Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act
Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act
Between:
Amy Pearson
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Jan Dymond, Vice-Chair
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Amy Pearson, Self-Represented
For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent
Heard by teleconference: April 14, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Amy Pearson (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2023 Kia, license plate number CWTN035, under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on March 14, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant’s son Joshua Pearson was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.
2The appellant appeals on the grounds that impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.
3The Registrar submitted documents confirming that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was under suspension. Accordingly, I find that the vehicle was lawfully impounded pursuant to s. 55.1(1) of the Act.
ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
4Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal. That section limits the grounds upon which the Tribunal can order the release of the vehicle. The appellant’s appeal is based on her allegation that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.
RESULT
5For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with section 50(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.
ANALYSIS
Has the appellant established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?
6I find that the appellant has not established exceptional hardship under the Act and the appeal must be dismissed as a result.
7The burden is on the appellant to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as defined in the Act and regulations.
8Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.
9Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
“…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”
10If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.
11If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.
12The appellant’s submission for exceptional hardship focuses on the financial hardship the impoundment fees will result in for herself and her family.
13The appellant testifies that she is employed fulltime at a patient transportation company where she works 12-hour shifts 3-4 days per week. Her employer is located approximately 45 kilometers from the appellant’s residence. The Registrar submitted evidence, confirmed by the appellant, that there are two other vehicles in the household in addition to the impounded vehicle: One vehicle used primarily by the appellant’s husband to travel to his full-time employment which is approximately 30 minutes away; a second vehicle is used primarily by the appellant’s daughter to travel to college in Kingston between two and four days per week.
14The appellant acknowledges that, since the impoundment, she has not missed any days of employment. She was able to borrow her parents’ vehicle for two weeks; she took three days of vacation and was able to rely on her daughter and husband for transportation on any remaining days. She testifies that she lives in a rural area and that taxis and rideshares are prohibitively expensive – as much as $100.00 one way to her employment in Smiths Falls, and that she cannot afford to consider renting a vehicle.
15The family has been able to look after their day-to-day needs using the household’s other vehicles.
16The respondent submits that the appellant has not met her onus to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available because she has been able to maintain her work schedule; has not suffered any loss of income; and has been able to maintain the needs of the family through the use of secondary vehicles.
17The Act permits impacts of an impoundment such as economic loss/financial hardship to be considered only under limited circumstances and only if there is first a finding that no alternative vehicle is available.
CONCLUSION
18I have considered the submissions of both parties and I find that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle because she has been able to make other arrangements such as borrowing her parents’ vehicle and the use of secondary vehicles usually operated by direct family members.
19For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail. As a result of this finding, I need not consider whether the appellant has satisfied the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.
ORDER
20On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing and the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.
Jan Dymond
Vice-Chair
Released: April 22, 2025