Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16825/MVIA
Appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act.
Between:
Deshawna Croxen-Moncrieffe Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISON AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Laura Hodgson
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant: Deshawna Croxen-Moncrieffe, Self-Represented
For the Respondent: Ian Sookram, Agent
Held by teleconference: April 07, 2025
OVERVIEW
1On January 28, 2025, the appellant’s vehicle, a 2019 Honda Acura, was impounded under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (the “Act”), after being driven by someone whose licence was suspended for a Criminal Code related reason. The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on March 18, 2025, 21 days after the time allowed for filing an appeal. The appellant brought a motion to extend the time for filing her appeal on March 23, 2025. The impoundment period ended on March 14, 2025.
2The appellant appeals from the impoundment on the grounds of “exceptional hardship”.
ISSUES
3The issues in dispute are:
Should the motion to extend the time to appeal be granted?
If so, did the impoundment result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act?
RESULT
4After hearing submissions from parties on the motion to extend time for the filing of the appeal, I granted the motion with reasons to follow. For the reasons given below, I found that the justice of this case warranted an extension of the time for filing the appeal.
5The appeal from the impoundment is, however, dismissed. As set out below, the appellant failed to establish that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as set out in the Act.
1. The motion to extend the time to appeal is granted
6An appeal of an impoundment under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days (Ontario Regulation 631/98). However, the Tribunal has the discretion pursuant to s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G (the “LAT Act”), to extend the time for filing after the 15 days where there are “reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.”
7In determining whether to grant an extension of time under s. 7 of the LAT Act, the Tribunal generally weighs four factors to determine whether the justice of the case requires granting the extension. The four factors are set out by the Divisional Court in Manuel v. Registrar, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 13 – 17 and 40:
The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;
The length of the delay;
Prejudice to the other party; and
The merits of the appeal.
8No single factor is determinative, and the “justice of the case” is the overriding consideration. The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are reasonable grounds for granting an extension.
9I find that the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period. She testified that she was present at the time of the impoundment and immediately made inquiries with the police and the Ministry of Transportation as to how she could recover her vehicle. The appellant made multiple attempts to fax the Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal in the two weeks following the impoundment. When she received no response from the Tribunal and noted that the appeal fee did not appear on her credit card statement, the appellant called the Tribunal to confirm the fax number. The appellant also testified that she was suffering from pregnancy related health issues so was only attending work, where she had access to a fax machine, intermittently.
10The appellant testified that it was not until early March that she learned that she could, in fact, email her Notice of Appeal. It is not clear why the appellant was not aware, during the appeal period, that she could email the Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal. Nonetheless, I find the appellant established that, within the appeal period, she made efforts to file the Notice and had a bona fide intention to appeal.
11I have also considered the length of delay and prejudice to the respondent. The Notice of Appeal was ultimately filed 21 days after the appeal deadline. The respondent submitted that the prejudice would be the added cost of the impoundment, should the appellant succeed on appeal. I have considered that this weighs against the granting of an extension to appeal.
12With respect to merits of the appeal, at this juncture, the appellant was only required to demonstrate that the appeal had some merit. The ultimate strength of the appellant’s appeal would be determined if an extension to appeal was granted. In her motion submissions, the appellant indicated that she was pregnant, suffered financially because of the impoundment and in her view, had no alternative transportation. It was the respondent’s position that the appellant had alternative transportation and could not establish exceptional hardship under the Act.
13It was unclear at this stage if the appellant could meet the relatively high threshold of establishing “exceptional hardship” under the Act. Without a full hearing I could not conclude she had reasonable alternative transportation available, and it remained possible that the appeal could succeed because of financial hardship or on medical grounds. I concluded that the appellant established, for the purpose of the motion, that there was some merit to the appeal.
14As noted, determining whether to grant an extension of time requires a balancing of the factors. Considering the four factors together, and in particular the intention to appeal and the possibility that the appeal may have merit, I found the justice of the case required that the request for an extension be granted. I granted the appellant’s motion to extend time to file the appeal and ordered the merits hearing to proceed.
2. The Appellant has not established the impoundment resulted in exceptional hardship as set out in the Act
15It was not disputed that the driver of the appellant’s vehicle had a Criminal Code related licence suspension at the time of the impoundment nor that the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle. I am satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.
16Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. If the owner fails to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no alternative available, then her appeal must fail.
17In order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person. This includes using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without a vehicle.
18If the appellant demonstrates that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal can then consider other criteria including: financial loss; loss of employment; and loss of education or training. The Tribunal cannot consider “inconvenience to any person” in determining exceptional hardship. Further, financial hardship due to the cost of the impoundment itself is generally not a factor that the Tribunal may consider in determining the issue of exceptional hardship.
19The appellant testified that because of the impoundment she had difficulty getting to work. The appellant explained that she is pregnant, has not been well and recently lost her accommodations. The cost of transportation during the impoundment period and the impoundment fees has meant that she depleted her savings and has had to borrow money.
20The appellant provided receipts for ride sharing services and for a 2-day car rental during the impoundment period. The appellant acknowledged that she is able to take public transportation within Toronto. She noted that when she needs to travel between workplaces within the city within a short period of time, she requires her vehicle. The appellant indicated that she may be able to receive compensation from the driver of the vehicle for the costs she has incurred due to the impoundment. There was no evidence that the appellant missed work or medical appointments because of the impoundment.
21In the respondent’s submission the appellant clearly had an alternative to her vehicle during the impoundment as she used ride sharing services, rented a vehicle and had public transportation available to her. The respondent asks that the impoundment be confirmed.
22I recognize the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle was financially stressful and very inconvenient for her. The appellant did, however, have several reasonable alternatives available to her; vehicle rental, ride share services and public transportation. As a result, the appellant did not establish that there was no alternative to the impoundment vehicle and therefore I find she has not satisfied the “exceptional hardship” ground of appeal as set out in the legislation.
ORDER
23The Tribunal confirms the impoundment of the appellant’s motor vehicle.
LICENCE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
_______________________
Laura Hodgson, Member
Released: April 22, 2025