Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16379/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Gianna Jyoti

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

PANEL:

Dimitri Louvish, M.D., Member Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Gianna Jyoti, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Ian Sookram, Representative

HEARD: January 10, 2025

OVERVIEW

1On October 30, 2024 Gianna Jyoti (the “appellant”) appealed the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) set out in a letter dated May 30, 2024 to suspend her Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) because the Registrar received a police report indicating that she has a condition that affects her ability to drive safely.

2Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that he or she is able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition which is likely to significantly interfere with the appellant’s ability to drive safely.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. The appellant admits in her Notice of Appeal that she has suffers from Addison’s Disease, multiple sclerosis, fibromyalgia and PTSD but denies that any of her medical conditions interfere with her ability to drive safely.

5This hearing was originally scheduled to be heard on December 10, 2024 but was adjourned on that date at the appellant’s request because she was feeling unwell. The hearing was re-scheduled to January 10, 2025.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

6By Notice of Motion dated January 9, 2025, the appellant filed a motion that she asked to be heard at the beginning of the hearing on January 10, 2025. The appellant’s motion was to remove from evidence her medical records dated 2011 submitted by the respondent, because these medical records are, in the appellant’s view, of no relevance to this appeal, or connected to this case, and should not be used in this hearing.

7The Registrar did not take a position on the appellant’s motion.

8On this basis, we heard the appellant’s motion at the start of the hearing.

9In summary, the appellant submitted that her 2011 medical records have no relevance now because the records are too old and were challenged by the appellant at the time and her driver’s licence was reinstated. The appellant submitted that these medical records would only serve to bias the Tribunal against her.

10At the hearing we denied the appellant’s motion for reasons to follow in the decision. These are our reasons.

11We find that the appellant’s medical history, even dating back to 2011, as put forward by the Registrar, is relevant to the issue before us, namely whether the appellant has a medical condition(s) that affects her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. The age of the appellant’s medical records does not affect the fact that these medical records exist and form part of the appellant’s medical history, whether challenged by her in the past or not.

12The appellant was advised at the hearing that the submissions she made during her motion will be taken into account when we decide how much weight to attribute to the appellant’s older medical records.

13There is no basis for the appellant’s submission that her medical history will serve to “bias” us against her at the hearing. The appellant’s medical history is comprised of documents containing medical and other information, documents which we will consider, subject to determining what weight we will attribute to those records.

14At this early stage in the hearing, we find that her medical records which the appellant asks us to exclude, are relevant to our determination.

ISSUES

15The issue in dispute is whether the appellant has a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

16To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant a have medical condition(s)?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

RESULT

17For the reasons set out, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

The appellant suffers from medical conditions

18The evidence presented at the hearing supports the Registrar’s allegation that the appellant has a medical condition.

19The Registrar’s position is supported by the police report regarding an incident May 29, 2024. The police report bears the names of the investigating officer and his supervisor and indicates that the appellant was apprehended under the Mental Health Act after the appellant came to the attention of the police due to collision, officer observation, and self-declared medical impairment – chronic fatigue, Addison’s disease, brain tumour, fibromyalgia. The report states that the appellant’s driving ability is likely compromised due to falling asleep, mental health, other-medical conditions. The report indicates that the appellant has been involved in previous vehicle related incidents, found in collisions, had listed a number of medical conditions such as chronic fatigue, Addison’s disease, brain tumour, fibromyalgia, multiple sclerosis, has been previously apprehended under the Mental Health Act, has been found in ditches, along the side of the road, and has been observed by officers falling asleep behind the wheel while waiting for her tow truck to arrive.

20According to the emergency department records of the Ottawa hospital, the appellant was taken to the hospital by the police on May 22, 2024, for anxiety/situational crises and diagnosed with agitation – primary. The appellant was ultimately released after being required to speak with the hospital social worker. The hospital record notes that the appellant’s blood work and chest x-ray are normal and do not show any signs of infection. The social worker concluded that the appellant’s social conditions can be best supported with stable housing.

21By letter dated November 5, 2024, the Registrar informed the appellant of the suspension of her driver’s licence on the basis of “mental health condition”.

