RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before:
Tanjoyt Deol
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:
22-005181/AABS
Case Name:
Michelle Foster v. Co-operators General Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant:
Maia Bent, Counsel
Stephanie C. Coppens, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Emily Schatzker, Counsel
Kara T. Ramnaraine, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On October 17, 2024, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated September 26, 2024 (“decision”).
2In the decision, I found that the applicant was entitled to the treatment plan (“OCF-18”) for social work services and to the expenses’ claim forms (“OCF-6s”) for cannabis. I also found that the applicant was not entitled to the OCF-18s for Case Management Services, a Cefaly Device, and vestibular physiotherapy.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant is seeking a reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(b). The applicant submits that the decision should be varied that she is entitled to the OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment.
5The respondent argues that the applicant has not met her onus, as she has not established an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would have reached a different result had the error not been made. Thus, it submits that the request for reconsideration should be dismissed.
RESULT
6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is granted. Pursuant to Rule 18.4, I vary the decision to find that the applicant is partially entitled to the September 19, 2022 OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment in the amount of $2,697.28. The applicant is also entitled to interest for this OCF-18 in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule.
ANALYSIS
7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
I erred regarding my application of the doctrine of res judicata and I would have likely reached a different result if this error had not been made
8I find that I made an error of law and fact in the decision as I applied the incorrect legal test for res judicata and I did not provide a thorough analysis of whether the same issue was being decided. In essence, I erred in determining that res judicata was applicable to the OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment. I agree with the applicant that if this error had not been made, I would have likely reached a different result. As such, I find that the applicant has established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b).
9The applicant argues that I erred in my conclusion that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment. She argues that at paragraph 25 of the decision, I applied the wrong legal test despite citing the authority of Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 SCR 460 (“Danyluk”). She argues that while I cited the authority of Danyluk, I stated that there were four pre-conditions that needed to be met for the doctrine of res judicata to apply. Meanwhile, the applicant argues that in Danyluk, at paragraph 25, the Supreme Court of Canada held that there were three preconditions that needed to be met for res judicata, and I did not consider the first pre-condition, which is whether the same question has been decided (i.e., the same issue).
10The respondent argues that the four pre-conditions as outlined in the decision at paragraph 25 were articulated by Adjudicator Mather in 16-003909 v. Aviva Insurance Canada, 2017 CanLII 59502 (ON LAT) at para 15. It argues that these four pre-conditions have been relied upon in numerous decisions by the Tribunal and provided some examples such as: Amalathasan v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company, 2023 CanLII 17707 (ON LAT); Handy v. Aviva General Insurance Company, 2023 CanLII 81811 (ON LAT); Reynolds-Gosling v. Aviva General Insurance, 2023 CanLII 67892 (ON LAT) (“Reynolds-Gosling); and Rattan v. Aviva Insurance Company, 2020 CanLII 103677 (ON LAT)(“Rattan”). It argues that while previous Tribunal decisions are not binding, it is widely accepted that the Tribunal is entitled to rely on its own decisions, including the generally accepted criteria for res judicata.
11I agree with the applicant that I made an error of law at paragraph 25 of the decision because I outlined the incorrect legal test for the doctrine of res judicata. Indeed, at paragraph 25 of the decision, I cited paragraph 18 of Danyluk and noted that the following pre-conditions had to be met to apply res judicata:
i. The parties must be the same in both actions;
ii. The prior claim must be within the jurisdiction of the Court/Tribunal;
iii. The prior adjudication must have been on the merits; and
iv. The prior decision must have been a final judgement.
12It is clear that I intended to rely upon the pre-conditions listed in the authority of Danyluk, as the authority and paragraph 18 was cited. However, paragraph 18 of Danyluk, does not outline these four pre-conditions, and the relevant paragraph that sets out the pre-conditions for the doctrine of res judicata is paragraph 25. At paragraph 25, the court determined that there were three pre-conditions for issue estoppel (a branch of res judicata) which are as follows:
i. That the same question has been decided;
ii. That the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and,
iii. That the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies.
