Oudit Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 23484

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16717/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Oudit Singh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Oudit Singh, self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: March 19, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Oudit Singh (the "appellant") appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the "Act"). The appellant's motor vehicle was impounded on February 6, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Amanda D'Orazio (the "driver") was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. whether the appellant exercised due diligence in accordance with section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act; or

ii. whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed, and the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

The appellant did not exercise due diligence

5I find that the appellant has failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence was not under suspension when the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded. His appeal pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act must be dismissed.

6This ground of appeal requires the vehicle owner to show that he took reasonable steps to determine that the driver's licence was not suspended. In this context, due diligence requires more than making assumptions of the facts. It requires steps to be taken by the owner to confirm the driver's assertion that his or her licence was not suspended and that it was valid. The specific steps that amount to due diligence depend on the circumstances of each case.

7The appellant testified that, at the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was leased to Christopher Ross, who later allowed the driver to operate the vehicle. A car rental agreement dated February 3, 2025 was submitted into evidence showing that the vehicle was rented to Mr. Ross on that date. The appellant never met, or even knew of the existence of, the driver.

8According to the appellant, he confirmed that Mr. Ross was properly licenced before allowing him to take possession of the vehicle. The appellant argues that he did all he could to make sure the vehicle was in the possession of a person who had a valid licence and that he had no way of preventing Mr. Ross from allowing an unlicensed person to drive the vehicle on the day it was impounded.

9In my view s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act does not provide the appellant with grounds to appeal an impoundment in the present circumstances. This section provides for an appeal where the owner uses due diligence as it pertains to the licence status of the intended driver of the vehicle where that intended driver was the person driving the vehicle at the time it was impounded.

10Section 50.2(3)(c) provides that the grounds for appeal include circumstances where the owner exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the "driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension…". The appellant quite correctly says that he had no way of knowing that Mr. Ross would allow the driver to operate the vehicle and could not have done anything to determine whether or not the driver's licence was then under suspension.

11In my view, the appellant, by renting his vehicle and giving possession of it to a third person, put himself in a position that he could not determine whether the driver had a valid licence when it was impounded. This resulted in the appellant being in a position where he was unable to exercise due diligence as required by the Act.

12I do not accept the appellant's position that he is entitled to rely on the ground of due diligence because he was unable to exercise due diligence. Such a result would be absurd and not in accordance with he purposes of the Act.

13I find that due diligence is not a ground of appeal available to the appellant in the circumstances and his appeal pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act must fail.

The appellant has not established exceptional hardship according to the Act

14I also find that the appellant has not established that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and his appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must be dismissed as a result.

15Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the "Regulation") sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

16Section 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

17If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

18If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

19The appellant was, at the time of the impoundment, being rented to Mr. Ross and was not available for use by the appellant. The appellant's evidence is that he has another vehicle for his own use and for the use of his family members. The appellant agreed that he is not alleging that he does not have an alternative to the impounded vehicle with respect to personal use by he or his family.

20The impounded vehicle was generally being rented to third parties by the appellant for income. He alleges that this rental income is his family's only source of income and that its impoundment has resulted in that income being lost. The appellant also says that having to pay for the cost of the impoundment will be a hardship to his business and to his family as it is their only source of income.

21First, I am not satisfied that the impoundment of the vehicle in question disentitles the appellant to the rental payments owning by Mr. Ross. Presumably Mr. Ross would be required to pay the agreed rent for the vehicle until such time as the vehicle is returned to the appellant.

22Second, the appellant's evidence is that he has a total of five rental vehicles. Currently two of those vehicles are unrented and available to rent. Given that the appellant has not rented all of his vehicles, I am not satisfied that the unavailability of the impounded vehicle is resulting in lost income to the appellant. More importantly, given the availability of the two additional unrented vehicles, I am not satisfied that the appellant has proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to the appellant for the purposes of the Regulation.

23While the appellant may sustain a loss of income due to the impoundment and will have to pay the costs of the impoundment, the Regulation requires that, before those issues are considered, the appellant must establish that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available to mitigate the damages and losses that will result from the impoundment. The appellant has not satisfied me that there is no alternative as that term is set out in the Regulation.

24I find that the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and his appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test. Although the impoundment has resulted in inconvenience, the appellant has failed to prove exceptional hardship under the Act and his appeal must fail on this ground.

ORDER

25For the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant's vehicle is confirmed.