Simone Maturine v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 35908

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16882/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Simone Maturine

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

PANEL:

Caley Howard Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Simone Maturine, self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent of the Registrar

Heard by Teleconference: April 10, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Simone Maturine (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2021 Mazda CX9 under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on March 9, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Zane Maynard (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence.

2Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). That section limits the grounds on which the Tribunal can order the release of a vehicle.

3The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship, pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ISSUES

4The issue in dispute is:

i. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5We find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship. The impoundment is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

6We find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act, (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Section 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the owner of the impounded vehicle must show that they have considered every reasonable option for an alternative that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss.

9Only if there is no alternative available to the impounded vehicle can we consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle.

10If the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic or employment losses. The Tribunal cannot consider inconvenience when determining whether impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

11The appellant testified that she is the mother of two young children, aged 10 and 4, and she needs her vehicle to transport the children to and from school and daycare, which is located at the same site as the school. Since the impoundment, she has transported the children to and from the school and after-school activities using a combination of public transit, Uber and assistance from her mother, who lives with the appellant and has a vehicle.

12The appellant testified that she has made it to her medical appointments since the impoundment. However, she stated that travelling to her appointments was more expensive since the impoundment. In addition, the children have dentist appointments during the impoundment period and she is not sure how they will get there.

13The appellant confirmed that, since the impoundment, she has had groceries delivered when her mother is unable to drive her, but that this option is more expensive.

14The appellant testified that she is also the main family member that her elderly grandparents depend on for transportation to their medical appointments and to pick up essentials. She stated that since the impoundment, her grandmother has been taking public transit and her mother has been driving them as needed.

15The appellant has a full-time job, which is a remote position that she performs from home, as well as a part-time job as a hairdresser. She performs her part-time job from a salon on some occasions but also travels to the homes of some clients who are unable to travel to the salon. Since the impoundment, she has had to take an Uber to get to the salon, which is an added financial strain, and she has been unable to travel to clients’ homes, which has reduced her part-time hours by approximately one-third.

16The appellant testified that while her mother has taken on additional driving duties since the impoundment, she is concerned that this is taking a toll on her mother’s health. The appellant testified that her mother is not comfortable lending anyone her vehicle and has been doing 98% of the driving since the impoundment.

17The appellant testified that a rental vehicle was out of the question for financial reasons and that taking Ubers since the impoundment was causing financial hardship. The appellant confirmed that in addition to her children, she lives in a household with her partner, her brother, her niece and her mother. She testified that most of the household expenses are paid by herself and her mother, although her brother, niece and partner all have jobs.

18The appellant seeks an order from the Tribunal to release her vehicle on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

19The respondent submits that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle and so the impoundment is not causing exceptional hardship. It submits that she has been able to maintain her own schedule and that of her children using a combination of public transit, Uber and rides from her mother.

20The respondent submits that transit services are available to the appellant to transport the children to school and to get to her part-time job at the salon. In addition, the appellant’s mother lives with the appellant and has a vehicle. The appellant’s mother has been driving the appellant, her children and her grandparents to school and appointments when she is able, since the impoundment.

21We find that the appellant has not demonstrated that she has no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to her.

22We find that the appellant has access to transit, Uber and rides from her mother. We find that the combination of these alternatives will enable the appellant to adequately mitigate any threat or loss to herself or her children. She can transport her children to and from the school and to activities. She can sustain most of her income by working from home and taking transit or Uber to the salon for her part-time job. She has access to delivery services for groceries when necessary. The appellant’s grandparents are also able to access transit and rides from the appellant’s mother during the impoundment period.

23While the appellant has expressed concern about the added expenses involved with these alternatives, we find that they are reasonable alternatives in the context of the appellant’s income and shared living situation.

24Therefore, we find that the appellant has not proven exceptional hardship as a ground for releasing her vehicle under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

ORDER

25For the reasons set out above, we confirm the impoundment of the vehicle.