13In Toronto (City) v. CUPE Local 79, 2003 SCC 63,, [2003] 3 SCR 77 (“CUPE Local”) the Supreme Court of Canada at paragraph 23 noted:
Issue estoppel is a branch of res judicata (the other branch being cause of action estoppel), which precludes the relitigation of issues previously decided in court in another proceeding. For issue estoppel to be successfully invoked, three preconditions must be met: (1) the issue must be the same as the one decided in the prior decision; (2) the prior judicial decision must have been final; and (3) the parties to both proceedings must be the same, or their privies (Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, 2001 SCC 44, at para. 25, per Binnie J.)…
14I acknowledge the respondent’s argument that the same pre-conditions as outlined at paragraph 25 of the decision have been used in numerous other Tribunal decisions. However, I am not bound by other Tribunal decisions but I am bound by the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Danyluk and CUPE Local. Following these decisions, I committed an error of law and fact because my decision provided a limited analysis on whether the same issue had been already decided in the prior decision of the Tribunal (the first pre-condition that needs to be met).
15Notably, the only discussion of this pre-condition was made briefly at the top of paragraphs 23 and 25 of the decision, where I noted that the respondent argued that a previous decision from the Tribunal determined that an identical treatment plan was not reasonable and necessary and that the doctrine of res judicata prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has already been decided. Critically, at paragraph 26 of the decision, where I made the finding that the doctrine of res judicata applied to the OCF-18 for vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment, there was no discussion of whether the issue in question was the same as the previous application before the Tribunal. Nor, did my decision address what the previous decision from the Tribunal had determined. Thus, I committed an error of law and fact because I provided a limited rationale on why the same issue in question had already been decided by the previous decision by the Tribunal.
16The respondent also argues that since the OCF-18 in the decision reported at Foster v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2021 CanLII 134960 (ON LAT) (“Previous Decision”), and this decision have the same amount, type of treatment and treatment provider, this equates to a determination that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable. However, I disagree because the Schedule allows for future treatment plans to be submitted, and the respondent has an ongoing duty to adjust the file. Moreover, I also agree with the applicant that my finding of the doctrine of res judicata being applicable to a previous treatment plan would lead to an absurd result because if a prior denial is res judicata on a future claim for benefits, then a prior approval would also be as well. On this reasoning, res judicata would also apply to a prior Tribunal decision approving benefits and prohibit the insurer from denying such benefits in the future. In my view, this is not the intention of the Schedule or the doctrine of res judicata.
17I also disagree with the respondent’s argument that the Tribunal can rely upon its own criteria for res judicata, because the Tribunal is bound by the Supreme Court of Canada and, therefore, must apply the pre-conditions as set out in Danyluk and CUPE Local. This is because the Tribunal does not have the authority or jurisdiction to override binding authorities from the Court. To do so would be an error of law. Thus, the applicant is correct that I applied the wrong legal test for res judicata and did not fully consider whether the first pre-condition had been met.
18I also find that I would have likely reached a different result if this error had not been made because I find that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to this OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment. The Tribunal determined in its Previous Decision that an OCF-18 for vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and home-based services in the amount of $3,791.00 was not reasonable and necessary. In the matter before me, the OCF-18 also pertains to a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular treatment sessions which will be provided in the applicant’s home. However, I find that the issue to be decided is different because these are two different treatment plans with two different denials and two different submission dates.
19I concur with Adjudicator Adamidis in Dahi v. Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company, 2023 CanLII 32797 (ON LAT) that bringing forward the same type of treatment plans does not constitute res judicata. In my view, this is because the Schedule provides for ongoing medical and rehabilitation benefits and there is no limit on the number of OCF-18s that can be submitted for such benefits.
