Daljit Sohal v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 45354

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16918/MVIA

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Daljit Sohal

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATORS: Rachel Levitsky Laura Hodgson

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Daljit Sohal, Self-Represented For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Held by teleconference: April 24, 2025

OVERVIEW

1On March 17, 2025, the appellant’s vehicle, a 2020 BMW M30I, was impounded under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”), as the appellant was driving the vehicle in contravention of a condition on his driver’s licence requiring that he have an ignition interlock device installed in the vehicle.

2The appellant appeals from the impoundment. He filed a Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2025, two days after the time allowed for filing an appeal under the Act and regulations. The appellant brought a motion to extend the time for filing his appeal on April 14, 2025. The respondent opposes this request.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

1. Should the motion to extend the time to appeal be granted?

2. If so, at the time of the impoundment, did the appellant’s licence have a condition prohibiting him from driving a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device?

RESULT

4For the reasons below, we find that the justice of the case does not warrant an extension of time for filing the appeal. The appellant’s motion, and therefore his appeal, is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

Motion for Extension of Time

5An appeal of an impoundment under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days (s. 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 under the Act). However, s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G, gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

6In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (“Manuel”), the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:

a. the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal;

b. the length of the delay;

c. prejudice to the other party; and

d. the merits of the appeal.

7All four elements of the test are to be considered, and no one element is necessarily determinative. The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are reasonable grounds for granting an extension.

Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

8We find that the appellant demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal the impoundment within the appeal period.

9The appellant testified that he was aware of the 15-day deadline, but that he had a court date scheduled for April 3, 2025, and believed he could wait until after that event to appeal. It was his understanding that, at that appearance, the court would address a charge related to his failure to have the ignition interlock device and it was possible his car could be released from impoundment. He also submitted that he telephoned the Tribunal on March 18, 2025, and was advised to wait to appeal until after his court date, otherwise the fee to appeal would go to waste. He could not recall who he spoke with at the Tribunal. The appellant testified that when his April 3, 2025, court proceeding was adjourned he immediately filed his appeal with the Tribunal on that date.

10The respondent’s agent explained that the appellant’s vehicle would never, as the appellant suggested, have been released on that April 3rd court date. The respondent’s agent explained that the vehicle could only be released from impoundment at the end date of the impoundment period, if the Tribunal orders the vehicle released after an appeal, or if the Notice to Registrar is rescinded by the police officer. However, we find the appellant’s testimony to be credible and accept that, even if inaccurate, it was his belief that the impoundment may have been lifted in court on April 3rd.

11The Court in Manuel indicated that a person satisfies this element of the analysis if an intention to appeal is demonstrated during the appeal period. Considering the appellant’s understanding, albeit mistaken, that his vehicle may have been released on April 3rd, and that he contacted the Tribunal during the appeal period to make inquiries, we find that the appellant demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal the impoundment during the appeal period.

Length of the delay

12The deadline for the appellant to appeal was April 1, 2025, and he appealed on April 3, 2025. In our view, two days is not a significant length of time.

Prejudice

13The respondent did not argue that it was prejudiced by the delay. As such, we find that this is not a significant factor.

The merits of the appeal

14On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish his case on a balance of probabilities but is required to demonstrate that the appeal has some merit.

15Pursuant to s. 50.2 (3) of the Act, there are only four grounds on which an owner may appeal an impoundment. Here, the appellant relies on s. 50.2(3) (b.1) - that his driver’s licence was not subject to a condition prohibiting him from driving a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device.

16The respondent provided Ministry of Transportation documentation showing that on March 17, 2025, the date of the impoundment, that the appellant had an ignition interlock condition on his licence. The appellant did not dispute the fact that the ignition interlock condition was in place at the time of impoundment. Instead, he submitted that he was not aware that this condition remained on his licence. Once he became aware, after the impoundment, he immediately submitted the documents to the Ministry of Transportation that were required to remove the condition.

17The issue before the Tribunal, under s. 50.2(3) (b.1) of the Act, is not whether the appellant was aware of the ignition interlock condition. The issue is whether the ignition interlock condition was in place at the time the appellant’s vehicle was impounded. The appellant conceded that it was. As such, we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the appeal would be successful on its merits should it be allowed to proceed.

18We have considered the four factors together and find that the lack of a reasonable possibility for the appeal to be successful weighs heavily in this instance. As such, we find that the justice of the case requires that the request for an extension for filing an appeal be denied.

ORDER

19The appellant’s motion for an extension of the time to appeal the impoundment is dismissed, and his appeal is accordingly dismissed.