Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16856MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Christopher Slaney

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Kailey Minnings, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Christopher Slaney

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: April 30, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Christopher Slaney (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar” or “respondent”) to suspend his Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received a report from a treating health care provider that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his safety to drive.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He denies that he suffers from alcohol use disorder and denies that he suffers from a medical condition which interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

ISSUES

6The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

7To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

8The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

9Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely, and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

10The evidence presented at the hearing establishes on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder.

11The Registrar’s position is supported by several medical reports:

i. An unsolicited Medical Condition Report (“MCR”) completed by hospitalist Dr. Nicholas Jeeves, dated November 2, 2023. On the MCR, Dr. Jeeves indicates that the appellant has a diagnosis of an uncontrolled substance use disorder, specifically, alcohol. Dr. Jeeves writes, “Chronic alcoholism with withdrawal episodes. Independent family reports of individual operating a motor vehicle +/- impairment”.

ii. A Substance Use Assessment (“SUA”) form completed by the appellant’s family physician at the time, Dr. Matthew Naccarato, which is dated May 8, 2024. On the SUA form, Dr. Naccarato indicates that the appellant has severe substance use disorder, specifically, alcohol; that he has completed a supervised treatment program; that he has been abstinent for a period of less than 6 months; and writes, “Last drink April 05, 2024”. Under ‘comments’, the doctor writes, “Driving assessment (on-road) suggested”.

iii. A second MCR report, dated May 10, 2024 and completed by Dr. Naccarato. On the MCR, Dr. Naccarato indicates that the appellant has an uncontrolled Substance Use Disorder, specifically alcohol, and writes that the appellant’s family member presented to the clinic to inform him that the patient “continues to drive, drives while intoxicated, and continues to drink despite completing a formal detoxification treatment program.”

iv. A discharge summary from St. Joseph’s Hospital Elliot Lake, dated April 26, 2024, which indicates that the appellant attended pre-treatment withdrawal management services from April 1, 2024 – April 5, 2024, and a residential chemical dependency program from April 5, 2024 until April 26, 2024.

12The appellant denies that he suffers from alcohol use disorder. He testified that he is unsure how his physicians would know about his alcohol intake patterns, and disagrees with the information contained in the MCRs. He testified that the hospital visit on November of 2023 was due to injuries he sustained after being struck by a flashlight – specifically, he attended hospital for a broken arm and a period of unconsciousness. He testified that he was unsure why an MCR had been filed by Dr. Jeeves, but that he suspects it was because he had had some alcohol prior to sustaining the injuries.

13His position is that while he occasionally drinks alcohol, he does not have an alcohol use disorder and does not drive while intoxicated. He testified that he attended a residential treatment program in April of 2024, not to address or treat an alcohol use disorder, but rather because it was a requirement to get his licence reinstated. The appellant testified that he last drank alcohol approximately one week ago.

14Considering the totality of evidence before me, I prefer and place more weight on the opinions of the two physicians, Dr. Jeeves and Dr. Naccarato, over the opinion of the appellant. Both physicians have submitted documentation that the appellant has a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder. I note that Dr. Naccarato, the appellant’s former family physician, who presumably was familiar with the patient and his history, not only completed the SUA form indicating that the appellant has severe alcohol use disorder, but he also submitted an additional MCR less than one month after the appellant had completed a rehabilitation program due to concerns about ongoing alcohol use.

15I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from alcohol use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

16I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

17The Registrar argues that alcohol use disorder interferes with the appellant’s ability to drive safely. The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [February 2021] (the “CCMTA Standards”), Chapter 15.6.3, which states that all drivers suffering from Substance Use Disorder, including alcohol, may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained for twelve months. It also states that earlier re-licencing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program. A road test or other functional assessment may also be required.

18Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them.

19The respondent’s position is that alcohol use can significantly interfere with and impair the functions necessary for driving; that alcohol is a depressant drug which slows down the brain and body; and that chronic and/or uncontrolled alcohol use can place an individual at high risk for withdrawal symptoms including seizure, which causes sudden loss of consciousness.

20The respondent points to the appellant’s driving record, which enumerates three impaired driving charges occurring in the years 1977, 1988, and 1990.

21The appellant testified that alcohol use does not impact his ability to drive safely. He admits to drinking alcohol occasionally but denies a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder and denies driving while impaired. His position is that he has done everything that the Registrar requested and that should be sufficient to regain his licence.

22While the CCMTA Standards are well-reasoned and provide assistance, every case must be considered on its own facts.

23Although I am not bound by the CCMTA Standards, I find them reasonable and given the evidence and submissions, I am persuaded to apply the CCMTA Standards in the circumstances of this case.

24The use of alcohol affects the functions necessary for driving including reaction times, visual acuity, judgment and insight, alertness and motor co-ordination. The use of alcohol impairs a driver’s judgment and behaviour towards others, including in determining whether they are fit to drive or not.

25I am concerned that the appellant continues to drink alcohol, has not demonstrated evidence of any period of abstinence, and denies that he has any problem with alcohol. I find on a balance of probabilities that the appellant currently lacks sufficient insight into his condition of alcohol use disorder. Insight means that a driver: is aware of their medical condition; understands how the condition may impair their functional ability to drive; and has the judgment and willingness to comply with their treatment regime and any conditions of licensing. Insight is an important consideration when determining fitness to drive.

26Based on the circumstances of this case, I find that it is too early for reinstatement of the appellant’s driver’s licence. I agree with the CCMTA standards, which require confirmation of a longer period of abstinence prior to considering reinstatement. I acknowledge that while the appellant did attend and complete an intensive alcohol treatment program, there is no confirmation of any significant period of abstinence following treatment. In addition, the appellant has no favourable recommendation from any treating healthcare professional for earlier re-instatement of their driver’s licence; on the contrary, the appellant’s physician submitted an additional MCR after the appellant completed a treatment program due to ongoing concerns around driving safety. Therefore, the criteria set out in CCMTA Standard 15.6.3 have not been met.

27I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

Conclusion

28I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

29For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.