Tribunals Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal

Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario Tribunal d'appel en matière de permis

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17087/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Aaliyah Turnbull

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Aaliyah Turnbull, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: May 23, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Aaliyah Turnbull, the appellant, appeals from the impoundment of her 2018 Hyundai, the vehicle, on April 30, 2025, for 45 days. At the time it was impounded, the appellant’s vehicle was stopped by the police and Matthew Leeder (“driver”) was found to be driving it without a valid driver’s licence.

2The appellant appeals on two grounds: that her vehicle was stolen at the time of impoundment, and that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship to her because she needs the vehicle to take her young child to school, her baby and herself to medical appointments, to provide for everyday living such as the grocery store and pharmacy.

3Although the appellant’s Notice of Appeal indicates her ground of appeal is exceptional hardship, the appellant stated at the hearing that she would also like to include as a ground of appeal that the vehicle was stolen. The Registrar did not object to the addition of this ground. As a result, the hearing proceeded on the basis of the appellant’s two grounds of appeal.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. Issue 1: Was the appellant’s vehicle stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA.

ii. Issue 2: Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

result

5I find that the appellant’s vehicle was not stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship.

ANALYSIS

6The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) may, pursuant to s. 50.2, appeal the impoundment and request an order that the Registrar release the vehicle.

7An owner may appeal only on the grounds set out in s. 50.2(3), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the HTA. The appellant appeals on grounds (a) that the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, and (d), that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

8Section 55.1(1) provides that where an officer is satisfied that a person driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his or her driver’s licence is under suspension, or in contravention of a condition that prohibits him or her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device, shall detain the vehicle and shall impound it under s. 55.1(3).

Issue 1: Was the appellant’s vehicle stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA

9I find the appellant’s vehicle was not stolen at the time it was impounded. The burden is on the appellant to establish that her vehicle was stolen on a balance of probabilities, and she has not done so.

10The appellant testified that on the day the vehicle was impounded, she delivered the vehicle to a man named Eddy who was going to change the oil in the vehicle and fix her brakes without charge because he owns a trucking company where mechanical work is done, and he is a friend of a friend. The appellant admitted in her testimony that she does not know Eddy, does not know Eddy’s last name, does not know the name or address of the trucking company where she left the vehicle. A friend had referred her to Eddy to have work done on the vehicle.

11The appellant testified that she gave Eddy the keys to the vehicle but did not have any conversation with Eddy about who was allowed to drive the vehicle.

12The appellant said she learned that the vehicle had been impounded because the driver did not have a valid driver’s licence on April 30, 2025, when she received a call from the police. The appellant said she does not know the driver but later learned that Eddy had asked the driver to drive the vehicle to go “pick up a truck”. The appellant gave no evidence about whether the driver intended to deprive her of the use of the vehicle, either temporarily or permanently.

13The appellant’s testimony is based on what she learned from others about how the driver came to be driving the vehicle. The appellant did not provide any corroborating evidence, either by testimony of others or documents, at the hearing.

14The term “stolen” is not defined in the HTA. The Criminal Code definition of “theft” provides some guidance as follows:

322 (1) Everyone commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent

(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of the things or of his property or interest in it;

(b) to pledge it or deposit it as security;

(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the person who parts with it may be unable to perform; or

(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.

15The Divisional Court held in Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Crt), that the Tribunal should not limit the meaning of “stolen” only to an intention to take the vehicle permanently. The Court stated that the word “stolen” could also apply to an intention to take the vehicle temporarily.

16Within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA, “stolen” does not mean the use of an owner’s vehicle contrary to the owner’s instructions: See Auto Zone & Rentals Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2016 ONLAT 10149, para. 16 (Exec. Chair).

17I am not satisfied that Eddy or the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the use of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently.

18The appellant admitted at the hearing that when the police called her to tell her the vehicle had been impounded, she did not ask the police to charge the driver with theft of the vehicle, nor did she do so at any time after the vehicle was impounded.

19Taken in totality, the evidence presented at the hearing does not satisfy me that the vehicle was stolen on the day it was impounded. The appellant has not proven this ground of appeal.

Issue 2: Will the impoundment result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation

20I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship because the appellant has alternatives available to the impounded vehicle.

21The appellant testified that her oldest child has missed six or seven days of kindergarten during the impoundment period so far. However, the appellant admitted that she did not take her oldest child to kindergarten for two of those days because it was raining, not because the vehicle is impounded. On the other school days since the impoundment, the appellant has been able to take her oldest child to kindergarten by using Ubers although she testified that this is a financial hardship for her.

22The appellant testified that she has used public transit to attend medical appointments for herself and her children, and to access the pharmacy at her doctor’s office. Although she has missed one doctor’s appointment during the impoundment period, the appellant said that she did not go to that appointment because she was tired that day, not because of lack of transportation.

23The appellant testified that she has been able to use public transit and grocery delivery services for everyday living needs such as the grocery store and pharmacy.

24The appellant testified that the necessity to use public transit, including buses and Ubers, and the use of grocery delivery services, are a financial hardship for her and are inconvenient and making life difficult for her. While the appellant said that she is currently unemployed, at the hearing the appellant clarified in her testimony that she is currently on parental leave. She stated that she could better manage her time for, and with, her children and would be relieved of financial burden if she had the vehicle.

25Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. In order to establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement, as set out in s. 10 (1) of the Regulation, is that there must be no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

26If the appellant is able to establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle then under s. 10(1), I must consider whether the impoundment will result in:

(a) a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; or

(b) a threat to the public health and safety or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used.

27I can only consider financial, employment and education or training losses listed in s. 10(2) of the Regulation if the appellant first establishes that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

28Pursuant to s. 10(2)(a) of the Regulation, the Tribunal may never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to any person.

29I accept the appellant’s testimony that arranging alternate transportation is financially difficult and inconvenient for her. However, under the legislation, inconvenience is not a factor which the Tribunal can take into consideration.

30I may only consider whether the impoundment will result in financial loss to the appellant if there is no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle.

31The appellant and her children have been able to use public transit, including the bus, and uber to attend medical appointments, access the pharmacy, attend kindergarten on most days. The one medical appointment that the appellant could not attend was not caused by lack of transportation.

32The appellant has been able to obtain groceries by using grocery delivery services during the impoundment period.

33I find that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle available during the impoundment period, specifically public transit including the bus, Ubers, and grocery delivery service, albeit at a cost.

34The appellant has not proven this ground of appeal.

Conclusion

35The appellant has not established either of her grounds of appeal. The appellant has not established that her vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the HTA.

36I also find the appellant has not established the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA and s. 10 of the Regulation.

ORDER

37Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the HTA, I confirm the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle.