Appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Kayla Hunter

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Jan Dymond, Vice-Chair

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Kayla Hunter, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Agent

Heard by teleconference: March 11, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Kayla Hunter (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of her 2013 Hyundai Sonata licence CYZL706 under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on March 1, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant’s common-law partner Adrian Christopher Halley was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship.

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

3Section 50.2 of the Act provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may appeal the impoundment to the Tribunal. That section limits the grounds upon which the Tribunal can order the release of the vehicle. The appellant’s appeal is based on her allegation that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with section 50(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

ANALYSIS

Has the appellant established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship?

5I find that the appellant has not established exceptional hardship under the Act and the appeal must be dismissed as a result.

6The burden is on the appellant to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as defined in the Act and regulations.

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

8Section 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

“…the owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.”

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will be dismissed.

10If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then s. 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to s. 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses. The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

11The appellant’s submission for exceptional hardship focuses on her lack of access to a vehicle for personal use and, therefore, the impact of the impoundment on her ability to transport the driver’s mother, referred to herein as DH. The appellant testifies that DH has significant health issues that impact DH’s mobility, ability to communicate and to travel independently, and that DH is dependent on the appellant to transport her to weekly medical appointments.

12The appellant acknowledges that grocery stores, pharmacies etc. are in close proximity and that, since the impoundment, she has managed without a vehicle for her own and her daughter’s needs by using public transit and walking.

13The appellant testifies that she is able to walk to DH’s home and to accompany the appellant’s daughter to school but that she cannot provide for the needs of DH without a vehicle. She testifies that DH attends two to three appointments weekly for blood pressure measurement, bloodwork, and physiotherapy across from Michael Garron Hospital and that the appellant is the only person available to assist DH. She testifies that DH has not attended her medical appointments since the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle. The appellant also testifies that DH must pick up prescriptions in person because DH’s pharmacy will not deliver them. She further testifies she does not have friends or a family member from whom she can borrow a car and that DH does not have other family members or friends who can assist her.

14The appellant states that she has not inquired into visiting health care services for DH’s bloodwork and blood pressure or whether DH could move her prescriptions to another pharmacy that would deliver DH’s medications. The appellant estimated that it is about a 20-minute drive from DH’s home to her medical appointments. I note that the location information the appellant provided indicates that the distance is less than 3 km.

15The appellant testifies that DH is unable to use regular public transit because of her physical limitations and will not use other available options such as TTC Wheel-Trans because she finds them stressful. The appellant testifies that she considered renting a vehicle during the impoundment period but that the $600.00 - $800.00 cost is beyond her financial means and has not considered taxis for the same reason.

16The respondent submits that the appellant has not met her onus to show that no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available because she has access to public transit, taxis and ride-shares.

17The respondent submits that the impoundment is an inconvenience rather than a hardship. The respondent submits that the appellant is able to use public transit for her own needs and has not looked into other available options to support DH’s medical needs.

18The Act permits impacts of an impoundment such as economic loss/financial hardship to be considered only under limited circumstances and only if there is first a finding that no alternative vehicle is available.

19I have considered the submissions of both parties and find that the appellant has not met her onus to demonstrate that she considered and inquired into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

20I have heard the appellant’s testimony as to DH’s reluctance to avail herself of alternative options for getting to her medical appointments; however, I agree with the respondent that the appellant has been able to manage without a vehicle for her own needs and has a variety of options available that she has not considered or inquired about that would mitigate any impact on DH, such as visiting home health care workers and pharmacy delivery services.

21I find that the appellant lives in a densely populated urban area that is well serviced by public transit including TTC Wheel-Trans; taxis including accessible taxis, and ride-shares. I am not persuaded by the appellant’s submission that DH cannot use Wheel-Trans or taxis to attend her medical appointments. The cost for a 3 km trip by TTC Wheel-Trans or taxi is minimal. Both options would permit the appellant to accompany DH, mitigating any potential anxiety she might experience in navigating alternative transportation on her own.

22I find, therefore, that the appellant has not demonstrated that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period, under s.10(1) of the Regulation.

23As a result of the above finding, I find the appellant has failed to establish exceptional hardship as a ground for releasing the appellant’s vehicle under 50(3)(d) of the Act and the relevant regulation.

ORDER

24On the basis of the evidence presented at the hearing and the reasons set out above, the impoundment of the appellant’s vehicle is confirmed.

Jan Dymond

Vice-Chair