissed. The appeal is dismissed.

LAW

7Pursuant to section 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 under the Act, an appeal of an impoundment must be filed within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained together with the fee established by the Tribunal.

8The Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend the time for filing of an appeal pursuant to section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Schedule G, which reads:

Despite any limitation of time fixed by or under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal under section or any other Act, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief, it may,

a) extend the time for giving the notice either before or after the expiration of the limitation of time so limited; and

b) give the directions that it considers proper as a result of extending the time.

9In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered in making that determination are:

a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b. The length of the delay;

c. Prejudice to the other party; and

d. The merits of the appeal.

10The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are grounds for the granting of the extension. My analysis will include a balancing of the conclusions reached when applying the facts of the case to the factors.

ANALYSIS

The existence of a bona fide intent to appeal

11I find the appellant did not demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal this matter within 15 days of the impoundment.

12The appellant admitted to not inquiring about her right to an appeal until well after the statutory deadline. To obtain information, she first contacted Service Ontario on or about March 28, 2025. After considering her options, the appellant then contacted the Tribunal where she was advised about the late filing. She wished to proceed despite the fact the deadline had passed on December 10, 2024.

13During the hearing, the appellant stated that one of the reasons for the late filing was that she was ill. However, she did not provide any supporting evidence, oral or documentary, to support this claim. There was no indication that the appellant was hospitalized or incapacitated during that time. The appellant did not contact the Tribunal until months later advising that she wished to appeal the impoundment.

14I find that the appellant would also have been made aware of her right to appeal by reading the Notice of Impound and Release. The appellant testified that she did not receive this document because any mail delivered to her mailbox is controlled by her landlord who has the key. I did not receive any evidence to confirm this assertion and why she would not receive this particular mail while still having access to her other mail.

15I also considered the practicality of obtaining the information regarding her right to appeal simply by speaking to others including her local police station, the tow and impound company, or the Ministry of Transportation (MTO). I find that there were multiple opportunities for the appellant to make inquiries about her vehicle but she chose not to until contacting Service Ontario in late March 2025.

16I find that the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period. She also did not make any urgent attempt to inquire about how the vehicle could be returned.

The length of delay

17The appellant’s notice of appeal was received 131 days after her vehicle was first impounded (116 days after the 15-day period specified in s. 9 of the Regulation). I view this to be an extraordinary period of delay. In addition to this, the appellant filed her Notice of Motion on May 6, 2025, which is 31 days after filing her appeal. In total, the motion arrived 162 days after the deadline to file an appeal suggesting no urgency on the appellant’s part.

18Throughout the entire time, information about the right to appeal the impoundment and overall procedure was available on the Tribunal’s website, MTO, or simply contacting the non-emergency number of her local police department.

19The appellant’s appeal rights are also contained on the Notice to Registrar issued by the MTO and any other impound notice which may have been issued at roadside by the police. The appellant was also present at roadside with the driver and could have inquired further with the officer and the tow yard about the vehicle and process.

Prejudice to the other party

20Given the fact that this appeal is being made well past the impoundment period, if I find that the extension should be granted, the Registrar would be prejudiced as it benefits from a hearing without delay. This is due to the fact that if the appellant’s appeal is successful, the Registrar is required to pay the cost of impoundment and that cost would be lower the earlier the vehicle is released. The longer the delay, the greater the cost to the Registrar. While this is an important consideration, it did not weigh as heavily in favour for the respondent because of the mere economic value of the impoundment.

Merits of the appeal

21On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish her case on a balance of probabilities but only that her version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome. I find that the appellant has not presented grounds for appeal which disclose a reasonable chance of success should the appeal be allowed to continue to a hearing.

22During the hearing, the appellant confirmed that, if given the opportunity, she would appeal on the basis that the impoundment has resulted in exceptional hardship. However, during her testimony she stated that she has access to another vehicle, including her daughter’s vehicle for any errands and appointments. She also stated that she recently purchased another vehicle which she has access to, and which R.P. uses for work. The appellant is currently unemployed.

23The appellant presented no evidence upon which I can conclude that she might be successful in her appeal on the ground of exceptional hardship. In order to advance the ground of exceptional hardship, s. 10(4) of Regulation 631/98 requires the appellant to first demonstrate that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle, which include using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.. I received evidence that the appellant was able to manage without the vehicle during the impoundment period. More importantly, she has viable options, including access to other vehicles, to ensure she is able to obtain groceries, medication and transport her grandchildren when necessary.

24I am not persuaded that the appellant’s reliance on the ground of exceptional hardship has a reasonable chance of success and, therefore, I find that she has no reasonable chance of success on appeal.

25Applying the criteria established in s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Schedule G, I am not satisfied that the justice of the case requires that an extension of time be granted in the circumstances of this case.

ORDER

26For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the appellant’s motion to extend the time for filing of the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.