Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16880/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an impoundment of a motor vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act.

Between:

Jennifer Hahn

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Rebecca Hines

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Jennifer Hahn, Appellant

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent for the Registrar

Heard by Teleconference:

April 9, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Jennifer Hahn (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2014 Dodge Caravan, for 45 days under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). At the time of the impoundment, a friend was driving the vehicle while her driving privileges were under suspension from a prescribed Criminal Code conviction.

2The owner of a vehicle which has been impounded in accordance with s. 55.1 may, under the provisions of s. 50.2 of the Act, appeal the impoundment and request an order from the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) that the Registrar release the vehicle.

3A vehicle owner may only appeal a vehicle impoundment on one or more of the five grounds provided in subsection 50.2(3). The appellant appeals under two grounds: s.50.2(3) (c) and (d). The appellant’s first ground of appeal, under s. 50.2(3)(c), is that the owner of the motor vehicle exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1 (1). The appellant also appeals under s. 50.2(3)(d), claiming that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4I have been asked to decide:

1. Did the appellant exercise due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension or subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1 (1)?

2. Will the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act?

RESULT

5I find the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. As a result, I direct the Registrar to release the vehicle.

ANALYSIS

I find the impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

6Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria by which exceptional hardship is defined for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. Subsection 10(1) compels the Tribunal to first consider whether the owner has alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

7Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation places the burden on the owner to demonstrate there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, which includes showing that they have considered and inquired into every reasonable option, such as using another vehicle and making arrangements to manage without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8Only if the appellant demonstrates that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available to her, may I consider the other factors and criteria in the Regulation that define the exceptional hardship test, for example, financial loss, loss of employment, or the health and safety of persons who may rely on the impounded vehicle. Importantly, the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

The appellant does not have any alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

9The appellant argues that the impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship because she is a single mother of three children with health issues and she requires her vehicle to get to and from physiotherapy and take her children to their medical appointments and extra curricular activities. She also requires the vehicle to get basic necessities such as groceries. She submits that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle during the impound period.

10The respondent argues that the appellant does not meet the test for exceptional hardship because she has walked and can take taxis and public transit during the impound period. As a result, she has access to alternative modes of transportation during the impound period and does not meet the test for exceptional hardship.

11I agree with the appellant and find that she does not have any alternatives to the impounded vehicle during the impound period for the following reasons.

12The appellant testified that she suffers from chronic pain in her shoulder, back and hips which result in limited mobility, and she has been missing her weekly physiotherapy appointments which has resulted in extreme pain. Because of this she is unable to walk and take public transit.

13The appellant acknowledged that public transit is available where she lives but submitted that her chronic pain is a barrier to her accessing it. Further, she cannot afford public transportation or taxis because she is unemployed and in receipt of Ontario Works which provides her with a monthly budget of $750 per month to pay rent, utilities and buy groceries. Additionally, she does not have family and friends nearby to assist her with transportation to get necessities and or to medical appointments. In addition, her twin 14-year-old sons have been impacted because they have missed all of their extra curricular activities, and one of them has a disability and has been especially hit hard because routine is important to him.

14The respondent argues that the appellant has alternative means of transportation available to her during the impound period such as taxis and public transit. For she could look into Wheel-Trans.

15I find the appellant to be a credible witness and find that she was forthright about the many challenges she has faced since the impoundment. I find she has established that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle during the impound period because she faces physical barriers to accessing public transit because she suffers from chronic pain which prevent her from walking to a bus stop and making several transfers to get to a location. Further, she is a recipient of Ontario Works which pays her a monthly benefit of approximately $750.00. Therefore, I conclude that other options such as Uber and taxis would be impossible for the appellant to afford. In addition, while Wheel-Trans may be an option for public transit for people with disabilities, there is no evidence before me to support that this service would be easily accessible or that the appellant would qualify for the service within the impound period.

16For these reasons, I find that public transit or taxis are not valid alternatives, and that the appellant has no alternative mode of transportation during the impound period.

Impoundment Poses a Threat to Health and Safety

17Since the impoundment, I find the appellant lacks alternatives to prevent her health from deteriorating during the impound period. Although the appellant acknowledged that she has access to emergency services, as noted above she has missed all of her weekly physiotherapy appointments which has had negative health consequences (experiencing extreme pain). Based upon the appellant’s testimony, I conclude that the impoundment will result in a threat to her health or safety because she has missed all of physiotherapy appointments and she will continue to miss them during the impoundment period. I therefore find that appellant has met the test for exceptional hardship.

18Finally, the appellant has had to reschedule doctors and dentist appointments for her two 14-year-old sons, and they have not been able to attend their extra curricular activities. Of concern, one of her sons has a disability and missing out on his extracurricular activities which may impact his well-being. I have considered the impact on the appellant’s children, however, I have already determined that the threat to the appellant’s health is sufficient enough to allow the appeal.

19I find the appellant meets the test in s. 10(4) as she has demonstrated that she has explored and inquired into every reasonable option to the impounded vehicle that would be an adequate alternative to prevent these kinds of threats to herself and children who usually rely on the impounded vehicle for transportation.

20For the reasons highlighted above, I have determined that the appellant has no alternative to the impound vehicle during the period of impoundment. Further, I find the impoundment will cause a threat to the health and safety of the appellant. The impoundment will therefore result in exceptional hardship.

CONCLUSION

21I find the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. Since I have determined that the exceptional hardship test has been met, I need not address whether the appellant exercised due diligence in ensuring the driver of the vehicle had a valid licence.

ORDER

22Pursuant to s.50.2(5) of the Act, I order the Registrar to release the impounded vehicle.