Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Naomi Brouse

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Jan Dymond, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Naomi Brouse, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Observers (Tribunal): Melissa Shea, Adjudicator Dagmara Szczudlo, Adjudicator

Heard by teleconference: May 20, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Naomi Brouse (the "appellant") appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2018 Hyundai Elantra licence CCJX965 under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the "Act"). The vehicle was impounded on May 4, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant was driving the vehicle while her licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

3Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal. That section limits the grounds upon which the Tribunal can order the release of the vehicle. The appellant's appeal is based on her allegation that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with section 50(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

ANALYSIS

Has the appellant established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?

5I find that the appellant has not established exceptional hardship under the Act and the appeal must be dismissed as a result.

6The burden is on the appellant to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as defined in the Act and regulations.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the "Regulation") sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

"...the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period."

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

10If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

11The appellant submits that the impounded vehicle is the only vehicle that she, her sister, and her sister's husband have available to travel to employment, job interviews, and to secure their personal needs. She testifies that the vehicle has been with her sister for the past two years and that the appellant is in the process of transferring ownership of the vehicle to her.

12The appellant testifies that she is self-employed providing house cleaning and landscaping services to two regular clients and occasional clients obtained through an online service. She testifies that, since the impoundment, she has been able to use ride-share services to travel to her regular customers but has been unable to accept occasional business because they tend to be too far away for a ride-share or taxi to be economically feasible. She testifies that, as a result of the impoundment she had to cancel two bookings – one for $5,000.00 and another for $1,500.00. She has been able to attend medical appointments with the help of another family member and by using ride-share services. She testifies that she has not looked into renting a vehicle because it would be too expensive, and that public transportation is not a feasible option for travel to distant work sites with her equipment.

13She testifies that her sister's husband works close by and can walk to his regular employment. He also works occasionally as a musician, and she submits that the impoundment may impact his ability to transport his equipment to two upcoming bookings.

14Since the impoundment, the appellant testifies that the family has been able to secure groceries by using Instacart and that there is a No-Frills grocery store within walking distance.

15The appellant's sister testifies that she works in IT and was working under contract to Elections Canada until May 16, 2025. She used ride-share services to travel to work from the time of the impoundment to the end of her contract. She testifies that she is now unemployed and looking for work and that the lack of a vehicle may impact her ability to attend interviews. She has had one interview to date conducted via Zoom. She has access to public transit but finds it unreliable and testifies that she would use a ride-share service to attend an in-person interview should one arise before the end of the impoundment. The appellant's sister also testifies that a rental vehicle is not an option because none of the family members has a credit card which a rental company would require.

16The respondent submits that the appellant has not met her onus to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available because she and the other members of her family who depend upon the vehicle have been able to meet their day-to-day needs through alternatives such as ride-shares and grocery delivery services. The respondent submits, therefore, that the impoundment is an inconvenience rather than a hardship and requests that the impoundment be confirmed.

17I have considered the submissions of both parties and find that the appellant has not met her onus to demonstrate that she considered and inquired into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

18I find that, for the most part, the appellant and her family members have been able to meet their day-to-day needs through the use of ride-share services and grocery deliver services. They are within walking distance of groceries and pharmacies. No one has missed or anticipates missing a medical appointment as a result of the impoundment. The family members have access to public transit which, while it may be inconvenient and require additional planning, is available and is an economical option. For these reasons, I find that the appellant and her family members have been able to mitigate their loss of access to the impounded vehicle.

19Further, I find that in failing to consider renting a car, the appellant has not considered all reasonable options. She testifies that she has not looked into a rental vehicle because of the cost; however, the two occasional jobs that she had to withdraw from would have provided enough income to cover a car rental, thereby enabling her sister to convey the appellant to the work sites. I also note that many car rental companies accept debit cards in addition to credit cards.

20For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period, under s.10(1) of the Regulation.

21As a result of the above finding, I find the appellant has failed to establish exceptional hardship as a ground for releasing the appellant's vehicle under 50(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

22The Act permits impacts of an impoundment such as economic loss/financial hardship to be considered only under limited circumstances and only if there is first a finding that no alternative vehicle is available. As I have found that the appellant has failed to establish that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle, I need not consider the ground of financial/economic hardship.

ORDER

23On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing and the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant's vehicle is confirmed.

Jan Dymond

Vice-Chair