20The respondent cites the Tribunal decisions of Reynolds-Gosling and Rattan to support its argument that the OCF-18 in this application is subject to res judicata. I am not bound by Reynolds-Gosling, and I note that the Tribunal in that decision did not provide reasoning on why the same issue had been decided previously. In a similar vein, the factual matrix in Rattan is distinguishable from the matter before me. In Rattan, the Tribunal determined that res judicata was applicable for OCF-18s for physiotherapy treatment and chronic pain treatment because the Tribunal determined previously that the applicant had substantially recovered from his accident-related injuries. The Tribunal also previously determined that the applicant did not have chronic pain syndrome.
21Here in the matter before me, the Tribunal in the Previous Decision at paragraph 117 determined that the applicant’s injuries did not require further physical therapy until her psychological symptoms had been fully investigated. In the decision, I noted at paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 14 that the applicant was receiving treatment from her psychologist, Dr. Heather Bromley Little, and that there was no disagreement between the parties that the applicant sustained a psychological impairment, as it was supported by the reports of Dr. Little and Dr. Ivan Kiss, neuropsychologist. In other words, following the Previous Decision, the applicant had her psychological symptoms fully investigated because both Dr. Little and Dr. Kiss diagnosed her with psychological impairments and she underwent treatment. Unlike, Rattan, the Tribunal in the Previous Decision did not make any findings of fact which would result in inconsistent findings. Rather, the Tribunal determined that the applicant’s injuries did not require further physical therapy until her psychological symptoms had been fully investigated, which she has done since that time.
22The applicant also made arguments that I did not correctly determine that the new evidence does not impeach the original results. However, based on my findings above, I find that this issue is moot because I have determined that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to this OCF-18. Therefore, the three-part test under CUPE Local is not engaged.
23In conclusion, I made an error and that I would have likely reached a different result of the decision if I had not made this error. As such, I find the applicant has established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b).
Rule 18.4 – Outcome of reconsideration
24Rule 18.4 provides that upon reconsidering a decision of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may dismiss the request, or, after providing the responding parties with an opportunity to make submissions, confirm, vary, or cancel the decision or order, or order a rehearing on all or part of the matter. Having found that the applicant has established grounds for reconsideration, I will now turn to the outcome.
25For the reasons that follow below, I vary the decision and find that the applicant is partially entitled to the OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment. The applicant is also entitled to interest for this OCF-18 in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule.
OCF-18 for Vestibular Physiotherapy Re-Assessment and Vestibular Physiotherapy Treatment
26I find that the applicant has established that the OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment is partially reasonable and necessary in the amount of $2,697.28. The applicant is also entitled to interest for this OCF-18 in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule.
27The OCF-18 in dispute pertains to: a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment to address issues of dizziness, imbalance, and pain; a report, time to develop a home program and communicate with medical team; eight vestibular treatment sessions; and travel costs. The goals are: pain reduction, increased range of motion, increased strength, and for the applicant to return to her activities of normal living.
28The applicant argues that the OCF-18 was submitted following the recommendation of the applicant’s family physician, Dr. Laurie Anne Komorowski, and that the re-assessment will allow Ms. Lisa Souliere (physiotherapist and certified vestibular therapist) to direct her treatment appropriately. She further argues that Dr. Keith Sequeira (physiatrist), Dr. Erin Warriner (psychologist), and Dr. Paul E. Cooper (neurologist), have opined that the applicant has significant concussion/mild traumatic brain injury as a result of the accident. The applicant further argues that it is well-documented that she suffers from debilitating post-concussive symptoms including post-traumatic headaches, nausea, and dizziness, and that Dr. Warriner and Dr. Komorowski have recommended vestibular physiotherapy treatment.