22The Registrar’s position is also supported by the appellant’s medical history which includes a medical condition report dated February 21, 2011 diagnosing mental or emotional illness – unstable, bipolar disorder rapid cycling, currently unstable made by Dr. Heidi King, psychiatry resident, a September 1, 2011 Dr. Douyon de Azevedo, addiction medicine physician at an Ottawa hospital diagnosing addiction and borderline personality disorder, the report of Dr. Gilles Fleury, psychiatrist, diagnosing borderline personality disorder and noting the appellant’s history of seeing mental health professional from a young age, history of concussion and motorcycle accidents. In addition, a September 1, 2015 mental health assessment made by Dr. Enrique Torres, appellant’s family physician, diagnoses her primary mental illness as personality disorder – currently stable. Documents filed by the Registrar indicate that the Registrar ultimately concluded that the appellant’s driver’s licence should not be suspended in 2015. The Registrar’s position has changed.

23The appellant testified that her medical history contains misdiagnoses.

24Taken by itself, the appellant’s medical history dating back to 2011 would not be sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant’s current medical conditions. However, when viewed in totality with the more recent documents filed by the Registrar from 2024, and the appellant’s admissions in her Notice of Appeal and her testimony at the hearing, we find that the appellant suffers from medical conditions.

25This is consistent with the medical report put forward by the appellant at the hearing in the letter from Dr. William Caron, her family physician, which confirms that the appellant has medical conditions, although he does not specify them. Dr. Caron in his November 13, 2024 report states that “This patient was seen in clinic on Nov 13, 2024, from a medical stand point, her current conditions do not prevent her from driving”.

26In her Notice of Appeal and in her testimony at the hearing, the appellant admitted that that she has four medical conditions but denies that she has a mental health condition. However, the appellant testified that she is being treated by a psychiatrist, has been seen as recently as several months ago, and is being prescribed medication by both her psychiatrist and her family physician for her medical conditions.

27We find based on the admissions of the appellant, her family physician Dr. Caron, and the medical records before us, that it is more likely than not that the appellant has medical conditions.

28We find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant has medical conditions.

The appellant’s medical conditions are likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely

29We are satisfied that the appellant’s medical conditions are likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely as established by the police report. The police report states that the appellant came to the attention of the police due to collision, officer observation, and self-declared medical impairment – chronic fatigue, Addison’s disease, brain tumour, fibromyalgia. The report also states that the appellant’s driving ability is likely compromised due to falling asleep, mental health, other-medical conditions. The report indicates that the appellant has been involved in previous vehicle related incidents, found in collisions, had listed a number of medical conditions such as chronic fatigue, Addison’s disease, brain tumour, fibromyalgia, multiple sclerosis, has been previously apprehended under the Mental Health Act, has been found in ditches, along the side of the road, and has been observed by officers falling asleep behind the wheel while waiting for her tow truck to arrive.

30The appellant testified that she is a good driver and on the night of the incident, before she set out to drive, was fine except for issues with her mother with whom she lives.

31The appellant testified that she stopped at the side of the road and called Brian Williams, a friend she had not seen for ten years, to help her because she was stuck and her wheels were spinning, and Mr. Williams has a truck. When he arrived at the side of the road, the appellant said that Mr. Williams starting verbally attacking her. She was shivering because she was cold, but denies she was having any mental breakdown. The appellant testified that Mr. Williams misunderstood the situation and contacted the police.

32The appellant filed an unsworn statement dated September 26, 2024, which the appellant said Mr. Williams had signed. This statement says that when Mr. Williams arrived on the scene, the appellant “seemed agitated by the situation and I totally misinterpreted what was happening…I also drove to her home because I was concerned at how flustered she seemed to be. I had no idea that she suffered neurological problems which affect her speech and nervous system…It turns out that she has Addison’s Disease and other conditions which made it seem to me that she was impaired or under the influence of some substance. This was completely wrong, and I acted on false assumptions to notify the police. All of this was based on incorrect information. What I observed was nothing more than her neurological response to stress.”

33We give the statement of Mr. Williams little weight. Firstly, the statement is not sworn or witnessed so that there is no verification that Mr. Williams signed this statement. Secondly, Mr. Williams did not attend the hearing and his statement could not be tested by cross-examination. Thirdly, when questioned, the appellant testified that she wrote this statement together with Mr. Williams.

