Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16891/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Patricia Mountain

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

PANEL:

Caley Howard Raymond Ramdayal

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Patricia Mountain, self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

Heard by teleconference: April 11, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Patricia Mountain (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2019 Chevrolet Equinox under s. 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on March 26, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Megan Mountain-Larocque (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence.

2Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). That section limits the grounds on which the Tribunal can order the release of a vehicle.

3The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5We find that the appellant has not demonstrated that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as the appellant has reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. We therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

The appellant has not proven that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

6We find that the appellant has not proven that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act, (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Section 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the owner of the impounded vehicle must show that they have considered every reasonable option for an alternative that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss.

9Only if there is no alternative available to the impounded vehicle can we consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle.

10If the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic or employment losses. The Tribunal cannot consider inconvenience when determining whether impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

11If the appellant is unable to prove that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the appeal will be unsuccessful.

12The appellant testified that she lives in a home with her daughter and two grandchildren. She works full-time in the tax field. At the time of the impoundment, which falls during tax season, she works six days per week and approximately 45-55 hours per week.

13She testified that she is responsible for driving her grandchildren to school in the morning as her daughter starts work at 4:00 am. There is no school bus service to the elementary school that the younger grandchild attends. While there is bus service to the older grandchild’s high school, the appellant drives them both because the schools are relatively close together, approximately 8 km from their home, and she has to make the trip anyway.

14She testified that, since the impoundment, she has been sharing her daughter’s vehicle to get to work and to take the grandchildren to school. This has required her to get up at 3:45 am to drive her daughter to work. After she takes the children to school, she then drives back to the daughter’s work and the daughter drives the appellant to work so the daughter has her vehicle in order to pick up the children after school. The daughter then picks up the appellant after work if she is able. The appellant testified that she has occasionally asked one of her other daughters to pick her up if the daughter with whom she lives is unavailable. The appellant’s two other daughters live approximately 15-20 km away. The appellant has had to wait for a ride home when no one is immediately available.

15The appellant testified that she is worried about the toll that the extra driving is taking on her daughter’s health.

16The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, she has had groceries delivered if her daughter was unable to pick them up. They have been able to pick up other household essentials on Sundays, when neither the appellant nor the daughter work, using the daughter’s vehicle. The appellant has not missed any medical appointments, although she is delaying seeing the doctor for a yearly appointment until after the impoundment period.

17The appellant testified that she is the treasurer of her church, which is a volunteer position that requires her to attend the church to input data into the accounting program approximately three times per month. The appellant testified that due to the impoundment, in combination with the appellant being busy at work due to tax season, the church has found someone to take over her treasurer duties for the duration of the impoundment period.

18The appellant testified that there is regional transit service in her area, but it is not very good, often requiring waits of more than an hour between buses. She also testified that there is no taxi service in town and she did not know if Uber would be an option.

19The appellant testified that she could not afford to pay the impound fees for the vehicle, which she had been told would be nearly $9,000. The driver is unemployed and would not be able to contribute to paying the impound fees.

20The appellant seeks an order from the Tribunal to release her vehicle on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

21The respondent submits that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle and so the impoundment is not causing exceptional hardship. Since the impoundment, the appellant and her daughter have been able to get to their employment, the grandchildren have been able to get to school and they have been able to obtain groceries and other essentials by sharing the daughter’s vehicle. The respondent also submits that transit is available in the area.

22The respondent seeks confirmation of the impoundment.

Conclusion

23We find that the appellant has not demonstrated that she has no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her.

24The appellant lives with her daughter, who has a vehicle. We find that sharing the daughter’s vehicle will allow the appellant to adequately mitigate any threat or loss to herself or the other members of her household. Sharing the daughter’s vehicle has enabled both the appellant and her daughter to maintain their incomes by getting to work. They have successfully transported the grandchildren to school. They have access to delivery services for groceries if necessary. In addition, there are transit services available in the area and the appellant has asked her other daughters for rides when necessary.

25While sharing the daughter’s vehicle is inconvenient and involves extra driving for both the appellant and her daughter, we find that it is a reasonable alternative in the circumstances.

26The Regulation sets out that if the appellant fails to establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, then an appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship cannot succeed. For the reasons set out in this decision, we find that the appellant has failed to discharge the threshold burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle. She therefore does not meet the test of exceptional hardship, as set out in the Regulation, based on the alternatives available to her.

27Therefore, we find that the appellant has not proven exceptional hardship as a ground for releasing her vehicle under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ORDER

28For the reasons set out above, pursuant to the Tribunal’s authority under s. 50.2(5) of the Act, we confirm the impoundment order.