Bruner Legault v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 CanLII 20844

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 16734/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

Samantha Bruner Legault Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Samantha Bruner Legault, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Sadia Ashraf, Representative

HEARD: February 27, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Samantha Bruner Legault, appeals under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the "Act") from the 45-day impoundment of a 2006 Volkswagen motor vehicle (the "vehicle"). The vehicle was impounded on February 9, 2025. At the time it was detained in order to be impounded, her son Ayron Douglas Bruner-Legault was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to an ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction.

2There was information presented by the Registrar that the vehicle was also subject to a 90-day impoundment. However, the appellant stated that she was not appealing the 90-day impoundment and she did not submit a notice of appeal for the 90-day impoundment.

3The appellant appeals the 45-day impoundment on the grounds that she exercised due diligence and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

4The issues in dispute are:

i. Whether the appellant exercised due diligence in accordance with section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act.

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5I find the appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in accordance with section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act. I further find that the impoundment will not result in exceptional hardship under section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act. The impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

6The respondent presented uncontradicted evidence which establishes that:

i. the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle;

ii. on February 9, 2025, the police discovered the vehicle being driven by the appellant's son Ayron Douglas Bruner-Legault (the "driver"); and

iii. the licence of the driver was subject to an ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction at the time the police detained the vehicle for impoundment.

Whether the appellant exercised due diligence in accordance with the Act

7The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver was not subject to an ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded. I find that the appellant has not met her burden.

8This ground of appeal requires the vehicle owner to show on a balance of probabilities that she took reasonable steps to determine that the driver's licence was not subject to an ignition interlock condition. In this context, due diligence requires more than making assumptions as to the facts. It requires specific steps to be taken by the owner to confirm that the licence was not subject to an ignition interlock condition. The specific steps that amount to due diligence depend on the circumstances of each case. Reasonable care does not mean perfection. The Tribunal has previously held that these steps or actions could include examining the driver's licence card or document, viewing Ministry of Transportation Ontario ("MTO") documents that pertain to the driver's licence status, inquiring of the MTO online or at Service Ontario as to the driver's licence status, or discussing the licence status in conversation with the driver. These various steps or actions are not an exhaustive list. The level of inquiry and action required can depend on the nature of the relationship between the owner and the driver.

9I find the appellant did not take reasonable steps to confirm that the driver's licence of the driver was not subject to an ignition interlock condition as result of a Criminal Code conviction at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded.

10The appellant testified that she lent the vehicle to the driver so that he could use it for work purposes. She testified that she knew the driver had a Criminal Code conviction for refusal to take a breathalyzer test but she did not know that he was subject to an ignition interlock condition at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded. Instead, she understood that the ignition interlock condition no longer applied to him as he had completed the necessary steps in order to have the condition removed from his driver's licence. She testified she was surprised to learn that he was still subject to the condition.

11The appellant testified that she did not ask to physically inspect the licence of the driver. She testified that he sent her a picture of his driver's licence that she forwarded to her insurance broker to arrange a car insurance policy for him. She testified that she looked at the picture of the licence quickly to ensure it was a clear picture, and did not examine the licence to determine whether a condition was listed. She also did not make any inquires of the MTO or Service Ontario to ascertain the licence status of the driver or any conditions on the licence. Instead, she presumed because the insurance company arranged a car insurance policy for the driver and his licence did not expire until 2026, he must be permitted to drive without an ignition interlock.

12I find the testimony of the appellant establishes she took no reasonable steps to determine that the driver's licence of the driver was not subject to an ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction. She was aware of driver's Criminal Code conviction. However, she assumed the driver had driving privileges without any conditions as she believed he had completed the steps needed to have the ignition interlock condition removed from his licence, and he had arranged car insurance for himself. However, she did not ask to view any paperwork that would demonstrate the driver was not subject to an ignition interlock condition, and that he had completed the necessary steps required of him.

13In addition, the appellant did not check his licence status with the MTO or Service Ontario, which she could have done. She did not ask to view the physical driver's licence and examine if a condition was listed. She also did not examine the picture of the driver's licence the driver sent her to determine if a condition was listed.

14As noted above, this ground of appeal requires the vehicle owner to demonstrate the exercise of due diligence by showing she took reasonable steps to determine that the driver's licence of the driver was not subject to an ignition interlock condition. In my view, due diligence required the appellant, who was aware of her son's prior conviction, to do more than she did, and I find that she did not take reasonable steps. The appellant has therefore not met her burden.

15Given the evidence before the Tribunal, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant did not exercise due diligence under the Act to determine that the driver's licence of the driver was not subject to an ignition interlock condition as a result of a Criminal Code conviction at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded.

Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship

16The burden is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship as it is defined in the Act and regulations. I find the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and she has not met her burden.

17Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the "Regulation") sets out the criteria and factors that the Tribunal must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment.

18Subsection 10(1) requires the Tribunal to first consider whether an alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

19If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act will fail.

20If the owner proves that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle available, then subsection 10(1) of the Regulation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle, or to the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. According to subsection 10(3), if the appellant has proven that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle the Tribunal may, in limited circumstances, consider financial, economic, or employment losses.

21The Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

22The Registrar presented evidence that the appellant has an alternative vehicle registered to her name, namely a 2016 Hyundai motor vehicle (the "Hyundai vehicle"). The appellant testified that, just prior to the impoundment, the Hyundai vehicle was taken to the Hyundai dealership for repair given a recall notice. She testified that she expects to have access to the Hyundai vehicle in about two weeks' time.

23The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, she has been walking to work or getting a ride from a coworker. Her work place is located a few blocks from where she resides and it takes her about 30 minutes to walk to work. She testified that walking to and from work is not as convenient as driving as she has to carry her lunch with her. She testified that she is an addictions counsellor and her employment requires her to attend treatment providers such as the John Howard Society and a methadone clinic in the community. However, her employer has provided her with an accommodation given her lack of access to a vehicle and she no longer needs to travel for work purposes.

24The appellant testified that she has not used any ride share services or taxis as they are costly. Similarly, renting a vehicle for the impoundment period would be expense. She acknowledges that public transportation is available to her but testified that it is not dependable.

25The appellant resides with her husband and they have not missed any medical appointment since the impoundment. She testified her husband has a medical appointment scheduled during the impoundment period, and he will likely use an Uber or attend virtually. She testified that he may also use the Hyundai vehicle if repairs are completed by then.

26The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, she has used Instacart for grocery delivery and has had medications delivered by Shoppers Drug Mart.

27The appellant testified her mother is in the hospital and, since the impoundment, she has been unable to visit her as the cost of an Uber would be too high.

28I acknowledge the appellant's testimony that she has been experiencing inconvenience and financial difficulties since the impoundment of the vehicle. However, I find the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I note that, since the impoundment, she has gotten assistance from a coworker with transportation to and from work, and she has walked to work. Her employer has made an accommodation for her and she does not need to travel for work purposes. She also has her groceries and medications delivered to her home. Her husband and her have not missed any medical appointments, and she testified that her husband will attend his upcoming medical appointment by Uber, or the Hyundai vehicle, or virtually.

29In addition, I note the appellant expects to have access to her alternative vehicle in about two weeks time.

30I find the appellant has not proven that there are no alternatives to the impounded vehicle available and her appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail as a result. I therefore need not make determinations with respect to the remaining components of the exceptional hardship test.

31Under the circumstances, I find the appellant has not proven exceptional hardship and the appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act must fail.

ORDER

32Pursuant to subsection 50.2(5) of the Act, the impoundment of the appellant's vehicle is confirmed.