Licence Appeal Tribunal
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16601/MVIA
Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Steeve Lemieux
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR: Colin Osterberg
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Steeve Lemieux, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Representative
HEARD: January 23, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Steeve Lemieux (the "appellant") seeks to appeal the impoundment of his 2008 Ford motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act (the "Act”).
2The appellant's vehicle was impounded on November 30, 2024 when it was stopped by the police and the appellant was found to be driving it while his licence was under suspension. The period of impoundment is 45 days and expired January 14, 2025. The appeal was filed on December 30, 2024, which is the 30th day after the impoundment.
3Section 9 of Ontario Regulation 641/98 (the “Regulation”) under the Act provides that an appeal under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days of the impoundment.
4The appellant brings this motion to extend the time for filing his appeal. Both parties agreed that, if the motion for the extension of time is granted, the evidence presented at the motion should be used as evidence for the purposes of the hearing of the appeal on its merits and that a further hearing date is unnecessary.
5The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant are that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
6For the reasons given below, I find that the justice of this case does not warrant an extension of the time for filing the appeal. The appellant’s motion is therefore dismissed.
ANALYSIS
Motion for Extension
7Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch G gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.
8In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:
a) the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;
b) the length of the delay;
c) prejudice to the other party; and
d) the merits of the appeal.
9I have considered the evidence relating to each of these factors as they apply to this case.
Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period
10I find that the appellant did not intend to appeal the impoundment within the 15-day appeal period.
11The appellant’s evidence is that he formed the intention to appeal the impoundment around the end of December 2024, after the 15-day appeal period. He found out that he could appeal to the Tribunal around the middle of December but did not immediately believe that he should appeal. Although the appellant’s evidence was somewhat unclear, it appears that he did not realize how expensive it was going to be to have the vehicle released until later in December and only then decided to appeal.
12The appellant was also unclear about his appeal rights and this uncertainty probably played some part in the delay.
13In any event, the appellant did not form the intention to appeal within the appeal period and this is a factor that is weighed against an extension of time.
Length of the delay
14I find the delay to be significant in this case. The time period the Act sets out as the time to appeal is 15 days. The appellant did not appeal until twice that length of time after the impoundment.
15I find that there was a significant delay in all the circumstances.
Prejudice
16The Registrar benefits from a prompt hearing and would be prejudiced by an extension of the time for filing the appeal. If the appellant’s appeal is successful, the Registrar will be required to cover the cost of the impoundment. The earlier the appeal is dealt with, the less it will cost the Registrar to have the vehicle released. The prejudice to the Registrar is the risk of incurring greater expense than it would otherwise have been exposed to.
17That said, the Registrar’s exposure to impound costs is limited to the 45-day impound period and so the prejudice resulting from the delay is limited. I do not find this to be a significant factor one way or the other.
The merits of the appeal
18On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish its case on a balance of probabilities but only that his version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome.
19The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant is that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
20Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.
21Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that to show there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
22If the owner fails to establish that there is no alternative available, then her appeal will fail. If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
23The appellant bases his appeal on his allegation that he will suffer economically due to the impoundment. The appellant presented some evidence that supports his allegation that the impoundment will cause him to suffer economically and I accept his evidence in this regard.
24However, in my view the appellant is prevented from relying on this ground of appeal by s. 10(3)(d)(i) of the Regulation which states that, in order to appeal on the ground of exceptional hardship on the basis of financial or economic losses, the owner must demonstrate that the impact of the loss will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and will not be a result of financial or economic losses by the suspended driver.
25The evidence demonstrated, and the appellant agreed, that the losses which will result from the impoundment are to the appellant, who was the person whose driving while his driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle. The appellant lives alone and was able to complete his required activities during the impoundment period and was able to secure the release of the vehicle from impound by paying the required costs. He is not employed and agreed that there was no one else who may have suffered, or will suffer, economic or financial losses due to the impoundment other than the appellant. The appellant did not argue that the impoundment resulted in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health or safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
26I find that s. 10(3)(d)(i) applies to prevent the appellant from relying on exceptional hardship as a ground of appeal since the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the impact of the loss will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle. I find that, even though the standard for granting an extension of the time for appeal is low, the appellant has not met that standard and that there is no reasonable possibility that the appeal would be successful on its merits should it be allowed to proceed.
27I find that the justice of the case requires that the request for an extension be dismissed.
ORDER
28For the reasons set out above, the appellant’s motion for an extension of the time to appeal the impoundment is dismissed.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
_______________________
Colin Osterberg, Vice-Chair
RELEASED: January 23, 2025