Harsimran Kour v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 45341

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16959/MVIA

Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Harsimran Kour

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATORS: Michael Beauchesne Raymond Ramdayal

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Harsimran Kour, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference: May 2, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Harsimran Kour (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “HTA”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on April 8, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant’s boyfriend was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended in accordance with section 42 of the HTA. A Notice of Impoundment (“NOI”) was issued for a period of 45 days.

2Section 50.2 of the HTA allows a motor vehicle owner to appeal its impoundment to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). Under section 50.2, the grounds on which the Tribunal may release the appellant’s vehicle are as follows:

(a) The impounded motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained;

(b) The driver’s licence of the motor vehicle operator was not under suspension at the time the vehicle was detained;

(b.1) The driver’s licence of the motor vehicle operator was not subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1 (1) of the Act at the time the vehicle was detained;

(c) The motor vehicle owner exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the motor vehicle operator was not under suspension at the time the vehicle was detained; or

(d) The vehicle impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

3In all cases, the appellant bears the onus of proving a ground of appeal. For this matter, the appellant indicated in her Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) that she was appealing on the grounds that her boyfriend’s driver’s licence was not under suspension at the time the vehicle was detained. However, at the outset of the hearing, the appellant confirmed she was appealing only on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUE

4The issue to be determined is whether the appellant’s vehicle impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA.

RESULT

5We find the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA. The appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The applicability of exceptional hardship

6We are not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated the impoundment of her vehicle will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the HTA.

7Section 10 of Regulation 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) says that to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

9If the owner establishes there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for employment or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) No alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) The loss will be immediate, significant, and lasting;

(c) The impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) The impact of the loss:

(i) Will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) Will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in the clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal cannot consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Submissions of the parties

12The appellant submits her car is vital to earn a living as she is otherwise unable to get to work, which consists of two different jobs at two different locations outside of her home community in North Bay. The appellant testified that she has recently obtained a third job that requires travel throughout North Bay to care for clients. She expressed concern that she may lose this job if she waits for her vehicle to be released before starting work with this employer. The appellant also explained that because she is the primary financial support for her household—and owing to the suspension of her boyfriend’s driver’s licence—the vehicle impoundment is causing financial stress.

13The respondent argues that alternate methods of transportation were available to the appellant since her vehicle was impounded. The respondent says the appellant used a taxi to get to work for most of her assigned shifts as well as to address her personal needs, such as grocery shopping and picking up prescribed medication. The respondent adds that the appellant’s community has public transit service, which she has used to go to the library for her school studies.

The appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle

14We agree with the respondent’s assertion. In our view, the appellant’s testimony establishes that alternatives to her impounded vehicle are available to her, and she has been using alternative means of transportation. In fact, the appellant acknowledged in her closing submissions that there are transportation options available to fulfill her needs and commute to work.

15The appellant testified that bus services in North Bay are not a reasonable alternative to her impounded vehicle because they are unreliable. We disagree. While the appellant testified she had to wait up to 30 minutes for the bus, we find this to be a mere inconvenience, which the Tribunal may not consider when assessing exceptional hardship, and, in any event, does not diminish the bus as a reasonable option to her impounded vehicle.

16The appellant also testified that the bus was not available for any night shifts she was scheduled to work because the routes do not operate past 11 p.m. While this may be true, we find this bears little on the appellant’s exceptional hardship claim because the appellant also testified that the transit service did not extend beyond North Bay’s city limits and was therefore not a feasible option for her employment in Sturgeon Falls or Corbeil. Further, the appellant’s testimony did not confirm whether the respite employment she was waiting to start involves night shifts.

17Speaking further to transportation options for employment, the appellant testified during cross-examination that since the impoundment she was able to make six of eight scheduled shifts at the Sturgeon Falls Hospital by using a taxi. The appellant also testified that she paid for taxis to report for all seven or eight of the on-call shifts she was offered at a retirement home in Corbeil during the same period. We find this evidence establishes that the appellant has had access to alternative means of transportation since the impoundment. The appellant emphasized that while it is “easy” to find taxis to take her to Corbeil for work, she has to pay $100.00 per day to commute, which costs more than what she earns from her employment. We afforded little weight to the appellant’s financial argument because economic loss is not a relevant consideration for exceptional hardship under the law unless the appellant first demonstrates she has no alternative means of transportation available to her.

18We make the same finding as it pertains to the appellant’s testimony about potential employment implications of delaying the start of her respite employment until her impounded car is returned. The potential loss of employment can only be considered if the appellant demonstrates that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available, which she has not done in this case.

19The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, then an appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed. For the reasons set out in this decision, we find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. She therefore does not meet the test for exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to her.

ORDER

20The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed per section 50.2(5) of the HTA.