29To this end, the applicant relies upon the referral for physiotherapy by Dr. Komorowski, dated August 4, 2022, and the physiotherapy vestibular assessment report completed by Ms. Souliere, dated June 26, 2018, physiatry assessment report by Dr. Sequeira, dated December 10, 2021, medical-legal neuropsychological assessment by Dr. Warriner, dated January 29, 2022, and neurology assessment report by Dr. Cooper, dated May 16, 2022.
30The respondent argues that s. 44 assessor, Dr. Mohamed Khaled (family physician) determined that no further such treatment was required, and s. 44 assessor, Dr. T. Levy (physician) recommended an interdisciplinary pain management program, with a goal of the applicant being able to live independently with her condition. It further argues that Dr. Khaled, Dr. Kiss, and Dr. Dimitrios Dimitriakoudis, (neurologist) have all concluded that the applicant is overtreating.
31The respondent also made arguments with respect to s. 38(2) of the Schedule. Pursuant to s. 38(2) of the Schedule, the respondent is not liable to pay an expense in respect to a medical benefit that was incurred before the insured person submits a compliant treatment and assessment plan unless:
a. The insurer gives the insured person a notice under subsection 39(1) stating that the insurer will pay the expense without a treatment and assessment plan;
b. The expense is for an ambulance or other goods or services provided on an emergency basis not more than five business days after the accident to which the application relates;
c. The expense is reasonable and necessary as a result of the impairment sustained by the insured person for,
i. drugs prescribed by a regulated health professional, or
ii. goods referred to in clauses 15(1)(d) to (f) and 16(3)(h) to (j) with a cost of $250 or less per item; or
d. The insurer agrees that the expense is essential for the treatment or rehabilitation of the insured person for goods or services referred to in clause 15(1)(h) or 16(3)(l) with a cost of $250 or less per item or service, as the case may be.
32The respondent at first instance argued that the proposed treatment plan was submitted on September 19, 2022. It further argued that the applicant submitted an Auto Insurance Standard Invoice (“OCF-21”) on September 30, 2022, which indicates that the applicant incurred $893.76 in total for treatment sessions and work completed from March 22, 25, 29 and April 5, 2021. As a result, it argues that under s. 38(2) it is not liable to pay for treatment that was incurred a year before the submission of the OCF-18.
33The applicant did not provide any submissions at first instance or in her reconsideration submissions to address s. 38(2).
34I find that the applicant is not entitled to the cost of vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment because it was fully incurred before the treatment plan was submitted to the respondent. Indeed, the treatment plan was submitted on September 19, 2022, and the OCF-21 shows that the cost of the assessment was fully incurred on March 22, 2021 in the amount of $199.50, more than a year before the OCF-18 was submitted.
35I also find that none of the exceptions listed in s. 38(2) apply because the respondent did not give notice that it would pay for the assessment without a treatment plan, and these services were provided more than five days following the accident. Moreover, this assessment is not a drug, prescription eyewear, denture, other dental devices, hearing aid, wheelchair or other mobility device, prostheses, orthotics, other assistive devices, workplace modification/workplace device, home modification/device, and vehicle modification. Nor, has the respondent agreed that these services are essential for the applicant’s treatment or rehabilitation.
36Likewise, I find that the applicant is not entitled to $694.26 which as noted by the OCF-21 was incurred partially for preparing the report, some travel costs, and some of the vestibular physiotherapy treatment sessions because these were all incurred before the treatment plan was submitted. As noted above, none of the exceptions under s. 38(2) are applicable.
37In short, the applicant is not entitled to $199.50 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment, $49.88 for planning, service costs, $399.00 for travel costs, and $245.38 for vestibular physiotherapy treatment (for a total amount of $893.76) which were incurred before submitting the disputed OCF-18.
38I find that the applicant has established on a balance of probabilities that the remaining cost of the proposed vestibular physiotherapy treatment is reasonable and necessary.
