Chase Papak v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 39294

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16820/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Chase Papak

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATORS: Dr. Kailey Minnings, Rachel Levitsky

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: No one appearing

For the Respondent: Ian Sookram, Representative

HEARD: April 11, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Chase Papak (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend their Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received reports from treating health care providers that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect their safety to drive.

ISSUES

2The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

3To answer that issue, we will address the following questions:

a. Does the appellant suffer from a medical condition, namely an alcohol use disorder?

b. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

RESULT

4Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, we find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

5The hearing began on April 11, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. The appellant, who is self-represented, did not appear and remained absent from the proceedings for the next 30 minutes. During this time, the Tribunal phoned the appellant, left a voicemail, and sent him an email with the hearing details. At 10:00 a.m., we proceeded with the hearing in the appellant’s absence.

6Section 7(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act (“SPPA”), states that, where notice of an oral hearing has been given to a party in a proceeding and the party does not attend the hearing, the Tribunal may proceed in the absence of the party and the party is not entitled to any further notice in the proceeding. Further, Rule 3.7.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”) states that if a party, who has been given notice of a hearing in accordance with the SPPA, does not attend their hearing within 30 minutes of the scheduled start time, the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in the absence of that party and/or make any order it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

7On March 20, 2025, the appellant was provided with a Notice of Hearing which stated that the hearing of this matter would take place on April 11, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. Subsequently, the appellant attended a case conference on March 28, 2025, where the parties agreed that a telephone hearing would take place on the previously scheduled date of April 11, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. This was confirmed in a Case Conference Report and Order which was sent to the appellant on April 1, 2025.

8On April 9, 2025, the appellant emailed the Tribunal advising that he would not be participating in the hearing. In his email, he acknowledged that the hearing was scheduled for April 11, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. He did not explain why he would not be attending the hearing, and his email did not contain a request for an adjournment. The Tribunal emailed the appellant on April 11, 2025, prior to the hearing, to advise him that the hearing would commence as set out in the Notice of Hearing provided to him, and that the Tribunal might proceed with the hearing in his absence.

9Shortly after the hearing began at 9:30 a.m., the Tribunal emailed the appellant, called him, and left a voicemail reminding him of the hearing. At 10:00 a.m., he had still not joined the hearing.

10In our view, these facts indicate that the appellant received due notice of the hearing but failed to attend. We therefore relied on the discretion afforded by s. 7(1) of the SPPA and Rule 3.7.1 of the Rules, and went ahead with the hearing at 10:00 a.m. in the appellant’s absence.

ANALYSIS

Overview

11The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

12A person whose licence is suspended under these provisions may appeal the suspension to the Tribunal under s. 50(1) of the Act. On appeal, the Registrar has the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant has a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Following a hearing, the Tribunal may, under s. 50(2) of the Act, confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

Does the appellant suffer from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder?

13We find that the Registrar has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder.

14An unsolicited Medical Condition Report (“MCR”) dated December 27, 2024, and completed by emergency room physician Dr. Bilal Akil, indicates that the appellant has or appears to have a diagnosis of substance use disorder, specifically alcohol.

15On December 31, 2024, the Registrar sent the appellant a letter indicating that his licence was suspended under s. 47(1) of the Act, and requested that he send in a completed Substance Use Assessment form. There is no evidence before us that this was completed.

16In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant takes issue with the fact that the practitioner’s street address was not included on the MCR, despite an asterisk indicating that information is mandatory. He argues that this document should be disregarded on that basis. We have considered this concern, notwithstanding that the appellant did not attend the hearing or make submissions on it, but we disagree. The only missing information in the form was the street address of Windsor Regional Hospital. We note that “WRH-OC-ER” was written on the address line to indicate the location of the physician who completed the form. The relevant portion of the form, which pertained to the appellant’s medical condition, was completed, and the form was verified via signature. We are not persuaded that the missing street address invalidates the rest of the information of the form. We are therefore not prepared to disregard or assign less weight to this document simply because it was missing the street address of the hospital.

17A second unsolicited MCR dated December 30, 2024, completed by nurse practitioner Karl Sweet, also indicates that the appellant has or appears to have a diagnosis of substance use disorder, specifically alcohol. However, there is no signature on the document. The appellant also stated in his Notice of Appeal that this document should be disregarded as it did not include Mr. Sweet’s signature. During the hearing, the Registrar acknowledged that if no signature is present on an MCR, typically the Ministry of Transportation (“MOT”) will reach out to the practitioner to verify the document. However, it did not do so in this case. As it appears that this document was not verified by a signature, and the MOT took no steps to ensure that it was verified, we are not prepared to assign weight to it in this hearing.

18The appellant did not attend at the hearing and thus did not testify as to his medical condition. Aside from the two MCRs, he did not provide the Tribunal with any other medical documentation.

19We find that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the MCR from Dr. Akil is compelling evidence that the appellant suffers from alcohol use disorder. We accordingly find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden of establishing that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

20We find that the Registrar has proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

21The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standard for Drivers [February 2021] (the “CCMTA Standards”), and argues that the licence suspension should be confirmed by the Tribunal. Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them.

22Chapter 15.4 of the CCMTA Standards explains that alcohol affects the functions necessary for driving, such as reaction times, vision, depth perception, judgment and insight, alertness, and motor co-ordination. Chapter 15.6.4 states that impaired individuals are not permitted to drive any class of motor vehicle. The rationale provided is that alcohol is known to impair the ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. Chapter 15.6.3 of the CCMTA Standards recommends that a driver who has been diagnosed with alcohol use disorder be considered eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained from the use of alcohol for 12 months. Earlier re-licensing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addictions specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program. The driver’s functional abilities necessary for driving must not be impaired.

23We find that the CCMTA Standards are well-reasoned and are therefore persuasive. Further, the appellant has not provided evidence or submissions as to why the CCMTA Standards should not be followed in this case. There is no favourable recommendation from a physician before us, and the CCMTA Standards confirm alcohol use disorder’s significant impact on the ability to drive safely.

24We are accordingly satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

ORDER:

25For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.