Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16569/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Melanie Jones

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Melanie Jones, self-represented

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: January 22, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Melanie Jones (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s 2023 Chevrolet Tahoe motor vehicle was impounded on November 29, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Emmery McGinnis was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The appellant has not established exceptional hardship according to the Act

5I find that the appellant has not established that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must be dismissed as a result.

6Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

7Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

9If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

10The evidence established that the impoundment period ended January 13, 2025. However, because the appellant was of the understanding that the impoundment was for 90 days rather than 45, the vehicle remained impounded at the time of the hearing.

11The appellant lives with her 8-year-old daughter and 9-year-old niece who she cares for. She is not employed and lives in a rural area without access to public transportation. The children are bussed to school and only missed school when the busses were not running because of the weather.

12During the impoundment period, the appellant had the assistance of her parents, her daughter’s father, and a friend who all assisted by getting groceries for her family and taking the children to their extra-curricular activities. No one in the household has a medical condition for which they need regular attention and no medical appointments were missed as the result of the impoundment.

13The Registrar provided evidence that the appellant owns a 2013 Dodge vehicle, in addition to the impounded vehicle. The appellant testified that on January 14, 2025 she gave that vehicle to her 22-year-old daughter and that in December it was in the shop for repairs and therefore not available to her. The appellant’s evidence on this subject was rather vague and unconvincing. She initially denied that she owned another vehicle and then admitted she did once the Registrar pointed to evidence that on January 14, 2025 the appellant was stopped by police driving the 2013 Dodge and that the police reported that she was the owner of that vehicle.

14The appellant did not state what repairs were required to the 2013 Dodge when asked. She initially said the Dodge was out of the shop by January 3, 2025, and when asked whether it was then available to her until January 14, 2025, she changed her answer and said the vehicle was in the shop until January 9, 2025. Despite the fact that she was found to be driving the 2013 Dodge on January 14, 2025, she denied that it was available to her and maintained that it was not roadworthy.

15The appellant’s evidence regarding the 2013 Dodge did not satisfy me that it should not be considered when determining whether there were alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to the appellant. I find that the 2013 Dodge was available to the appellant to some extent during the impoundment period.

16I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to the appellant. She has been able to have her ongoing daily requirements met with the help of her parents, her daughter’s father, and her friends. She also had the Dodge 2013 available to her to some extent. Her children have not missed significant time from school and have been able to attend their extra-curricular activities using the alternatives available. The appellant did not present evidence that any significant activities were not accomplished during the impoundment period or that the impoundment will cause any significant hardship in the future.

17Since I have found that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available, her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test. Although the impoundment has resulted in inconvenience, I am not satisfied the appellant has shown exceptional hardship under the Act and her appeal must fail on this ground.

ORDER

18For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.