39The evidence before me demonstrates that the applicant sustained a concussion/mild traumatic brain injury. This is because the applicant has been diagnosed with a concussion/mild traumatic brain injury not only by Dr. Sequeria, Dr. Warriner, and Dr. Cooper but also by the s. 44 assessors, Dr. Khaled, and Dr. Kiss. Dr. Dimitriakoudis also concluded that the applicant had a degree of a post-concussion syndrome. The applicant has also consistently reported to Dr. Komorowski, Ms. Souliere, Dr. Sequeria, Dr. Warriner, Dr. Cooper, Dr. Khaled, Dr. Dimitriakoudis, and Dr. Kiss of ongoing headaches, issues with bright lighting, nausea, balance issues, visual tracking/processing issues, and dizziness from March 26, 2018 to May 16, 2022. As noted by Ms. Souliere, the purpose of the vestibular physiotherapy is to treat the applicant’s balance and dizziness issues. Therefore, the fact that the applicant has been diagnosed with a neurological impairment, and consistently reported of cognitive and vestibular impairments, including balance and dizziness issues, demonstrates that the proposed treatment is reasonable and necessary.
40The proposed vestibular physiotherapy has also been recommended by the applicant’s family physician, Dr. Komorowski and Dr. Warriner. On August 4, 2022, Dr. Komorowski noted that the applicant requires vestibular physiotherapy for ongoing vertigo issues related to a head injury. I place significant weight on this recommendation by the family physician because she has the most intimate knowledge of the applicant’s treatment needs. Likewise, on January 29, 2022, Dr. Warriner concluded that given the applicant’s ongoing visual tracking/processing inefficiency and associated head/eye pain pressure, and nausea, further vestibular and ocular-motor investigations, and treatment would be indicated. I am persuaded by Dr. Warriner’s opinion because he conducted testing which showed that the applicant had visual tracking/processing inefficiency, and his conclusion is collaborated by the applicant’s ongoing complaints as noted above.
41The respondent argues that neither Dr. Komorowski nor Dr. Warriner have addressed the fact that the applicant underwent years of rehabilitation treatment, including vestibular therapy, without significant improvement. The respondent does not refer me to evidence to support this argument. In any event, I disagree with the respondent’s position because it is well-settled that treatment Is reasonable and necessary if it results in the temporary relief of pain or restores an individual’s function. Here, Ms. Souliere, the applicant’s treating vestibular physiotherapist on June 26, 2018, noted that the applicant initially had very low stamina for any type of exercise, including walking, balance training or vertiginous/visual therapy. However, over time the applicant’s tolerance for this type of rehabilitation had slowly improved. It was also noted that for the applicant’s outdoor walking program, she had progressed with her balance retraining exercises. Therefore, there is evidence before me from a treating practitioner that shows that the applicant received benefit from the previous treatment.
42Finally, I find that the s. 44 reports of Drs. Khaled, Kiss and Dimitriakoudis, are of little evidentiary value for the following reasons.
43I acknowledge the respondent’s argument that Dr. Khaled concluded that no further such treatment was required. I disagree. Dr. Khaled concluded that the applicant sustained uncomplicated soft tissue injuries and that from a physical medicine perspective, in relation to her soft tissue injuries, no further facility treatment was required. However, the treatment before me is for vestibular physiotherapy which largely addresses the applicant’s vestibular impairments, arising from her brain injury. Significantly, Dr. Khaled concluded that the applicant sustained “no more than a mild traumatic brain injury”. He then concluded that his physical examination demonstrated no ongoing neurological impairment, but notably he did not conduct any neurological testing for the physical examination portion of the assessment. Therefore, it is unclear to me how Dr. Khaled concluded that the applicant has no ongoing neurological impairment when he conducted no neurological testing, the applicant requested that the lights be turned off during the assessment, and reported ongoing headaches, confusion, difficulty focusing, poor memory, and significant cognitive dysfunction.
