Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16976/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Eden Bonsu

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Eden Bonsu, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: May 6, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Eden Bonsu, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”) from the 45-day impoundment of a 2015 Nissan Rogue motor vehicle (the “vehicle”). At the time it was detained in order to be impounded, her son C.B. was driving the vehicle while his licence was subject to a mandatory ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction. There was no ignition interlock device installed on the vehicle.

2The appellant’s vehicle was detained in order to be impounded on April 14, 2025. The 45-day impoundment period ends on May 29, 2025.

3The appellant is appealing on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5I find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

6The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

7The respondent presented uncontradicted evidence which establishes that:

i. the appellant is the registered owner of the impounded vehicle;

ii. on April 14, 2025, the police discovered the vehicle being driven by C.B. (the “driver”);

iii. the vehicle was not equipped with an ignition interlock device; and

iv. the licence of the driver was subject to a mandatory ignition interlock condition after a Criminal Code conviction at the time the police detained the vehicle for impoundment.

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

8The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find the appellant has not met her burden.

9Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

10Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

11If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

12If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then subsection 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to subsection 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses.

13The Tribunal is not permitted to consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

14I find the appellant has alternative means of transportation available to her. The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, she has been using a 2021 Mercedes motor vehicle that is registered to her. She testified that the Mercedes motor vehicle is primarily used by the driver who resides with her, but she can use it when needed, and she has used it to get to her place of employment and to complete tasks. She has also been driven by the driver to her place of employment using the Mercedes vehicle.

15In addition, aside from the Mercedes and the impounded vehicle, there is another vehicle registered to the appellant, a 2002 Toyota vehicle. She testified that the Toyota vehicle is primarily used by her other son, who does not reside with her, but she has used/borrowed the Toyota vehicle on multiple occasions to get to and from work. Her other son has also driven her to work in the Toyota vehicle.

16The appellant further testified that she is a nurse and her coworker has also provided her with rides. She testified that, since the impoundment, she has not missed any work.

17The appellant testified that she has also used an Uber about three times. However, she found it too expensive, and thus, she rented a motor vehicle. She testified that she rented a vehicle for about 5 days. At the time of the hearing, the appellant was using the rental vehicle to attend work and complete her essential tasks.

18The appellant testified that she lives close to the grocery store and can walk to obtain groceries.

19Since the impoundment, she has not missed any medical appointments.

20I find the evidence before the Tribunal clearly establishes that there are alternative means of transportation available to the appellant. Since the impoundment, the appellant has used two other vehicles that are registered to her, a Mercedes and a Toyota. While I note that the Mercedes vehicle is primarily utilized by the driver for work purposes, she has nonetheless used it to attend her workplace and complete her essential tasks. Similarly, while the Toyota vehicle is primarily used by her other son, she has nonetheless used it on multiple occasions. She has also gotten rides from both her sons and a coworker. She has also used Uber ride share. More recently, she rented a motor vehicle as a cheaper alternative to Uber.

21Under the circumstances, I find the appellant has not proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

ORDER

22Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.

Released: May 16, 2025

__________________________

Rupinder Hans

Adjudicator