34Even if we were to accept that this statement of Mr. Williams is reliable, which we do not, it was not Mr. Williams who took the appellant to the hospital. The police report indicates that it is based, at least in part, on officer observation which was sufficient to prompt the police to apprehend the appellant under the Mental Health Act.

35Although Ms. Macarie and Mr. Brunet testified that the appellant had no trouble driving the night of the incident, and her distress was caused by the police attending at their home, not driving, neither of them was present with her in her vehicle when she was driving and have no first-hand knowledge of this.

36Further, Ms. Macarie, a retired nurse, wrote that the appellant was “…having one of her flare-ups crises that occur with stress of any kind”. Ms. Macarie confirmed the appellant’s testimony that she did not defend the appellant during the interaction with police, something she now regrets.

37The appellant put forward a one sentence letter from Dr. William Caron, appellant’s family physician, dated November 13, 2024 which states “This patient was seen in clinic on Nov 13, 2024, from a medical stand point, her current conditions do not prevent her from driving”. Dr. Caron does not specify what the appellant’s current conditions are, does not outline treatment he or other physicians give to her, list her current medications, or disclose if the appellant is being treated by medical specialists. Dr. Caron does not explain how her current conditions do not prevent her from driving. Dr. Caron does not state that the appellant can drive a motor vehicle safely, or the basis for his conclusion that her conditions do not prevent her from driving. This opinion is largely unhelpful to us, and we give it little weight on the issue of the appellant’s capacity to drive a motor vehicle safely. The issue before us is whether the appellant can drive a motor vehicle safely.

38Although the appellant testified that the police report is false, we do not find the police report to be unreliable, except in one detail. There is an apparent error in the date of the incident in the police report. The hospital records show that the appellant was taken to the hospital on May 22, 2024, not May 29, 2024. We do not find this to be a material error affecting the validity of the police report.

39Although the appellant, her mother Cecilia Macarie and mother’s friend Guy Brunet, all testified that the police were unnecessarily aggressive and rude when they attended at the appellant’s home and she was taken to the hospital, this testimony about the conduct of the police is not relevant to the determination of the issues we have to decide, specifically whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition(s) and if so, whether this likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

40We are unconvinced that the appellant has the insight and understanding of her medical conditions to be able to judge whether she can safety operate a motor vehicle.

41The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers (the “CCMTA Standards”), particularly s. 14.6.1 in support of its submission that the licence suspension should be confirmed by the Tribunal. Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration, although they are not binding on the Tribunal.

42Section 14.6.1 of the CCMTA Standards provides that a driver who has been diagnosed with psychiatric disorder may be considered eligible for a driver’s licence if, the condition is stable, the driver has sufficient insight to stop driving if the condition becomes acute, the functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired, a treating physician supports a return to driving and the conditions for maintaining a licence are met including remaining under regular medical supervision and compliance with prescribed medication or other recommended treatment.

43Although we are not bound by the CCMTA Standards, we find the above-described requirements to be reasonable at this time. There are diagnoses in the appellant’s medical history of psychiatric disorder and we are not satisfied that the appellant’s medical conditions are stable and that she has enough insight to stop driving if necessary.

44Dr. Caron does not opine that the appellant can drive a motor vehicle safely at this time.

45There is no recent medical information put forward by the appellant concerning her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. It is the appellant’s right to refuse to put more fulsome current medical information before us because the burden of proof remains on the Registrar in this appeal. However, that leaves us with uncontroverted police report and medical evidence put forward by the Registrar which we find sufficient to establish the Registrar’s case on a balance of probabilities.

46The Registrar’s submission that the appellant’s driver’s licence should remain suspended at this time is supported by the police report, and the CCMTA Standards. Given the appellant’s multiple medical conditions, we agree with the Registrar’s submissions that the appellant’s driver’s licence should remain suspended at this time.

47We are satisfied that the appellant’s medical condition(s) is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely.

Conclusion(s)

48We find that the appellant suffers from a medical condition(s) that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

49For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.