44I also acknowledge that a portion of the vestibular physiotherapy sessions is to address the applicant’s pain. Critically, the respondent’s own s. 44 assessor, Dr. Levy has concluded that the applicant has a chronic pain disorder, and an interdisciplinary pain management program is recommended, which would include treatment from a physiotherapist, which Ms. Souliere is qualified as.
45I am alive to the respondent’s argument that Dr. Levy proposed an interdisciplinary pain management program over 6-8 weeks, 5 to 6 hours a day with the goal of the applicant becoming independent and learning to live with her condition. However, the applicant is not pursuing infinite vestibular physiotherapy but rather she is seeking funding for eight treatment sessions which are an hour and half long per session, which is a total of 12 hours. I find that this is consistent with Dr. Levy’s recommendation that the applicant receive treatment from a variety of specialists, including a physiotherapist, which is Ms. Souliere, because it fits within his proposed timeline of 6-8 weeks, for 5-6 hours a day, which accumulates to a maximum of 336 hours. Here, the applicant is seeking vestibular physiotherapy for a faction of the time recommended by Dr. Levy.
46Moreover, while Dr. Levy noted the usual goals of the program which were to increase the patient’s function and to teach them to safely engage in activities despite their pain, he did not provide an opinion of whether these goals will be met for the applicant’s case after six-eight weeks. Respectfully, he could not provide such an opinion, as this would be dependant on the progress that the applicant made with various specialists, including a physiotherapist.
47Finally, I place little weight on the conclusions of Drs. Khaled, Kiss and Dimitriakoudis that the applicant is overtreating and that her residual impairments are primarily psychological. First, Dr. Khaled generally remarked that there is evidence that prolonged facility based rehab therapies can contribute to a prolongation of symptoms, but he made no comment on whether this was the case for the applicant, and if so, why. Moreover, Dr. Khaled provided no rationale on why the applicant’s symptoms were significantly affected by psychological conditions only when he diagnosed her with “no more than a mild traumatic brain injury” and the applicant reported neurocognitive symptoms as indicated above. I also place limited weight on Dr. Khaled’s opinion because his report was completed in 2019, which was before the applicant was receiving psychological treatment.
48Likewise, Dr. Kiss concluded that there was a strong possibility of iatrogenic influence in the persistence of symptoms, but provided no specifics on how the applicant has been overtreated for vestibular physiotherapy.
49In a subsequent report, Dr. Kiss concluded that the applicant’s current difficulties were primarily psychological and that her psychological conditions should be treated before other treatments are considered. Significantly, the applicant has been receiving psychological treatment from Dr. Little since early 2021, and has been diagnosed with psychological impairments by both Dr. Little and Dr. Kiss. Therefore, Dr. Kiss’s conclusion that other treatment should not be considered until her psychological conditions are treated is moot because the applicant has already been receiving treatment since 2021 and still reported cognitive and vestibular issues as outlined above to Drs. Sequeria, Warriner, Cooper, and her family physician.
50In a similar vein, Dr. Dimitrakoudis concluded that there was a possibility of some iatrogenic effect and it is quite common for patients to be overtreated, but he did not provide opinion of whether this was the case with the applicant, and if so why.
51As the respondent has not raised issues with the proposed costs associated with the remaining vestibular physiotherapy treatment, the report preparation, time to develop a home program and communicate with medical team, and travel time. I have no reason to think that the costs associated with the treatment are unreasonable.
52In conclusion, I find that the OCF-18 for a vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular treatment is partially reasonable and necessary in the amount of $2,697.28.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
53The applicant’s request for reconsideration is granted.
54Pursuant to Rule 18.4, I vary the decision to find that the applicant is partially entitled to the OCF-18 for vestibular physiotherapy re-assessment and vestibular physiotherapy treatment in the amount of $2,697.28. The applicant is also entitled to interest for this OCF-18 in accordance with s. 51 of the Schedule.
Tanjoyt Deol
Adjudicator
Tribunals Ontario – Licence Appeal Tribunal
Released: March 3, 2025